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ABSTRACT
Following humanitarian, social justice, and labor organizing traditions that readily
incorporate Latino immigrants’ voices into their work, and drawing upon postmodern,
feminist, and activist schools of thought, this study illuminates the history of immigration
policy and discourse in America and the Latino community’s knowledge and expertise
about life as an undocumented Latino immigrant in Southeast Michigan. The
development of increasingly restrictive immigration policies is traced, paying special
attention to the adaptation of a criminal justice/enforcement models to the realm of
immigration control and the concurrent criminalization of undocumented immigrants.
The effects of current immigration and immigrant-specific policies on criminal offenses
committed by, with, and against Latin American immigrants are explored. Offenses are
examined using a status-driven offense typology. Ultimately, it is argued that current
immigration and immigrant-specific policies are criminogenic and must be reformed if
the United States desires to reduce status-driven offending and victimization.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
U.S. immigration policy is complicated. It involves political and ideological divides,
countless interest groups, and ever-changing laws that even immigration lawyers struggle to
keep up with. Of course, this is all rather obvious, yet it is still worth emphasizing as the
numerous complexities of immigration are often left out of media and policy debates. Also
absent from mainstream immigration conversations is the criminalization of immigrants, a
trend that has dominated immigration policy since the 1980s. This trend is twofold and
includes (1) the securitization and militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border and increasing
interior enforcement, and (2) the incorporation of criminal justice/enforcement models into
the framework of U.S. immigration and immigrant-specific policy. Treating immigrants as
criminals has serious consequences from both a legal and social standpoint. Legally,
immigrants are constrained by the framework of immigration policy and operate within a
second-class status. Socially, the criminalization of immigrants influences how
nonimmigrants interact with immigrants, as well as how immigrants interact with each other.
Overall, the criminalization of immigrants perpetuates the “criminal alien” narrative and
greatly influences immigrants’ daily lives, both encouraging and facilitating criminal activity.
Although immigration legislation does not explicitly single out specific immigrant
groups, this criminalization takes an especially heavy toll on Latino immigrants. First, many
of these policies are spatially-centered at the U.S.-Mexico border. Increased militarization of
the southern border as compared with a near-complete lack of security/enforcement on the
U.S.-Canada border implies a clear anti-Mexican or anti-Latin American bias. Other polices
indirectly target Latino immigrants vis a vis their implementation. The prevalence of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement raids on businesses employing large numbers of

Latino workers, several Supreme Court rulings upholding the validity of highway
checkpoints targeting drivers and passengers that appear “Mexican,” and the fact that
Latinos—especially Mexicans—make up a disproportionate percentage of ICE detentions
and deportations is a testament to this (Bacon 2008; Hing 2004; Schrag 2010; United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2004; Office of Immigration Statistics 2010).
While the singling out of specific immigrant groups is nothing new, Latin American
immigrants, and especially Mexicans, have experienced severe discrimination for more than
a century and have born the brunt of criminal stereotyping since the 1930s (Schrag 2010). It
was at this point that news media, politicians, and the nearly-defunct federal Bureau of
Narcotics used sensationalized images and testimony about marijuana-crazed Mexican
criminals to pass the Marijuana Tax Act, making marijuana illegal (Op. cit.). This image was
layered upon the already tarnished reputation of Mexicans, who had typically been thought of
as extraordinarily violent in light of the rather bloody Mexican Revolution two decades
earlier. To this day Mexicans and many other Latinos have been unable to shake such
unfounded stereotypes.
In his groundbreaking study of Latino violence, Latino Homicide: Immigration,
Violence, and Community, Ramiro Martinez Jr. argues that the most prevalent image of
Mexicans in popular culture has consistently been that of the violent bandit or “bandito,”
later represented as the “criminally inclined [x] zoot-suit-wearing gang member” and most
recently (re)presented as the young gangbanger (2002). Citing authors such as Diego Castro
and Alberto Mata, who have also examined the criminal Latino myth, Martinez emphasizes
that popular media has solidified the image of the violent Latino in Americans’ minds. For
example, Martinez highlights films such as Scarface, Colors, American Me, Carlito’s Way,
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and Traffic as just several media portrayals of the “criminally inclined” Latino. Nearly ten
years later, his argument still holds. The list of movies and television shows with plot lines
that center around the tatted-up Mexican gangbanger or the Colombian drug lord with a thick
Spanish accent has only grown. This is especially true of popular action films and shows set
in Miami, such as 2 Fast 2 Furious (2003), Bad Boys II (2003), Miami Vice (2006), CSI
Miami (2002-present), Burn Notice (2007-present), and Nip/Tuck (2003-2006), all of which
have had plot lines with prominent Latino villains.
To no one’s surprise, the image of the criminal Latino dominates much of the current
immigration discourse and is inextricably linked to conceptions and misconceptions about
unauthorized immigration and crime. As Rumbaut points out, “the perception that foreignborn, especially ‘illegal aliens,’ are responsible for higher crime rates is deeply rooted in
American public opinion and is sustained by media anecdote and popular myth” (2008:1).
Anti-immigrant proponents often credit floods of undocumented Mexicans with increasing
U.S. crime rates despite the fact that crime has been declining in the United States since the
‘90s. This notion is further exacerbated by movies, television, and media coverage of
singular events that depict immigrant communities as plagued by criminal elements
(Rumbaut 2008). Furthermore, Ngai points out that “Mexicans [have] emerged as iconic
illegal aliens,” and that “illegal status [has become] constitutive of a racialized Mexican
identity and of Mexicans' exclusion from the national community and polity” (Ngai 2003).
Along these lines, any and all Spanish-speaking immigrants are often lumped together as
“Mexicans,” “wetbacks,” or “illegals” and are presumed to engage in a vast assortment of
crime.
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Yet is this image valid? Furthermore, is the criminalization of immigrants—
specifically Latin American immigrants—justified? In other words, are Latino immigrants
simply crime prone? Should they be treated like criminals and kept out of or removed from
the United States whenever possible? Existing research does not support this conclusion.
The authors of historical works on immigrants and crime have often hypothesized all
the reasons why immigrants should be more crime-prone than native-born folks. Many have
argued that factors associated with crime, like acculturation stress, community
disorganization, poverty, a high concentration of young males, and group conflict are
extremely prevalent among immigrant communities and would be suggestive of high crime
rates. For instance, Thorsten Sellin (1938) and Edwin Sutherland (1947) both made the
claim that immigrant groups had “cultural predispositions” to certain types of crimes. Yet
despite claims of immigrants’ criminal inclination, a thorough examination of immigrant
offending paints a different picture. In fact, numerous studies documenting the relationship
between immigrants and crime have long shown that immigrants are not nearly as crimeprone as native-born Americans, and in some instances, may actually lower crime rates.
Beginning in the early 20th century, evidence began to surface that negated the
criminal immigrant myth. As early as 1901, the U.S. Industrial Commission reported
foreign-born whites to be less criminal than native-born whites (Tonry 1997:21). Ten years
later, the 1911 Immigration Commission not only found that rising immigration had not
increased U.S. crime rates, but also noted that immigrant presence may have suppressed
crime (Op. cit.). Subsequent studies throughout the 20th century have arrived at similar
conclusions.
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The National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement’s Report on Crime
and the Foreign Born, commonly referred to as the Wickersham Commission or Report, is
one of the most prominent early studies of immigration and crime. Published in 1931, the
report found no demonstrable link between immigrants and crime, noting that “in proportion
to their respective numbers, the foreign born commit considerably fewer crimes than the
native born” (1931:400). Furthermore, while it did find that some immigrant groups were
disproportionately involved in specific types of crime (perhaps lending support to the
aforementioned claims of both Sellin and Sutherland), the study showed that the overall
crime rates of Mexican immigrants were proportionate with their population size (Martinez
2002:23).
In Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas, Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay
came to a similar conclusion. In their study of Chicago delinquency, the pair noted that
foreign-born and natives, recent immigrant nationalities and older ones, exhibited similar
delinquency rates (Shaw & McKay 1969). They also found that certain areas had
consistently high rates of delinquency regardless of the immigrant group living there and that
as immigrants moved into “better” neighborhoods their delinquency rates fell (Op. cit.).
Overall this suggests that neighborhood characteristics, not immigrant composition, are
linked to crime.
More recent studies replicate such findings. For example, in “Cross-City Evidence on
the Relationship Between Immigration and Crime,” Kristen F. Butcher and Anne Morrison
Piehl lay out four avenues by which immigrants may impact the criminal justice system: 1)
immigrants may be more likely to commit crimes than natives or commit more costly crimes
than natives; 2) immigrants may negatively impact native’s opportunities by “taking jobs” or
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“overburdening” the welfare system, causing natives to commit more crimes; 3) immigrants
may be more likely to be apprehended than natives; and, 4) immigrants may serve longer
terms than natives. Exploring the first two possible impacts, the pair claimed that if either
were true, crime rates should be higher in areas with high immigration concentrations
controlling for all other factors.
Overall, Butcher and Piehl found that although cities with high crime rates have large
populations of immigrants, controlling for the demographic characteristics of the cities
reveals that immigrants have no effect on crime rates and that foreign-born youth are
significantly less likely than native-born youth to be criminally active (1998). In addition,
drawing on the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), the study also revealed that
immigrants are less likely than native-born youth to report engaging in criminal activity,
being stopped by the police, being arrested by the police, and being convicted of a crime—
and controlling for demographic characteristics only further reinforced this finding (Op. cit.).
Perhaps most interesting of all, Butcher and Piehl argued that immigration might actually
lower the rates of native-born victimization as “new immigrants have characteristics that
place them at high risk of victimization” and they quite possibly take the place of would-be
native-born victims (1998:497).
In accordance with Butcher and Piehl’s findings, James Climent notes that
immigration-related arrests, not arrests for property or violent offenses, dominate immigrant
interaction with the criminal justice system (2001). He cites Bureau of Justice Statistics data
that show that more than half of all noncitizen arrests from 1984-1994 were for immigration
offenses (2001:680). What is more, these same reports show that in 1994, only 1.4% of
noncitizen arrestees were charged with violent crimes, compared with 8.5% of citizens in
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federal court (Op. cit.). However, Climent does not neglect to include the criminal
underground of human smuggling from his analysis of immigration and crime, noting
immigrant involvement in organized crime and pointing out that a small number of
immigrants do extend organized crime networks from their native countries to the U.S. (Op.
cit.). He concludes by arguing that criminal activity is not unique to immigrants, but
emphasizes that immigration policies inextricably link immigration and crime by making
unauthorized immigration extremely profitable and by supplying an exploitable labor force to
the U.S (Op. cit.).
A 2008 study by the nonpartisan Public Policy Institute of California explored
immigrant impacts on the criminal justice system not addressed in the Butcher and Piehl
study. Researchers found that the national incarceration rate of native-born Americans was
813 for every 100,000, while the incarceration rate of the foreign-born was a mere 297 for
every 100,000 (Schrag 2010:196). Although incarceration rates are not necessarily indicative
of actual offense rates, the nearly 3:1 ratio of native to foreign-born incarceration supports
research that places immigrant offending at lower-than-native levels. A 2011 United States
Chamber of Commerce report came to similar conclusions, stressing that among young men,
incarceration rates are the lowest for immigrant men, “even for the Mexicans, Salvadorans,
and Guatemalans, who comprise the majority of the undocumented population” (U.S.
Chamber of Commerce 2011). Furthermore, the report noted that while America’s
immigrant population nearly doubled and the number of undocumented immigrants tripled
between 1990 and 2009, the national violent crime rate dropped by 41% and the property
crime rate nearly mirrored this drop at 40% (Op. cit.). Finally, the Chamber of Commerce
report emphasized that the 1994 U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform and a number of
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community-level studies in cities with large immigrant populations all came to this same
conclusion more than a decade earlier.
Ruben G. Rumbaut also arrived at similar conclusions in his in-depth look at
undocumented immigration and crime. Using FBI crime data as well as the National Crime
Victimization Survey, he found that during the ‘90s when America experienced
unprecedented rates of growth in both the Hispanic and undocumented immigrant
populations, U.S. crime rates fell significantly at the national level. This drop occurred most
notably within cities with high immigrant concentrations and large numbers of
undocumented immigrants (2008:7). Furthermore, he noted that although Mexican
immigrants display demographic characteristics similar to incarcerated Americans–
predominantly young, less educated and male—and thus would be expected to exhibit higher
rates of offending, they have among the lowest offense rates alongside Salvadorans and
Guatemalans (2008:8). Perhaps even more astonishing, Rumbaut found that native-born high
school graduates had a higher rate of incarceration than foreign-born non-high school
graduates (Op. cit.). This is a quite unusual finding considering that studies of U.S.
incarceration tend to find that education has a negative impact on incarceration, meaning that
the less educated have a higher chance of winding up in jail or prison. Finally, like many
researchers before him, Rumbaut emphasized that “Americanization,” or the assimilation of
second and third generation immigrants into American society, increases the risk of criminal
activity and involvement with the criminal justice system (see also: Martinez 2002). Hence it
is only when the criminal tendencies of American society are absorbed by the children of
immigrants that those with immigrant heritages begin to exhibit crime rates mirroring
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“Americans.’” Overall, Rumbaut’s work supports the claim that immigrants, including
Latino immigrants and the undocumented, are less crime-prone than native-born Americans.
Rumbaut’s findings are to be expected when one examines the literature on Latino
crime. There tends to be a general consensus among criminologists that Latino immigrants
have lower crime rates than the native-born folks and that overall Latino crime rates rank
between those of native whites and blacks. Many studies that have examined the Latinocrime relationship have focused on Latino homicide rates, as these tend to be indicative of
overall violent crime rates. Nearly all such studies have found Latino homicide rates to fall
between those of whites and blacks for more than half a century (Martinez 2002). For
example, using Houston homicide data from 1960, Alex D. Pokorny found both Latino
homicide victim and offender rates to be between native white and black rates, being twice
those of whites but a third less than blacks (1965). These findings were expanded by
Margaret Zahn in her 1987 examination of Anglo, Black, and Latino homicide in 9 major
U.S. cities. Overall, she, too, found that Latino victim and offender rates fell between those
of whites and blacks (Zahn 1987).
While it is common for Latino crime studies to focus on cities with large Latino
populations, Miami has been an especially popular comparison point when examining Latino
crime, homicide, and the impacts of immigration on crime. This makes sense as the city has
experienced several consecutive Latino immigrant waves–including a substantial number of
Cubans and Nicaraguans—and continues to be a magnet for Latino immigration to this day.
Overall, this research is in line with general findings on immigrants and crime.
In one study using Dade County data from 1980, William Wilbanks found that while
Latinos made up the majority of homicides in Miami, they were not overrepresented relative
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to population size (1984). Furthermore, he noted that Latino homicide rates fell between
those of native whites and blacks (Op. cit.). In line with Wilbanks’ research, a 1998 study of
the impacts of immigration on Miami homicides by Martinez and Lee found that by the mid1980s, Miami’s Latinos and Haitians were actually underrepresented in homicide relative to
group size and that, in some cases, they exhibited lower homicide rates than native-born
whites (1998). Another examination of Miami homicides by Martinez and Lee found that
Mariel Cubans–immigrants often credited in the media with increasing violent crime in
Miami—actually tended to have lower homicide rates than native whites, explicitly refuting
any stereotypes to the contrary (Martinez & Lee 2000).
More recently, researchers have begun comparing Latino crime across cities. Using
crime data from five cities with large populations of native-born and immigrant Latinos–
Chicago, El Paso, Houston, Miami, and San Diego—Martinez found that for all years
between 1980-1995, Latinos had consistently lower homicide rates than native-born blacks in
nearly all cases (2002). Furthermore, he revealed that recent immigration was unrelated to
Latino homicide in four of the five cities examined (Op. cit.). El Paso provided the only
exception, where to the surprise of many, recent immigration was actually associated with a
lowering of homicide rates (Op. cit.).
Several other studies examining Latino crime have exposed the impact of
neighborhood context on crime rates. For example, using data from 1979-1981, Rosenwaike
and Hempstead showed that while recent Puerto Rican immigrants in New York City had
high homicide rates, those living elsewhere had rates comparable to native whites (1990).
Similarly, in examining the impact of immigration on serious youth crime in three California
cities with large Latino populations, Alaniz, Cartmill, and Parker found that immigration was
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not related to youth violence, noting instead that the number of alcohol outlets in an area was
one of the largest contributors to crime (1998). Both studies suggest that neighborhood
characteristics—not immigrant composition—impact area crime levels.
Taking such findings a step further, Martinez has even made the claim that Latino
immigrant communities can and often do act as buffers against crime. He came to this
conclusion after finding that urban Latino immigrant communities have lower homicide rates
than urban black communities despite being equally impoverished (2002). In explaining this
phenomenon, Martinez highlights several points. First, Latinos are poor but working.
Moreover, despite finding work in predominantly low-paying service sector jobs, Latino
immigrants often view U.S. job opportunities as substantially better than those in their home
countries—a twist, he explains, on relative deprivation. Finally, many such jobs can be
found in ethnic enclave communities and serve to connect new immigrants to older
generations and native-born Latinos. In essence, new immigrants see themselves as much
better off in the United States and, through their daily link to older immigrant groups, remind
older folks how difficult life was and still is in their native lands. All in all, Martinez argues
that the relative social integration of Latino communities causes their homicide rates to be
lower than those of their black counterparts despite similar crime-inducing circumstances.
One notable exception to the general Latino immigrant-crime relationship is the
notorious Mara Salvatrucha gang, often referred to as MS-13. With roots in the barrios of
Los Angeles, this gang was originally made up of young male immigrants from El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras who had been brought to the United States—many illegally—by
their parents escaping civil war (Arana 2005). Over the years, MS-13 grew to include a large
number of first-generation Central Americans with similar family backgrounds as the gang’s
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founders (Op. cit.). The combination of “tough on crime” policies and gang crackdowns in
California with IIRIRA immigration reforms in 1996 led to the imprisonment and eventual
deportation of thousands of presumed MS-13 members over the past 15 years (Op. cit.).
Unfortunately, this actually strengthened the gang, and it developed powerful transnational
networks that control much of the human and drug smuggling from Central America into the
United States. Today, many deported gang members have returned to the United States
illegally, bringing with them numerous immigrant recruits and expanding MS-13’s network
to the East Coast (Op. cit.). MS-13 is currently believed to operate in at least 42 states, with
between 6 and 10 thousand members in Washington D.C. alone, and is one of the most
violent gangs in the U.S. (FBI 2008). A thorough analysis of MS-13 would ideally include
an examination of the effects of civil war on individual and group violence, an exploration of
and comparison with other Los Angeles and U.S. gangs, and a socio-historical understanding
of the political relationships between the United States and Central American nations;
however, this is far beyond the scope of this project.
Despite a few exceptions like MS-13, as Martinez succinctly sums up, “The major
finding of a century of research on immigration and crime is that while immigrants
occasionally displayed tremendous variations across time and place in their criminal
involvement, contrary to popular opinion they nearly always exhibit lower crime rates than
native groups” (2002:22). Furthermore, in many cases immigrants appear “more able to
withstand crime-facilitating conditions than native groups” (Martinez 2002:31). As we have
seen, this applies both to Latino immigrants and the undocumented. Yet the story of Latin
American immigrants’ experiences with the “illegal” cannot be simplified to this extent.
Latin American immigrants are neither sinners nor saints. Instead, like most people, they
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engage in networks and interactions that often blur the line between legal and illegal. Unlike
most people, however, immigrants’ experiences with the illegal are often driven by their
status as immigrants vis a vis the way the criminalization of immigrants shapes and
constrains their lives. More to the point, I argue that immigration and immigrant-specific
policies encourage and facilitate status-driven civil and criminal offenses committed by,
with, and against Latin American immigrants.
This argument should not be surprising when one places immigrant status among the
many other statuses, labels, or categorical definitions—social or legal—that influence our
lives. Like race, gender, or age, immigration status also shapes one’s life experiences, both
real and imagined. It not only carries legal meaning as one is legally included or excluded
from various aspects of American society depending on this status, but it has significant
social connotations as well. Hence laws that govern what immigrants can and cannot do, as
well as the social meanings attached to being an immigrant, determine the range of
interaction, both legal and illegal, in which Latin American immigrants participate.
Furthermore, both actual immigration status and perceived immigration status shapes how
others—including immigrants and nonimmigrants alike—interact with Latino immigrants.
Since current immigration and immigrant-specific policies are extremely restrictive
and often criminalize Latino immigrants, this sets the tone both legally and socially for
increased status-driven offending and victimization if just one of four possible tenets is true:
1) immigration and immigrant-specific policies actually deny Latino immigrants the ability
to perform or participate in certain “daily” activities through legal means, leading them to
adapt vis a vis illegal means; 2) Latino immigrants perceive that immigration and immigrantspecific policies deny them the ability to perform or participate in certain “daily” activities
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through legal means, leading them to adapt vis a vis illegal means; 3) Latino immigrants are
vulnerable to victimization because immigration and immigrant-specific policies actually
deny them equal protection from victimization; or, 4) Latino immigrants are vulnerable to
victimization because immigration and immigrant-specific policies are perceived to deny
them equal protection from victimization by victimizers and/or victims.
More than proving this connection between immigration policy, status, and crime,
however, this study aims to uncover the specifics of status-driven immigrant offending and
victimization. Do specific policies engender crime or does the overall tone set by such
policies create an environment within which the crimes and victimizations of Latino
immigrants are rationalized? In other words, do policies place real constraints on immigrants
that lead to offending and victimization? Under what circumstances do Latino immigrants
offend? Are these offenses victimless? How does this look in the workplace as compared
with the home? What is the underlying motivation for these offenses? Under what
circumstances are Latino immigrants victimized? Who are the victimizers—other Latino
immigrants or American-born citizens or a mixture of both? To whom, if anyone, do those
who had been victimized turn to for support? How common are offending and victimization
in Latino immigrants’ lives? Are they simply a part of the daily grind or are they actually
anomalous occurrences?
In answering these questions, I explore the nature of immigrants and crime from an
untouched perspective. I am not interested in non-status-driven illegal activities of Latino
immigrants, such as theft, assault, or murder. As previously noted, Latino immigrants do not
have higher crime rates than native-born folks and, in fact, tend to have lower crime rates.
What I am interested in are those criminal activities for which immigration status is a
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determining factor. For example, this might include theft of social security numbers or
identity fraud for employment purposes; domestic violence sustained through threats of
deportation; or wage theft that targets immigrant workers purely because they are
undocumented. I hold that such crimes actually add significantly to criminal activity within
the United States, although in most cases the harm being done is not to the average American
citizen, as pundits and politicians would like us to believe, but instead falls on Latino
immigrants, specifically those who are undocumented.
In commenting on the state of literature on immigration and crime, Ruben G.
Rumbaut notes that, for the most part, “immigration scholars [have] focused on the
incorporation of the latest waves of newcomers, [and] have all but ignored the areas of crime
and imprisonment...[and] criminologists in turn have paid no attention to the surge in
immigration” (2008:5). Surprisingly, while there exists much research about immigrant
identity, immigrant communities, undocumented immigration, immigrants and labor, and
immigrants and crime in the traditional sense, research on the complexities of the
immigration-crime story is conspicuously absent. Specifically, no existing study examines
the civil and criminal offenses that spring up, in part, due to Latin American immigrants’
second-class status from a holistic, interdisciplinary perspective. Furthermore, little research
has incorporated the actual voices of undocumented Latin American immigrants, let alone
the voices of Latin American immigrants in general, into an analysis of immigration and
lawbreaking. This is a crucial shortcoming of existing immigration and criminological
literature.
Taking heed from the humanitarian, social justice, and labor organizing traditions, all
of which readily incorporate the voices of Latino immigrants into their work, and drawing
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upon lessons from postmodern, feminist, and activist schools of thought, this study
illuminates both the history of immigration policy and discourse in America as well as the
Latino community’s knowledge and expertise about life as an undocumented Latino
immigrant in Southeast Michigan. First, I trace the development of increasingly restrictive
immigration policies in the United States, paying special attention to the adaptation of a
criminal justice/enforcement models to the realm of immigration control and the concurrent
criminalization of undocumented immigrants. Then, based upon an analysis of 12 in-depth
interviews, I explore how current immigration and immigrant-specific policies encourage and
facilitate civil and criminal offenses committed by, with, and against Latin American
immigrants as the specific result of their immigration status. Ultimately, I argue that the
current state of immigration in America actually increases the proliferation of crime by
creating a vulnerable immigrant underclass and hold that progressive immigration reform,
including some type of legalization for America’s nearly 13 million undocumented
immigrants, is necessary in order to curb these offenses.
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CHAPTER 2: METHODS
Mainstream criminologists and immigration scholars have yet to thoroughly explore
the relationship between immigration policy, status, and crime. Furthermore, while there is
much literature on the securitization and militarization of the U.S-Mexico and a fair amount
of literature on the adoption of a criminal justice/enforcement model within the realm of
immigration control, research has yet to link these two phenomena to the production of
crime. In addition, while it has been thoroughly documented that immigration enforcement
is biased towards immigrants of Latin American descent, the effects of such skewed
enforcement on crime have been ignored (see Bacon 2008; Hing 2004; Schrag 2010; United
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2004; Office of Immigration Statistics 2010).
Instead, alongside popular media, securitization and criminalization have perpetuated
the image of Latino immigrants—especially Mexicans—as violent criminal aliens (see
Martinez 2002; Rumbaut 2008). This image continues to exist despite that fact that the
majority of scholarly work has shown immigrants to be no more criminal than native-born
folks and, in fact, less criminal in many cases (see Butcher & Piehl 1998; Shaw & McKay
1969; Tonry 1997). Furthermore, immigrants may even suppress crime (Martinez 2002;
Tonry 1997). This has also been proven true for Latino immigrants on the whole (see
Martinez 2002; Martinez & Lee 2000; Rosenwaike & Hempstead 1990; Rumbaut 2008;
Pokorny 1965; Wilbanks 1984; Zahn 1987).
Yet crimes involving Latino immigrants cannot be simplified to this extent. The
criminalization of immigrants has serious consequences and actually encourages and
facilitates criminal activity by, with, and against Latin American immigrants. This suggests
that although Latino immigrants many not commit more crimes than native-born Americans,

20

the crimes they do become involved with are often inextricably linked to their immigration
status. To fully explore this relationship, however, it is necessary to create a composite
frame of analysis and methodology from across several disciplines.
DEVELOPING AN IMMIGRANT OFFENSE TYPOLOGY FOR STATUS-DRIVEN
CRIME
Research within the fields of criminology, anthropology, sociology, and applied
social justice examines immigration policy, undocumented immigration, and crime in a
rather fragmented way. First and foremost, the discussion of undocumented immigrants and
crime is conspicuously absent from most criminological work. This includes the work of
critical, comparative, and global criminologists who examine both nontraditional crimes and
crime in nontraditional ways including topics such as crimes of the powerful/powerless,
white collar or corporate crime, environmental crime, human rights crime, state crime,
nonviolence, peacemaking criminology, animal rights criminology, the construction of crime
and criminals from both legal and social standpoints, and so on.
Furthermore, research that does address the immigration policy-crime connection or
the undocumented immigrant-crime connection tends to do so from a social justice or human
rights perspective. For instance, such writings detail ever-tightening immigration restrictions
and document immigrant rights abuses at the hands of Border Patrol or Immigration and
Customs Enforcement. Or perhaps they document increasing migrant death tolls at the
border or acts of violence against immigrants and the expansive underground economy
involved in moving such migrants. In other cases they explore the labor exploitation of
undocumented immigrants in America’s restaurants, factories, and fields. While an
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important contribution to the field of knowledge on immigration, this research suffers from
two shortfalls.
First, it fails to explore these occurrences using a criminological framework. All of
the aforementioned actions can and should be framed as criminal. Abuse of immigrant rights
can be unpacked as excessive use of force, failure to comply with federally mandated
detention and removal standards, and, in some cases, rape, assault, or even murder.
Racially/ethnically motivated violence against immigrants becomes hate crime. The
underground economy at the U.S.-Mexico border responsible for the unauthorized
immigration of millions can be seen to include a whole host of crimes from human
trafficking to extortion to fraud. Labor exploitation often translates to discriminatory wage
and hiring practices, wage theft, or the failure to comply with health and safety standards
mandated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Shall we not also include
the hiring of someone without permission to work, which is yet another crime? Thus the
major critique here is that researchers are writing prolifically on the immigration-crime
connection but are failing to recognize it as such.
The second shortfall is that the majority of this research almost completely ignores
immigrant offending, and when it is acknowledged, it is never labeled as crime and never
discussed within a criminological context. Perhaps this is due to a desire to disassociate
undocumented immigrants from their existing criminal stigma. As such, the failure to report
on immigrant offending may be a conscious effort to refute the unjustified criminalimmigrant stereotype, a just, yet perhaps misguided, endeavor. On the other hand, this may
just be because few criminologists have picked up the subject, and researchers and social
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justice workers in other fields are not comfortable borrowing from or adopting a
criminological standpoint.
But immigrants do offend. Not only do they offend, most undocumented immigrants
offend every day and their offending is directly linked to their immigrant status. Again, the
concern is not violent or property crimes because the introduction to this study reviewed
research on how immigrants—including Latino and undocumented immigrants—tend to
have lower offending rates than native-born Americans when discussing “traditional” crime.
Rather, the crimes referred to are crimes that are derived from immigrants’ status. In other
words, the motivating factor behind these crimes is immigrants’ immigration status, and were
it not for this status, there would exist no motivation to offend in such a manner.
For example, many undocumented immigrants obtain work by using false SSNs or
other identity documents. In immigration literature, this is typically cast as one of life’s
necessities for the undocumented who are unfairly denied legal permission to work, making
them susceptible to exploitation. Is it unjust to deny immigrants permission to work? Many
would say yes and there are strong arguments to support this conclusion. Does a lack of legal
work permission make immigrants more susceptible to exploitation? Yes it does; this has
been extensively documented (see Bacon 2008; Thompson 2010). However, neither of these
points changes the fact that most immigrants commit identity fraud to obtain work, and
identity fraud is a crime.
Driving provides another example. Until recently, most states did not require proof
of valid residency in the United States to obtain a driver’s license. This allowed even
undocumented immigrants to take a driving test and receive a driver’s license. Now most
states require a valid SSN, U.S. passport, American birth certificate, or Green Card
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(permanent resident card) to obtain a drivers license. Without one of these proofs, many
undocumented immigrants choose to drive without a license. While unlicensed driving is
discussed as a negative consequence of immigrant-specific policy, it is rarely labeled a crime,
but it is.
Such immigrant offending cannot be cast aside or covered up for fear of tarnishing
the already sullied reputation of undocumented immigrants. Without examining immigrant
offending, in addition to immigrant victimization, we cannot fully understand the ways
immigration policy and status influence crime. Similarly, we cannot address the negative
and often harmful consequences of existing immigration policy without fully understanding
this relationship. This is extremely important because if, as I argue, current immigration and
immigrant-specific policies actually encourage and facilitate crime—whether immigrants are
the offenders or victims—it is worth considering policy alternatives.
GROUNDING THE PROJECT
Grounded in the traditions of post-modern, feminist, and participatory research, this
project intends to fill a glaring hole in the realms of both immigration and criminological
knowledge by examining offender and victim patterns linked to the immigration status of
Latino immigrants. The analysis of 12 in-depth, semi-structured interviews on immigration
and crime serve as the crux of this study. By exploring how immigration policy and
immigrant status impacts crime through the words of Latino immigrants themselves, I aim to
bring a new level of clarity and realism to analysis of this topic. In short, this project aims to
personalize immigration policy and its impacts, two things that often appear rather intangible
and distant for many people.
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By attempting to personalize the political, I reject traditionally held research norms of
objectivity, distance, and absolutes as the markers of rigorous knowledge production.
Instead, throughout this project I embrace subjectivity, the breaking down of barriers
between “researcher” and “participant,” and nuances of relativity. In essence, while I put this
project in motion, participants and current events pulled me through to the project’s
completion.
On the note of subjectivity, I want to briefly discuss my time spent as a community
organizer with a local worker center predominantly serving the Latino community, one of the
major catalysts that sparked this research. In addition to relating my experience as an
organizer as a prelude to the actual research, it also signifies my awareness and acceptance of
potential biases that may be present; as many feminist and activist researchers have noted,
acknowledging and incorporating one’s standpoint into one’s projects is crucial as this is
what shapes the activist research from the beginning (Villalon 2010).
I embrace my experience as an organizer and do not view it as a handicap in anyway.
Working with the local center, I was exposed to the elaborate, and often harsh, realities of
immigrant life in Southeast Michigan. Day after day I heard stories of exploitation,
extortion, and maltreatment—granted, I worked for one of the few Latino-focused support
organizations in the area. People also spoke of daily troubles and minor headaches related to
being an immigrant in the United States, along with coping strategies that sometimes flirted
with or blatantly crossed into the illegal. It became clear that, at least for many local Latin
American immigrants, life was often a mix of successes and failures, good fortune and
victimization, and attempts to get by—all of which frequently involved the illegal.
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Moreover, I was inundated with critical theories of race and labor relations, as well as
strategies for community collaboration, advocacy, and social justice at the local and
international levels through which I could process and respond to what I observed and
became entangled with. I participated in—and later coordinated—bilingual community
dialogues, one-on-ones, and participatory research projects aimed at improving local labor
conditions and immigration realities. Through this, I experienced the importance of
collaborative ground-up knowledge production firsthand and learned valuable tactics for
incorporating these philosophies into my own research. Furthermore, were it not for my
organizing work, I would not have been granted such open access to the Latino community—
especially as I, myself, am a white American-born citizen. First, it is quite possible that I
would have remained somewhat oblivious to the offenses and victimization of Latin
American immigrants as these are not always apparent to outsiders. Second, without my
organizing and personal ties, it is unlikely that Latino immigrants would have been willing to
discuss with me exactly what it is to be an immigrant in southeast Michigan. In essence, this
project was made possible by my ties to both the Latino and social justice communities.
PROJECT METHODS
It would be nearly impossible to thoroughly understand the current relationship
among immigration policy, immigrant status, and crime without first exploring a history of
U.S. immigration, immigration policies, and immigrant-specific policies, i.e., policies that
target immigrants but do not form a part of the nation’s immigration regulatory system. For
instance, while introducing his book on the rise of social control and risk assessment
responses to criminality in recent years, Threat Perceptions: The Policing of Dangers from
Eugenics to the War on Terrorism, Saran Ghatak addresses this point:
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...in order to understand [x] current policies it is important to situate these in a broader
historical perspective...Michel Foucault has called [this] a ‘history of the present.’
Historical knowledge in this case is not just an exercise in uncovering facts about the
past. Rather, the purpose of historical knowledge in this context is to show the tortuous
ways in which certain ideas and concepts about criminality and social control have
developed and influenced those of contemporary times... In order to assess the scientific,
legal, and political ramifications of contemporary risk assessment techniques it is
essential to see how past history weighs on the present...(Ghatak 2011:6)
From this perspective, it is near impossible to comprehend current political, social, or
economic issues without understanding their origins and predecessors. This perspective can
and should be applied to understanding the nexus of immigration and crime.
Hence the first half of this project is dedicated to establishing an immigration “history
of the present.” Through a combination of historical research, policy analysis, and an
examination of current immigration discussions in the media, I provide a socio-historic
analysis of U.S. immigration and related policy from the days of the colonies onward. The
majority of this analysis centers approximately around the past 150 years as immigration was
nearly unregulated prior to this. This review emphasizes the impacts of nativism,
xenophobia, racism, politics, international relations, labor, and capitalism in shaping
immigration regulation, enforcement and control. It highlights the racialization of
immigration policy, the progressive securitization of the U.S.-Mexico border and the nation’s
interior, and the increasing criminalization of Latino immigrants. I also pay special attention
to recent developments in immigration and immigrant-specific policy and the constraints
such policies have placed on immigrants, especially the undocumented. Overall, based in
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archival and secondary sources, this section provides the necessary contextual knowledge for
linking immigration policy, status, and crime, which is the major task of the other half of this
project.
The study’s second half focuses on the fruits of 15 in-depth, semi-structured
interviews with Latin American immigrants residing in Southeast Michigan, from which I
examine immigration and lawbreaking as a social phenomenon vis a vis the individual
realties of project collaborators (participants). Because unauthorized immigration is a
sensitive and complex topic, because there is little existing information on the criminalization
of undocumented immigrants at the individual level, and because undocumented immigrants
are difficult to access, it would be extremely difficult to examine this phenomenon using
quantitative methods. Moreover, one-on-one interviews are conducive to deep-level analysis
that other methods cannot facilitate (O’Leary 2010). Using this method, participants can
recount personal experiences and opinions in rich detail absent in quantitative measures or
qualitative, structural-level analyses. Accordingly, a qualitative study of the daily lives of
Latino immigrants employing flexible interviews to capture micro-level data will make a
substantial contribution to existing literature on Latin American immigration.
As such, primary data were acquired through qualitative interviews and analyzed
using both inductive and deductive approaches. In accordance with the philosophies of
participatory research and critical/radical ethnography, participants were not merely data
sources to be mined and discarded. Instead, they were project collaborators and experts
of their experiences and communities. Participant insights and contributions are the
driving force behind this research. As such, not once during the project process did I
view myself as “expert researcher.” Instead, I found myself experiencing the project as
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an “inquisitive student” seeking to learn from participants. At the same time, I did not
neglect my role in facilitating a comfortable flow of information while being cautious not
to infuse the interview with personal biases/opinions. Ultimately, like Pierrette
Hondagneu-Sotelo in Domestica: Immigrant Workers Cleaning and Caring in the
Shadows of Affluence, a qualitative examination of immigrant household workers, I
strived to “[enable] the voices” of research participants to be heard (2001:xxv). In other
words, I wanted to create a space where people could speak for themselves.
Interviews were conducted with Latin American immigrants above 18 years of
age currently residing in Washtenaw and Wayne Counties. I was confident that the
average Latino immigrant, regardless of immigration status, would have knowledge about
life as an undocumented Latino. This assumption was based on my experience as a
community organizer with the local Latino community, during which the prevalence of
mixed status families and social networks among Latino immigrants was made obvious.
For example, children brought to the United States by their undocumented parents
without authorization may have earned permanent residency or citizenship and then had
citizen children of their own. Individuals may have undocumented parents or siblings
living nearby. Latinos born in the U.S. may have married undocumented Latino
immigrants. The possibilities for family structure and immigration status are endless.
Furthermore, while a Latin American immigrant may not have any direct or indirect
family members who are currently or were previously undocumented, it is likely that
their expanded social network includes one or more undocumented Latino immigrants.
Hence it seemed safe to assume that most Latino immigrants would have at least some
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knowledge on the daily activities of undocumented Latino immigrants regardless of their
own immigration status.
As it turned out, although participants were not asked about their immigration
status, in the end, 11 participants alluded to or openly referenced their status as
undocumented during the interview. The 12th participant openly discussed himself as
documented. In fact, many participants discussed the limitations one faces as an
undocumented Latino immigrant using personal experiences as examples. When
participants did not directly reference personal experiences in responding to interview
questions, they often shared the experiences of undocumented friends or coworkers.
Hence despite not targeting undocumented participants, my population parameters
fulfilled the project goals.
Because even many documented Latino immigrants have close family members
or friends who are undocumented and in constant danger of deportation, Latino
immigrant communities are tight-knit and somewhat closed-off to outsiders (HondagneuSotelo 2001). Furthermore, Latino immigrants are unlikely to discuss topics related to
immigration with people they do not trust. Taking this into consideration, I connected
with participants using convenience and snowball sampling techniques. Both snowball
and convenience sampling are nonprobability sampling techniques commonly used in
field research (Babbie 2007). As Earl Babbie notes, these methods are most appropriate
when working with members of a special population that are difficult to locate, including
the homeless, migrant workers, or undocumented immigrants (Op. cit.). The basic
concept behind both methods is to find study participants by asking key community
members and individuals who have participated in the study to recommend potential
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participants. Hence drawing on prior connections to the local Latino community, I
tapped into key informants and community gatekeepers who could link me with people
who met the population parameters (see O’Leary 2010). Participants were also asked if
they knew anyone else who might be interested in being interviewed. By accessing
participants through trusted family, friends, and colleagues who could vouch for me,
participants were not only willing to be interviewed, but were able to trust me, increasing
the likelihood of open, honest responses.
The downside to snowball and convenience sampling techniques is that they do
not necessarily produce representative samples (O’Leary 2010), meaning that it is more
difficult to assume that information gleaned from a study using these techniques applies
to the target population as a whole. Although convenience and snowball sampling risk
producing non-representative samples, generalizability was not as important as depth and
complexity of information for the purposes of my research. In order to lessen any biases,
such as a desire to provide answers expected to please the interviewer, I attempted to
interview people with whom I had not previously had direct contact. Ultimately, of the
12 interviewees, I had prior contact with only two.
Most participants were recruited over the phone and had been suggested by my
community informants or other participants. I always asked that referees checked with
potential participants before giving me their phone numbers, and to the best of my
knowledge, they always did. In addition, I was introduced to several participants by
mutual friends and colleagues at community events.
During the participant recruitment process, all potential subjects were either
shown an informed consent form or given the specifics of the form over the phone. I
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made sure to explain: (1) the purpose of the study; (2) the confidentiality of any personal
information collected; (3) participant anonymity; and (4) that participation was voluntary
and that participants could refuse to discuss any topics or stop the interview at any time
without any negative consequences. When scheduling interviews, participants’ first
names and phone numbers were recorded in my personal calendar, but I made no notes
that connected participants to the study, making participants indistinguishable from any
other names in my calendar.
Interviews always took place in a location of the participants’ choosing.
Generally, women were more inclined to do the interview in their home. Men tended to
ask me to suggest a location, at which point I always suggested a coffee shop with a
private area or alcove. I offered to buy participants a coffee or a snack when at a cafe,
but not a single participant took me up on my offer. In fact, several participants insisted
on buying my coffee.
Although interview participants were not involved in the development of
interview questions, nor did they interview others, key community informants did assist
in this process. Interviews were informal, semi-structured—i.e. flexible in nature—and
included 12 of open-ended questions. The purpose of questions was not necessarily to
solicit specific answers, but to encourage detailed, yet focused, conversation. Questions
explored specific scenarios and hypothetical situations regarding certain activities Latino
immigrants may or may not engage in [see Appendix A]. Overall, interview questions,
scenarios, and examples were based upon a thorough review of relevant literature and my
experiences, training, and knowledge gained as a community organizer with the Latino
community.
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Participants were given the option of conducting the interview in English or
Spanish. All but one participant opted for Spanish. Interviews lasted anywhere between
40 minutes and 2.5 hours. At the start of each interview, participants were given two
copies of the informed consent agreement in English or Spanish—whichever they
preferred. One copy was kept by the participant and the other was signed and collected
by me. Participants were given the option to sign the consent form with a pseudonym or
an “x.” Time was taken to ensure that participants understood the entire form and to go
over any questions participants had, although they usually had none. Participants were
also given a resource list with names of local service providers and support organizations
in the event that the interview caused participants to experience any form of emotional
distress. If legal questions arose, participants were referred to the resource list. At this
point participants were also given the option to have the interview tape-recorded or not.
All of the participants agreed to tape-recorded interviews.
During the interviews, participants were not called by their name to protect their
anonymity. Aside from this, the interviews, as well as the overall time spent with
participants, was rather informal. My goal throughout our time together was to make the
participants comfortable, as well as establish some form of credibility with the
participants. This was important, first because I did not want the study to cause
participants any discomfort, and second because I wanted them to be willing to discuss
the interview themes frankly.
To facilitate this, I made an effort to make polite small talk to set the participant at
ease in the moments leading up to the actual interview. I would comment on the weather,
the location, my coffee habits, and so on. Another easy way to break the ice was to bring
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up something I noticed the participant and I had in common. For example, one
participant’s living room was covered in beautifully embroidered pillows, tablecloths,
and blankets. This was a great conversation point for the participant and I because I knit
and crochet. In other instances, participants were from areas of Mexico I had traveled to.
This was another valuable icebreaker as Mexican participants were always excited to hear
that I had been to and had some knowledge of Mexico. Overall, I found that if the
participant and I were both laughing, or at least smiling, prior to beginning the interview,
naturally awkward aspects of discussing personal topics with a near-stranger melted
away.
At the end of each interview participants were asked if they wanted to add
anything that had not been discussed or if they had any questions. Most of the time
participants did not want to add anything and had no questions; however, some were
interested in learning more about me and the project’s purpose. In fact, after several
interviews the participant and I continued chatting for up to an hour and one woman even
insisted I stay for dinner at her home.
Interview data were collected via tape recordings and note taking. I then
transcribed the interviews and, following the procedures used by Hondagneu-Sotelo
(2001), translated only the sections chosen for quotation. This was a lengthy and arduous
process despite having had prior knowledge of and experience with transcription,
translation, and interpretation. I have translated numerous documents in my own
research, as well as while working as a community organizer and a volunteer translator. I
have also spent numerous work, volunteer, and personal hours acting as an EnglishSpanish interpreter. None of this truly prepared me for the painstaking labor required of
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transcription and translation within the context of this project. Fortunately, aside from a
few technology issues, the process went smoothly. Furthermore, I had very few
transcription/translation questions, but consulted key informants in the few instances
where they arose.
To further this inquiry, Figure 1.1 presents the connections between immigration
policy, status and crime from a non-traditional, holistic perspective that simultaneously
focused on immigrant offenses and victimization. It is a five-point offense typology to
explore all offenses that can be linked to immigration policy and status. The offense
typology is as follows: status offenses, circumstantial offenses, opportunity offenses,
predatory offenses, and due process offenses [see Figure 1].
Status offenses are the most straightforward of all offenses. These are activities that
immigrants—due to their status—are forbidden or unable to perform without violating one or
more laws. These acts are not malum en se, or inherently wrong, but are merely viewed as
unacceptable for specified groups. More importantly, most non-immigrants are not barred
from these activities. Working and driving could both be status offenses as one’s legal
ability to participate in these activities depends upon one’s immigration status. Working
without permission, just like driving without a license, is a criminal offense. So is using a
false identity document to do so, but immigrants may choose to do this if their status prevents
them from legally obtaining work or driving.
Circumstantial offenses are similar to status offenses in that they include “normal
acts,” like hiring an employee or giving someone a ride to the grocery store, that become
illegal due to one or more of the participants’ immigration statuses. For example, driving a
car with an undocumented passenger is not only a crime—it is a felony. This highlights an
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interesting aspect of circumstantial offenses that differentiates them from the other four
offenses: individuals may be guilty of these offenses without being aware that they have
violated the law. Most people do not check the passport of everyone they hire to do yard
work or, for that matter, everyone who rides in their car. It should be noted that offenses that
may appear to be circumstantial on the surface could easily fit into one of the other offense
types when motivation enter the analysis. For example, hiring immigrants who lack
permission to work because one is sensitive to the difficulties these individuals face in
finding acceptable work is very different from hiring immigrants with intentions of
exploitation, which I would label a predatory offense; I will return to this shortly.
STATUS-DRIVEN OFFENSE TYPOLOGY
Offense
Status Offense

Definition
Act that is illegal because of
prohibitions or restrictions
connected to an immigrant’s
immigration status

Circumstantial Offense

Act that is illegal because of
one or more participants’
immigration status—or—an
act that is done as a favor for
an undocumented immigrant
because his or her status
restricts the person from
achieving a desired outcome
through legal means
Illegal provision of goods or
services predicated upon
immigrant consumer
wants/needs due to the
consumer’s immigration
status—or—illegal act from
which one profits off of
another due to his or her
immigration status, not
including acts with malicious
intent

Opportunity Offense

Malicious Offense

Illegal act in which an
immigrant is targeted due to

Examples
Fraud; identity theft; forgery;
employment without
authorization; unlicensed or
uninsured driving; unlawful
presence in the United States;
Employment of someone
unauthorized to work;
harboring an illegal alien;
transporting an illegal alien;
aiding or inciting someone to
enter the United States without
authorization;
Aiding or inciting someone to
enter the United States without
authorization; production and
sale of fraudulent or forged
documents; identity theft;
harboring and/or transporting
an illegal alien; soliciting
and/or accepting bribes;
employment of someone
without authorization to work;
business tax evasion and
payment of wages in cash;
Harassment; extortion;
exploitation; wage theft;
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Due Process Offense

his or her real or perceived
immigration status; the
offender may or may not profit
financially
Illegal act involving
immigration or criminal
justice actors—such as police,
ICE agents, judges, or
corrections officers—in which
an immigrant’s rights are
overlooked or an immigrant is
purposefully discriminated
against due to his or her real or
perceived immigration status

robbery and/or theft; physical
and/or sexual assault;
domestic abuse; enslavement;
Racial profiling and/or
discrimination; harassment;
unreasonable
stop/search/seizure;
warrantless search; excessive
use of force; extortion; failure
to comply with Detention and
Removal Operations
Standards (detainee rights
abuses); physical and/or
sexual assault;

Opportunity offenses include all service-related offenses and comprise the “blackmarket of immigration.” Opportunity offenses range from the illegal provision of goods and
services, such as travel into the U.S. or false identification papers, to various payoffs and
bribes given to officials to spare immigrants negative interaction with police, Border Patrol,
or Immigration and Customs Enforcement. These offenses contribute substantially to crime
along the U.S.-Mexico border, where an economy based heavily on unauthorized
immigration has arisen in response to U.S. immigration and border policies that push
immigration underground. Demand for legally unattainable services does not stop at the
Border; once residing in the U.S. there are still a number of illicit goods and services sought
by immigrants. In essence, opportunity offenses are a product of the market; if there is a
demand, it will be satisfied regardless of potential legal recourse as with the famous black
markets of Nazi-occupied territories, the USSR, and Cuba. Profit is the driving force behind
all opportunity offenses.
Predatory offenses encompass all offenses perpetrated against immigrants because
offenders believe they are somewhat immune to apprehension and punishment due to
immigrants’ perceived and actual vulnerability. These offenses are carried out by people
who know or presume to know an immigrant’s immigration status and purposefully exploit,
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extort, assault, or violate the immigrant under the pretense that the immigrant will not report
them for fear of immigration consequences like deportation. Specific examples include fraud
in which immigrants are charged for services never provided, domestic abuse attached to
threats of deportation, and the violation of labor laws—such as the Fair Labor Standards Act
that dictates federal minimum wage and overtime regulations—and threats of deportation to
any worker who speaks up. Unfortunately for immigrants without documentation,
sometimes-empty threats of deportation can appear to have very real consequences. What is
more, if immigrants are engaged in some form of law violation—like being in the country
without documentation—they are unlikely to seek the assistance of formal law enforcement
for fear of self-incrimination.
A fifth and final class of offense, due process offenses, includes offenses
committed by government actors such as Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), police, judges, and so on, which violate the rights
immigrants are legally entitled to regardless of their status. Racial profiling and illegal
searches may be the most common due process offenses; however, this category includes
actions such as not informing individuals of their rights, denying access to lawyers, and
so on. Despite being illegal, government actors are inclined to engage in these activities
because they assist in the detention and deportation of individuals. Furthermore, unlike
“typical” court cases in which neglecting due process can result in a case being thrown
out, it makes no difference in deportation proceedings whether or not the law has been
properly followed.
Yet to fully understand this typology of offenses, it is necessary to provide a working
definition of crime for the purposes of this project. As put forth by several critical
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criminologists over the last 20 years (Michalowski 1985; Reiman 1979), many injurious acts
are not labeled or defined as criminal or regulatory offenses by the state. Hence in many
instances, a working definition of “crime” that includes acts prohibited under criminal
regulatory law and analogous forms of social injury, or “legally permissible acts or sets of
conditions whose consequences are similar to those of illegal acts,” is necessary to truly
understand criminal phenomena. The concept of analogous social injury applies to the study
of the interaction between immigration status and crime because not all crimes, whether
harmful or merely deceptive, connected to immigration status are labeled or defined as
offenses by the state. By incorporating this concept into the understanding of crime for the
purpose of this study, one is able to see the crime-immigration status relationship from a
holistic perspective and can move beyond contemporary legal understandings of crime and
criminal behavior.
As such, this offense typology encompasses all forms of criminality that can be linked
to immigration status. Furthermore, when taken together, the offense typologies themselves
can be grouped into two categories: immigrants as perpetrators and collaborators (status,
circumstantial and opportunity offenses), and immigrants as victims (predatory and due
process offenses). By viewing immigrant criminality and victimization using this
framework, the nuances of the immigration-crime relationship are revealed.
Overall, this typology is one of the driving forces behind this project as it is the
lens with which to examine Latino immigrant offending and victimization. However, I
also draw on historical and current accounts of Latino offending and victimization from a
variety of outside sources including articles, nonprofit reports, and academic studies to
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support interview data organization and analysis. Together, this creates a multifaceted
look at immigrant status-driven crime.
FINAL THOUGHTS ON METHODS USED
In sum, this study blends together a variety of research methods and disciplines in the
hopes of providing a thorough, multifaceted examination of policy, immigration, and crime.
Yet although influenced by a variety of sources and techniques—specifically those adopting
a postmodern, feminist, or social justice perspective—this is still a criminological work as
the central analysis is carried out from a criminological standpoint. This is extremely
important, for as previously noted, criminology currently lacks a vibrant
conversation/dialogue on immigration and crime. By combining a socio-historical policy
analysis, or a “history of the present” of American immigration control with the actual voices
of Latino immigrants on status-driven crime, this study lays out a new lens from which to
study both immigration and crime. Perhaps more importantly, it reminds us how valuable
interdisciplinary study and the recycling and reinvention of social science methodology and
frameworks can be.
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CHAPTER 3: HISTORY, POLICY, AND LATINO IMMIGRATION: THE ROLES OF
NATIVISM, SECURITIZATION, AND CRIMINALIZATION
The United States is a nation of immigrants. America’s first immigrant settlers were
primarily British conservatives in search of religious freedom and other Brits merely hoping
for a better life. Along with them, however, were several thousand criminals. In fact,
between 1717—when “transportation” of criminals to the New World became an official
punishment—and the start of the American Revolution in 1776, England sent approximately
40,000 convicted criminals to the American colonies as indentured servants (Hughes
1987:41). And thus began American immigration. Yet by the early talks of independence
Americans no longer felt the need to house England’s unwanted, especially since the slave
trade had made indentured servants obsolete. In 1788, the Congress of the Confederation
adopted a resolution urging individual states to enact laws preventing the transport of
criminals to the U.S. (Hing 2004:14). In subsequent years, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Virginia, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island all
passed such laws, putting an end to “convict” immigration and perhaps making America’s
first attempt at regulating immigration and distinguishing those who deserved a place in the
New World from those who did not (Op. cit.).
So begins the story of American immigration. A story yet unfinished, but up to this
point, that could be summed up in just one word: exclusion. While immigration policy has
not remained stagnant since the Colonial days, experiencing both periods of openness and
repression, excluding the “unwanted” or the “other” from full participation in American
society has always been the underlying goal. First it was the criminals, the paupers, and the
public charges, typically lumped into the same category well into the 19th century. Then it
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was the Catholics and those Southern and Eastern Europeans who spoke languages other than
English. Next it was the Chinese—practically considered to be aliens at the time—and all
other Asians. This was followed by a near total exclusion of all nonwhites through various
restrictions and quotas. For the past half-century, however, the group of choice for exclusion
has been immigrants from Latin America.
While the groups targeted for exclusion have changed, the tactics of exclusion have
both expanded and become more comprehensive over time, first incorporating nativist
racism, next employing securitization, and ultimately through criminalization. Hence
immigrants were first excluded on the basis of protecting American interests and the success
of its stock—morally, socially, and biologically. During this time, it was believed that nonwhite, non-Protestant immigrants would deteriorate the quality of the American people
mentally and physically, and such discriminatory ideologies were justified in immigration
and immigrant-specific policies. Changing understandings of “American,” “white,” and the
fall of eugenics as a legitimate science ushered in an age of immigration exclusion through
securitization. This meant securing America’s physical borders through surveillance and a
closer examination of those who entered and exited the country.
Securitization was easily justified by fear of enemy combatants during WWI, WWII,
and later, the Cold War. Coincidentally (or perhaps not) this was also when Latin
Americans—specifically Mexicans—became the excluded immigrant group of choice.
Nativist policies had already managed to control unwanted flows of immigrants from across
the Atlantic and Pacific, but they had failed to address immigration within the Western
Hemisphere. Despite sharing more than 5500 miles of border with Canada, border control
efforts were and still are centered on the U.S.-Mexico border, making it glaringly obvious
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that America either felt Mexico posed a greater threat to the U.S. than Canada and was a
more strategic location for foreign nationals intent on harming the U.S. or that the U.S. was
simply unconcerned with white, English-speaking Canadian immigration. Securing
America’s physical boundaries was thus an attempt to control the flow of Latin American
foot traffic across the nation’s border.
While securitization is still a primary aspect of immigration policy and a vibrant
method of exclusionary immigration (especially post-9/11), the primary immigration tool for
excluding unwanted immigrants over the past fifteen years has been the criminalization of
immigrants. This criminalization—or the transformation of immigrants into criminals—has
occurred in several ways. First recent immigration policies have designated a number of
immigration offenses as severe criminal offenses with criminal penalties including prison
time. Furthermore, other immigration and immigrant-specific polices have restricted
immigrant participation in “normal” daily activities, leaving some immigrants little choice
but to break the law. Finally, immigration authorities have both embraced a law
enforcement/criminal justice model in regard to immigration policy creation and
enforcement, as well as begun to work together with local law enforcement to execute
immigration law. Moreover, this criminalization targets Latin American immigrants—
specifically Mexicans—through enforcement, which is geographically, racially, and
ethnically biased in practice. Together, this not only conflates immigrants with criminals but
also reinforces stereotypes of criminal Latino immigrants, leading average Americans to
view immigrants as criminal. Overall, while nativism and securitization have had major
impacts on immigrants for decades and have been used to justify increasingly repressive
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policy, the recent criminalization of immigrants has made life extremely difficult for Latino
immigrants in America today.
All in all, transformation in immigration and immigrant-specific policy, as well as
immigration politics, over the last 200 years has been guided by nativism, securitization, and
the criminalization of immigrants—especially Latinos and the undocumented. Together, this
has crystallized immigrants’ second-class position in the United States legally, socially, and
economically. Despite early immigrants’ ability to assimilate into American society through
physical and cultural similarities as well as fewer barriers to economic mobility, more recent
waves of immigrants have faced mounting social intolerance and legal restrictions to
participation in American society. In an age of terrorism, securitization, risk management,
and economic instability, immigrants—especially the undocumented—are increasingly
targeted in policy and discourse as the problematic “other.” As such, they are singled out for
discriminatory treatment by the federal immigration system, the justice system, and society at
large. Thus while immigration policy no longer blatantly discriminates against specific
immigrant groups, the legacies of such discriminatory policies are not only still visible but
have paved the way for the rationalization of anti-immigrant policies that, ultimately,
encourage and facilitate crimes by, with, and against Latino immigrants.
19TH CENTURY IMMIGRATION AND NATIVISM IN THE U.S.
Prior to the mid-1800s, American immigration policy was relatively underdeveloped.
There were few immigration or immigrant-specific policies on the books, and immigration
operated within an “open-door” framework. This was a moment of massive expansion that
required a constant supply of cheap labor well in excess of what natural population growth
could supply. In 1790, Congress passed, as Schrag calls it, “one of the world’s most liberal
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naturalization laws,” requiring just two years of residency in the U.S. and one year in a
particular state to become a citizen, as long as the immigrant was a white person of “good
moral character” (Schrag 2010:23). In 1798 Congress passed the more restrictive
Naturalization Act as part of the Alien and Sedition Acts, lengthening the residency period to
14 years (scaled back to 5 years in 1802) and authorizing the president to deport “dangerous”
foreigners; again, only whites need apply. It should be noted, then, that America’s “liberal”
immigration system was not a product of some sort of “warm welcome” immigration
ideology, but more likely the result of the need for labor and a realization that the nation did
not have the technological or infrastructural capacity to thoroughly control the movement of
people through its borders.
Throughout the 19th century, the federal government, individual states, and private
employers encouraged emigration from Europe with targeted promotional campaigns and
facilitated immigration through liberal policy. Individuals from Andrew Carnegie to
Abraham Lincoln raved about the economic benefits of immigration. For instance, in
December of 1863, President Lincoln asked Congress to consider new legislation to further
induce immigration, noting that there was “still a great deficiency of laborers in every field of
industry...[and] while the demand for labor is thus increased here, tens of thousands...are
thronging our foreign consulates and offering to emigrate” (Hing 2004:21). In essence,
America was a blossoming nation in need of labor and bodies to push westward expansion,
and as Hing notes, “as long as they were the right kind of immigrants, the new nation wanted
them” (Hing 2004:20).
Subsequently, America’s image as the land of opportunity—in combination with the
numerous political, social, and economic struggles happening throughout the rest of the
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world—made the U.S. an immigrant magnet. As Peter Schrag stresses, this magnetism was
exponential (2010). In the 1820s, roughly 143,000 immigrants made there way to the U.S.
(Op cit.). That number jumped to 600,000 in the 1830s, 1.7 million in the 1840s, and
reached a height of 2.3 million in the 1850s just before plummeting during the Civil War
(Op. cit). Initially these waves were composed of mostly Irish and Germans; however, the
numbers of Eastern and Southern Europeans—Jews, Italians, Greeks, Russians, Poles,
Czechs, Hungarians, Romanians, Turks, and Armenians—rose steadily throughout the 1800s
until overtaking immigration from western Europe around the turn of the century. For
example, of the 14.5 million immigrants that entered the U.S. during the first two decades of
the 20th century, 60% were from Italy, Austria, Hungary, and the area that later became the
Soviet Union (Hing 2004:4). On the West Coast, western expansion and the 1850s Gold
Rush first drew a number of Chinese—many fleeing a widespread rice shortage and the
fallout of the Taiping Rebellion—French, Brits, and even Chilean miners (Hing 2004; Schrag
2010). Moreover, the annexation of large portions of modern-day California, New Mexico,
Arizona, and Texas after the Mexican War and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo added
another 80,000 Mexicans—given the option to become citizens—to America’s immigrant
pool.
By the 1830s, the continuous arrival of hundreds of thousands of relatively poor,
undereducated, non-Protestant immigrants ignited nativist fears. Tensions ran high and it
was said that new immigrants were facilitating the destruction of American cities and a
breakdown in American ethics. This was supposedly evidenced by the dirty, destitute, and
relatively violent conditions in immigrant slums, as well as the gross “drinking and
debauchery” of Irish and German Catholics that ran counter to Puritan mores (Schrag 2010).
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In some instances, anti-Catholic sentiment exploded into the streets in the form of angry
mobs, riots, arson, and even lynchings. For example, anti-Catholic anger led to both the
1834 burning of the Ursuline Convent in Charleston and, ten years later, three days of rioting
in Philadelphia (Hing 2004:17). The more “civilized gentry” expressed their frustrations vis
a vis the political system, only inciting others to actual violence. It was during this time that
America witnessed the growth of parties such as the American Party, the American
Republican Party, the fraternal Order of the Star Spangled Banner, the Order of the United
Americans, the Patriot Party and various other groups in line with the Know-Nothing
movement opposed to “the insidious policy of the Church of Rome, and all other foreign
influence against our republican institutions” (Schrag 2010:30).
As the immigrant pool shifted away from northern and western Europeans to other
immigrant groups, anti-immigrant ideology began to shed some religious animosity and take
on an ever-increasing racial character. Many immigrant groups, especially the Irish, were
viewed as non-white and “negroized” in both commentary and depiction. That being said,
fair-skinned, English-speaking immigrants were able to assimilate into American society as
they looked and, in about a generation, sounded like America’s Protestant founders. Aiding
their normalization was the influx of non-white, non-English speaking immigrants who were
unable to mask their “otherness.” Hence despite strong anti-immigrant sentiments targeting
Catholics in the first half of the 19th c.e., the first anti-immigrant policies actually targeted
the Chinese, who, as Schrag notes, “were a purely alien breed” (2010:36).
Anti-Asian Immigration Policies
Despite the active recruitment of Chinese laborers with westward expansion and the
Gold Rush, it was not long before anti-Chinese sentiment spilled into American politics. In
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1850, California passed the Foreign Miners’ License Tax law requiring all foreigners to pay a
$20 fee to mine. Although affecting all foreigners, the fee was intended to curb both Chinese
and Mexican presence in California (Hing 2004:29; Schrag 2010:36). In 1851 the law was
repealed but was followed by a new miner’s tax directed specifically at the Chinese the next
year (Hing 2004:30). That same year, Governor John Bigler called for a law prohibiting the
Chinese from mining and disqualifying them from serving as jurors or trial witnesses as they
“would never honor an oath” (Op cit.).
Two years later, the California Supreme Court classified the Chinese with Indians,
blacks, and mulattoes, making them ineligible to testify at trials involving whites (Schrag
2010:36). In 1856, with increasing anger over Chinese miners’ success at claims abandoned
by whites, Mariposa County ordered all Chinese to leave the country or be forcibly removed
(Op. cit.). This was followed by an 1858 state-wide ban on Chinese and Mongolian
immigration, which was struck down as unconstitutional in 1859. Nonetheless, many states
drew upon Californian policies in their efforts to control or prohibit Chinese immigration,
naturalization, suffrage, and the right to own property (Op. cit.). State-level attempts such as
these were just the start of anti-Asian immigration agreements and policies that lasted well
into the mid-twentieth century.
Similar to anti-Catholic ideology turned violent on the East Coast, anti-Chinese
attitudes manifested in a number of “anticoolie” clubs and mob attacks. Such clubs’ less
severe actions included evicting miners form their production areas and confronting railroad
workers on site, often rolling rocks at workers (Hing 2004:31). More violent actions ranged
from physical violence against individual Chinese to the burning of Chinese homes and
factories that employed Chinese workers (Op. cit.).
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Facing mounting anger over Chinese laborers, the federal government passed a series
of anti-Chinese bills. This began in 1870 when Congress rewrote the 1790 Nationality Act to
extend citizenship to Africans and those of African descent, but deliberately left out the
Chinese due to their “undesirable qualities” (Hing 2004:36). This was followed by an 1875
law prohibiting the importation of Chinese women for “immoral purposes,” effectively
barring all Chinese women from the U.S. (Op. cit.). Then came the Chinese Exclusion Act in
1882 just a few short years after the completion of the transcontinental railroad, for which
construction had primarily depended upon Chinese labor. The 1882 act banned the
immigration of Chinese laborers, but permitted the entry of professors, students, merchants,
and their servants; it was extended in 1892 and made permanent in 1902. The law also
included a “right of return” for U.S.-born Chinese Americans, legal U.S. residents, and
foreign-born children of U.S. natives. Despite having the right to legally enter the U.S.,
many Chinese-Americans and their family members were detained at Angel Island’s
immigration detention camp in the San Francisco Bay for weeks, months, and in some cases,
longer than a year (Schrag 2010:62). In addition, official exclusion of the Chinese increased
the number of “paper sons,” or undocumented Chinese, who attempted to enter the U.S.
using fraudulent documents certifying them as U.S. natives or their children born abroad
(Schrag 2010:70). Although illegal immigration was nothing new—even immigrants not
restricted from entering the U.S. had long depended on the practice of avoiding border
checkpoints and health inspections to successfully get into America—illegal Chinese
immigration was significant.
Anti-Asian sentiment was not only directed at the Chinese but at the Japanese as well.
In the wake of Chinese exclusion, Japanese laborers began migrating first to Hawaii and then
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the west coast. The Japanese were soon regarded with the same contempt once reserved for
the Chinese as American farm workers feared Japanese competition. The situation only
worsened after Japan’s show of strength in defeating the Chinese in 1895 and Russia in 1905
(Hing 2004:42). Facing mounting political pressure, President Roosevelt negotiated the
Gentlemen’s Agreement with Japan in 1907. Under the agreement, Japan effectively halted
emigration to the U.S. by refusing to issue passports to Japanese laborers. In exchange the
U.S. agreed not to officially exclude the Japanese and allowed Japanese wives and children
to reunite with husbands and fathers in America (Op. cit.). This was later followed by
California’s Alien Land Act of 1913 prohibiting Japanese aliens from owning land or other
real property, and eventually, a restriction against the immigration and naturalization of
almost all Asians.
Furthering Racialized Immigration Policy
With a second spike in immigration predominantly composed of Eastern and
Southern European immigrants and intensifying labor conflicts and union-busting from the
1880s onward, nativist fears were exacerbated once more. As Peter Schrag notes:
Fear of immigration took all manner of forms, expressed in countless ways: as complaints
about the burdens immigrants placed on charitable institutions and the numbers of
immigrants in prisons and asylums; as the problems of immigrant children in schools;
with photographs of urban slums; with muckraking exposés of political corruption and
the city bosses who thrived on immigrant votes; with liberal complaints about immigrants
as the exploited labor pool of the economically privileged; and, beginning in the first
decades of the twentieth century, with intelligence test scores. All of these fears would be
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the subtext–a mixture of social reform and nativism–of the immigration restriction
movement and policies to this day. (2010:50)
Accordingly, Congress, in a trigger-happy fashion, began adding to the list of European
immigrants eligible for exclusion starting with contract laborers in 1881; preexisting
restrictions against “lunatics,” paupers, and people likely to become public charges had been
on the books for decades. By 1903 excludable immigrants also included “persons suffering
from a loathsome or dangerous disease,” those convicted of a crime of “moral turpitude,”
polygamists, idiots, insane persons, epileptics, and people who had been insane with the past
five years, people who have had two or more attacks of insanity, professional beggars,
anarchists, or anyone who “advocated or believed in the overthrow of the United States
government by force or violence or of all government or of all forms of law or the
assassination of public officials,” and prostitutes and “persons who procure or attempt to
bring in prostitutes or women for the purpose of prostitution” (Schrag 2010:72).
Within this context, the U.S. Immigration Commission performed a 3-year study of
the nation’s immigration situation resulting in a 41-volume report released in 1910. The
report was expansive to say the least and covered a multitude of issues: conditions affecting
emigration from Europe; the jobs held by immigrants in American factories, mines, and
agriculture; historical immigration statistics by year and “race” or national origin; data on the
“problem” of immigrant children in American schools; data on the “fecundity” of immigrant
women; information on conditions in the steerage quarters of immigrant ships; data “on the
importation and harboring of women for immoral purposes”; the number and national origins
of immigrant inmates in jails, charitable hospitals, and asylums; an abstract of the
government’s official “dictionary of races and peoples” used to classify new arrivals; and,
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numerous other statistics that painted a comprehensive picture of immigration prior to the
20th century (Schrag 2010:70). Overall, the report found that the majority of Southern and
Eastern European immigrant children were “retarded,” that unskilled immigrants were the
least likely to assimilate properly into American society, and that immigration should be
heavily restricted, limiting entries by ethnic origin and race (Op. cit.). In essence, as Schrag
notes, the report’s “essential message was the danger from, and need to curb, the new
immigration” [italics added] (Op. cit.).
Following the report, Congress passed a bill requiring all adult aliens seeking to
immigrate—with the exception of Russian Jews fleeing pogroms—to pass a literacy test.
The test was intended to stem the flow of Eastern and Southern European immigrants, yet as
Schrag points out, by the end of WWI many such immigrants were becoming literate,
rendering the law ineffective (Hing 2004:57; Schrag 2010:73). The law also contained a
provision restricting the immigration and naturalization of people from what it called the
Asiatic Barred Zone—also referred to as the Asia-Pacific Triangle—again along the
recommendation that the United States restrict immigration by ethnic origin and race (Schrag
2010:110). The restricted area ran from Turkey to Southeast Asia and included all of the
Middle East, India, Burma, Thailand, the Malay States, the East Indian Islands, Asiatic
Russia, and the Polynesian Islands (Hing 2004:46).
At this point, citizenship and the franchise were guaranteed to anyone white, black, or
of African nativity or descent born or naturalized in the United States. Moreover, many
Asians, including most Chinese and Japanese, were already explicitly prohibited from
naturalization. Hence the passage of the 1917 law further complicated immigration matters
and sparked a series of court decisions to determine who was white and who was not—a task
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that was much more difficult than it sounds (Schrag 2010:111). While the details of these
court cases extend beyond this chapter, a sprinkling of court decisions up to the 1950s
highlights the complexity of race, immigration, and naturalization in the U.S. Syrians were
white sometimes (Op. cit.). Asians were white, then they weren’t (Op. cit.). Asian Indians
and Koreans were not white (Op. cit.). Afghanis weren’t white, and neither were “Arabians,”
but then it was decided they were white because European civilization originated in the
Middle East (Op. cit.). Mexicans were usually white “for most official purposes” (Op. cit.).
Persons who were half white and half Asian were not white and persons who were part
Native American and part African were not black or African (Op. cit.). Sicilians were not
white (Op. cit.). It would not be until the 1943 repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act and the
1952 passage of the McCarran-Walter Act that the ban on Asian immigration and racial
restrictions on naturalization would be lifted.
Several years later, influenced by the U.S. Immigration Commission report and a
plethora of studies detailing the genetically inferior makeup of non-Anglo peoples—which
were propped up by the faulty “science” of eugenics and based on a mélange of incorrect
research techniques and the misapplication of Darwinism and Mendelian inheritance—
Congress passed the Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924. The 1921 act imposed America’s
first-ever immigration quotas, limiting the total number of immigrants of any nationality to
3% of the foreign-born population of said nationality living in the U.S. in 1910 (Schrag
2010:113). This was a part of a post-war understanding of the nation-state system and
sovereignty based upon hardened borders and enhanced control over the movement of people
(Op. cit.). Greatly influencing the passage of the act was Congressman Albert Johnson’s
1920 report to Congress that alluded to tens of millions of undesirable Europeans—many
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with fraudulent passports and visas, many adhering to Socialist ideas, and many of them
Jews—primed and ready to catch the next ships to America (Schrag 2010:115). Overall, the
act set a limit of 350,000 immigrants annually and allowed only one-fifth of the any nation’s
annual quota to immigrate in any single month. Interestingly, countries in the Western
Hemisphere, including Canada and all of Latin America, were excluded from the quotas.
Despite angering the business community, who argued that the U.S. was experiencing
a labor shortage and that new restrictions would increase illegal immigration, Congress
continued tightening immigration controls. In 1924, the Johnson-Reed Act revised the initial
provisions of the 1921 reforms, further restricting immigration to the United States. As
Schrag notes, widespread support for reducing immigration had existed for quite some time,
thus “the question was never what to do, but only how to do it without seeming too blatantly
racist and/or ruffling too many diplomatic feathers abroad” (2010:117). Therefore when it
was initially proposed that immigration quotas be based upon numbers of foreign-born
populations from the 1890 Census—when Italians, Greeks, Poles, Hungarians, Russians, and
Jews were still a relatively small portion of total U.S. immigration—it was apparent that the
bill would never pass as it blatantly discriminated against the American descendants of such
immigrant groups, which by that time comprised a large portion of the voting public (Schrag
2010:120). The solution was a “sort of ethnic genealogy” tracing the descendants of all
immigrant groups in the U.S., including acceptable Northern and Western Europeans, to
calculate a percentage breakdown of the entire U.S. population by national ancestry.
Regardless of the fact that 300 years of intermarriage and changing national
boundaries, along with the difficulty of establishing national origins at all, made the new
quota system arbitrary, it went into effect in July 1927 (Schrag 2010:123). The new system
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limited overall immigration to just 150,000 people annually and restricted immigration by
country to just 2% of the total number of ethnic descendants from any given nation living in
the U.S. in 1920: 5,802 for Italy, 6,524 for Poland, 2,784 for Russia, 15,957 for Germany,
17,853 for Ireland, and 65,721 for Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Op. cit.). Many
nations were given quotas under 1,000, with Spain’s quota, for example, being set at 131
immigrants annually. Other nations were given token minimums of 100 even if their actual
quota would have been smaller based on the population figures used in the calculation.
Spouses and minor children of American citizens were exempt from the quotas, and
immigration from countries in the Western Hemisphere remained unrestricted, despite, as
Schrag notes, Southwestern anger at the continual influx of Mexicans (Op. cit.). The law
also removed the statute of limitations on deportations for illegal entry among other offenses.
As Hing notes, the 1924 act was praised as “the ‘most far reaching change that occurred in
American during the course of this quarter century,’ enabling a halt to ‘the tendency toward a
change in the fundamental composition of the American stock’” (2004:69). In sum, the
reform allowed Congress to successfully curb immigration based upon racial and ethnic
preferences without appearing overtly racist or discriminatory, making it clear that despite
claims otherwise, nativist racism was the fundamental tool of immigration exclusion at the
time.
Immigration Reforms of 1965
At the height of the Civil Rights movement, immigration reform made its way to the
forefront of political debates. It was undeniable that the national origins quotas were
discriminatory, if not explicitly racist and classist. In fact, numerous politicians and activists
had spoken out against the quotas since they went into law for that very reason. Dislike for
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American immigration policy reached as high as the Executive Office, as evidenced by
President Truman’s open opposition to the national origins quotas during his veto of the
McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, which included provisions to exclude subversives,
Communists, and homosexuals:
I have long urged that racial or national barriers to naturalization be abolished. This was
one of the recommendations in my civil rights message to the Congress...the [McCarranWalter Act] would continue, practically without change, the national origins quota
system...the greatest vice of [this] quota system, however, is that it discriminates,
deliberately and intentionally, against many of the peoples of the world. The purpose
behind it was to cut down and virtually eliminate immigration to this country from
Southern and Eastern Europe...The idea behind this discriminatory policy was, to put it
baldly, that Americans with English or Irish names were better people and better citizens
than Americans with Italian or Greek or Polish names. Such a concept is utterly unworthy
of our traditions and our ideals. It violates the great political doctrine of the Declaration
of Independence that ‘all men are created equal.’ It denies the humanitarian creed
inscribed beneath the Statue of Liberty proclaiming to all nations, ‘Give me your tired,
your huddled masses yearning to breathe free.’ In no other realm of our national life are
we so hampered and stultified by the dead hand of the past, as we are in this field of
immigration. (Veto of Bill to Revise the Laws Relating to Immigration, Naturalization,
and Nationality, June 25, 1952)
While President Truman’s brutally honest analysis of the national origins quota system, as
well as America’s stagnant, discriminatory stance on immigration policy in general, was both
poignant and inspirational, Congress overturned his veto. In many ways, Truman and others
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calling for immigration reform were ahead of their time. The first two world wars, followed
by the Red Scare and the Cold War, threw America into an uber-conservative state of
nativism, xenophobia, and dislike for all things “different” that was hard to shake. It was not
until 1960s, imbued with liberalism, progressivism, and optimism, that American would see
true immigration reform.
In 1965 Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act, commonly referred to as
the Hart-Celler Act. The new law did away with national origins quotas, setting an Eastern
Hemisphere limit of 170,000 and a Western Hemisphere limit of 120,000 (Schrag 2010:160).
In 1976 an annual limit of 20,000 visas per country was set, and in 1978 the Eastern and
Western hemisphere totals were combined for a global annual limit of 290,000 (Hing
2004:98). It also established a new set of immigration priorities based upon skills and family
unification, giving priority to the educated, as well as spouses and unmarried minor children.
The total number of annual immigrant visas has slowly risen since 1965, but it still remains
relatively low in comparison with the number of immigrant visa applications the US receives
each year. Currently, family sponsored preference categories are limited to 226,000 per year,
and employment based preference visas are limited to 140,000 per year (U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services 2011). There are still limits on the percentage of visas that can be
allotted to each country.
As Schrag points out, the new bill was not expected to have a great impact on immigration,
and as Hing notes, even President Johnson stated that the bill was not revolutionary nor
would it reshape America (Hing 2004:95; Schrag 2010:161). This analysis seems apt when
one considers the relatively insignificant rise in the annual number of admitted immigrants.
Furthermore, the new priorities still favored those immigrant groups previously favored
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under the national origins quotas—at least for a time—as these immigrants had a larger pool
of family members in the United States to pull upon in applying for a visa and because,
coming predominantly from developed western European nations, they likely had more
access to higher education.

Despite the Act’s conservative position, it did suggest an

easing of nativist and labor tensions:
...the law [x] seemed to reflect the fact that prior immigration restrictions had done their
work, sharply reducing the number of foreigners in the United States and reducing the
tensions that had historically been associated with them...the nation [x] had assimilated many
millions of immigrants, nearly all of whom were now generally regarded as
Americans...[and] had officially become white (Schrag 2010:161).
Yet the next several decades of political conflicts and upheavals throughout the globe—
especially the numerous military dictatorships and civil wars throughout Latin America—
would bring a substantial number of new immigrants, again often very different from
America’s white Protestant founders, to the United States through both legal and extralegal
means. To prevent the successful incorporation of these “undesirables” into the U.S.,
America would turn almost entirely to immigration control by securitization of the U.S.Mexico border and, eventually, the criminalization of immigrants. Once more, however,
policy would be insufficiently prepared to cope with the fierce desire of millions to
immigrate to the United States.
EMBRACING THE SECURITIZATION OF AMERICA AND THE CRIMINALIZATION
OF IMMIGRANTS
Even prior to the fall of racially/ethnically discriminatory immigration policy,
America had already begun exploring alternative methods of exclusion, including
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securitization and the criminalization of immigrants. These methods were an easy sell and
complemented each other quite nicely. New understandings of national sovereignty,
heightened global awareness, and a rise in unauthorized immigration strengthened the
argument for tighter controls of America’s geographic boundaries. Furthermore, by
controlling the movement of people across America’s borders, the U.S. believed it would be
able to curb Mexican and other Latin American immigration, effectively excluding an
unwanted minority group without turning to blatant racial discrimination.
As Border control increased, however, so did America’s population of undocumented
immigrants, of whom, many were Mexican. When it was apparent that Border policies had
not achieved the desired effects, America began adopting policies that criminalized
immigrants once in the United States. This resulted in the solidification of the image of the
“illegal Mexican,” portraying Mexicans and Latino immigrants in general as both “illegal”—
i.e. in the United States unlawfully—and “criminal.” Furthermore, such criminalization has
actually encouraged crime as immigrants have fewer and fewer legal ways to participate in
American society and have also been made extremely vulnerable to becoming the victim of
crime because many fear criminal consequences related to their immigration status if they
denounce their victimizers.
Illegal Immigration, Border Security, the Undesirable Mexican
Prior to the early 1900s, the prevalent meaning of the U.S.-Mexico border was that of
a “frontier” (Payan 2006:6). The border region was relatively decentralized and detached
from the economic and legal worlds of the heavily populated East coast—in other words, it
was somewhat “out of sight and out of mind.” Furthermore, as Hing notes, after the
Southwest was acquired from Mexico, “Mexicans and Americans paid little heed to the
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newly created international border, which was unmarked and wholly unreal to most...[and]
Mexicans continued to cross all along the border with the feeling that in reality nothing had
changed” (2004:118). Hence the Border was merely political; it was not used to inhibit the
mobility of people or goods. During this time, the vast majority of immigration officers were
stationed on Ellis Island, and only a handful of men patrolled U.S. land borders.
Understandings of the Border aside, as briefly noted, unauthorized—or illegal—
immigration existed well before the tightened immigration controls of the early 1900s. Even
prior to the quotas of 1921 and 1924, immigrants from around the globe chose to bypass
official points of immigration for a variety of reasons ranging from a fear or inability to pass
health inspections or literacy tests to an inability to pay the $8 head tax and $10 visa fee.
Furthermore, as most Asians were barred entry to the U.S. by the turn of the century
regardless of personal circumstances, many attempted to enter the U.S. illegally. Of course,
the passage of the 1921 and 1924 Immigration Acts resulted in an increase in the number of
European immigrants entering the country illegally. Interestingly, there was a legal loophole
to the quotas: any quota immigrant who lived in the western hemisphere (outside the U.S.)
for five years could enter as a non-quota immigrant (Schrag 2010:129).
Regardless of the loophole and the fact that non-quota immigrants could freely enter
the U.S. (in theory), a growing number of both quota and non-quota immigrants opted for
illegal immigration. This quickly caught the attention of nativists and government officials
alike. For instance, in 1923 Secretary of Labor Davis reported that the growing demand for
labor had led to an increase in both immigration of legal non-quota immigrants from Mexico
and Canada, as well as the establishment of “far-reaching organizations that take the alien
from his home in Europe, secure a passport for him (a fraudulent one if necessary), purchase
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his steamship passage, place him on the ship, arrange for his entry into Cuba, Canada, or
Mexico, and late conduct him by various underground routes into the United States–all for a
fixed price...” (Schrag 2010:126). Shortly afterwards, the U.S. Border Patrol was established
to control the movement of goods and people into and out of the United States. While border
“patrollers” such as the Texas Rangers and, later, the Congressionally approved “mounted
guards” had operated since the late 1800s, they were small in number and poorly trained
(U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2009). Despite formal support, Border Patrol was illequipped to make any real dent in illegal immigration, and operations remained relatively
small and received little funding until well into the second half of the twentieth century.
Prohibition and later, WWII, further exacerbated concerns over unauthorized
immigration across the Canadian and Mexican borders. The strong desire to keep bootleg
liquor out of the country and fears of enemy combatants sneaking into the United States
weighed heavily in immigration conversations. Despite these somewhat legitimate concerns,
by the 1920s immigration politics along the Border had become dominated by an overtly
anti-Mexican slant. As Schrag comments, prior to WWI, “Mexican immigration had been of
little interest to anybody”; however, the coupling of a strong American economy with a
series of “revolutionary upheavals” in Mexico had caused the southwest’s Mexican
population to rise steadily throughout the first quarter of the 20th century (2010:126).
Arguments against Mexican immigration were characteristic of anti-immigration
positions of the century before, blending nativist fears, labor concerns, and racialized
“science.” For instance, the Order of the Native Sons of the Golden West argued that it was
“evident that, unless an end is put to the influx of Mexicans, this country will have merely
substituted a low-grade Westerner for a European immigrant, with a new race problem
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thrown in” (Schrag 2010:133). Similarly, others argued that Los Angeles had become a
“dumping ground for poverty-stricken Mexicans,” and still others claimed that Mexicans
were not only carriers of dangerous diseases but genetically predisposed to them (Op. cit.).
A perfect example blending politics, labor and race comes from a warning about the
explosion of Mexican immigration in the southwest from Harry Laughlin, director of the
Eugenics Record Office from 1910-1939, to Albert Johnson’s House committee on
immigration in 1928:
There have been established a great many Mexican immigrants who seem to be driving
out the Americans. How will this situation ultimately work out? The common Mexican,
of course, is, as we know him, of mixed racial descent—principally Indian and Spanish,
with occasionally a little mixture of black blood. The Mexican comes in freely because
there is no quota against him. And during the last few years he has come here in such
great numbers as almost to reverse the essential consequences of the Mexican War. The
recent Mexican immigrants are making a reconquest of the Southwest more
certainly...than American made the conquest of 1845, 1848, and 1853 (Schrag 2010:128).
All in all, Laughlin called for a Mexican immigration quota at worst and the barring
of all non-Caucasian immigration—recall that the meaning of “white” was still a hotly
debated term in the legal world. By using the term “Caucasian” Laughlin aimed to permit
immigration of light-skinned western Europeans. Laughlin was not the first to advocate for
the restriction of Mexican immigration. In fact, on two separate occasions—1926 and
1928—Congress debated ending the quota exemption for countries in the western
hemisphere, but as the State Department feared Mexican retaliation against the growing
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number of American businesses in Mexico, the U.S. opted for tougher Border enforcement
(Schrag 2010:129).
In 1929 Congress made unauthorized entry to the U.S. a crime. The first offense was
only a misdemeanor, but subsequent offenses were charged as felonies. This was the
moment at which undocumented immigrants became defined as criminals, situating “the
principle of national sovereignty in the foreground [and making] state territoriality—not
labor needs, not family unification, not freedom from persecution, not assimilation—the
engine of immigration policy” (Ngai 2003). Armed with a new commitment to immigration
enforcement, the 1929 law criminalizing unauthorized entry, and facing the Depression,
stricter Border enforcement measures quickly became an effective means of controlling the
population of Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the southwest, who were often swept up
and deported, unable to adequately demonstrate residency or citizenship or merely the
victims of targeted racism. As Schrag points out, immigration enforcement was used to drive
Mexicans out during moments of high unemployment, but would turn a blind eye to
immigrants during labor shortages (2010:129). Hing echoes his sentiments: “if Mexicans
were needed for [x] jobs, their temporary presence was to be encouraged and accommodated;
if not, they were to be kept out and if necessary driven out” (2004:125).
Enforcement was sloppy, complicated, and often arbitrary. Border Patrol and other
immigration officers were able to exercise a substantial amount of discretion on the job and,
as Schrag highlights, after nearly a half-century of immigration restrictions and a lack of
formal due process rights, “the legal threshold justifying deportation became both murkier
and easier to cross” (2010:130). Warrantless raids and random interrogations of anyone
perceived to be an alien landed many in immigration custody. Once in the hands of
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immigration, immigrants—sometimes already legal residents or citizens—were subject to
inquisitorial-style deportation “hearings,” in which the detaining officer was often the
interpreter, prosecutor, and presiding officer (Op. cit.). In these hearings, suspects were
rarely informed of their right to an attorney and interrogation officers relied heavily on
various forms of prosecutorial deceit (Op. cit.). Furthermore, because immigration hearings
did not qualify as criminal proceedings, there was no right to judicial review save unlikely
habeas corpus petitions (Op. cit.).
Although deportations of Mexicans continued to increase throughout the 1930s—
some estimates suggest upwards of 400,000 Mexicans in all—the pace at which Mexicans
were being deported could not keep up with increasing anti-Mexican sentiment (Schrag
2010:135). It was at this point the Mexican-drugs connection took hold. California
multimillionaire Charles M. Goethe was one who led this charge. As Schrag describes,
Goethe hoped to use the “marijuana-Mexican link both ways. Mexicans were evil because
they were bringing marijuana in; meanwhile, the refer-madness prohibitionists were trying to
show that marijuana was evil because Mexicans used it” (2010:134). Newspaperman
William Randolph Hearst contributed by filling his paper with stories of drug-crazed
Mexican rapists and murderers, although this was a common theme in the general media of
the day (Schrag 2010:135). Marijuana was quickly banned in numerous states as the choice
drug of “Mexicans, blacks, and other low types,” and a federal ban was enacted with the
Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 (Op. cit.).
In 1942, despite decades of anti-Mexican discrimination and continual attempts to rid
the southwest of Mexicans either through legislation or deportation, Congress created the
Bracero Program. Intended to offset severe wartime labor shortages, the Bracer Program
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was a guestworker program that granted between 4 and 5 million Mexicans permission to
work on America’s railroads and fields over a 22-year period. Many Mexicans came
seasonally while some stayed for extended periods of time or simply relocated to the Border
and commuted daily. When the program ended in 1964, both economic and social crossborder relations had already crystallized. Millions left without legal permission to work in
the U.S. chose to continue. This added to the growing number of unauthorized daily crossing
as well as the undocumented population permanently residing in the U.S. Border Patrol was
thus tasked with deterring, capturing, and returning these individuals as anti-Mexican
sentiment continued to grow.
Adopting a Law Enforcement/Criminal Justice Model
As unauthorized immigration reached an explosive level by the early 1980’s, many
wondered if there was anything that could stop, or at least slow, the influx. The combination
of undocumented immigrants, the 1980s economic downturn, and Reagan’s War on Drugs
led the Reagan administration to focus its attention on the U.S.-Mexico Border. Media
attention, too, was drawn to the border as it was believed that hundreds of thousands of
undocumented Mexicans were not only invading the United States and taking American jobs,
but were bringing the drug trade with them. Along these lines, Border Patrol’s funding was
greatly increased and “beefing up” border security became a top priority.
In essence, this equated to the militarization of the Border and its protective force, the U.S.
Border Patrol. It appeared that the U.S. had lost control of its own borders, and border
defenses were seen to be “under siege...by clandestine transnational actors” (Andreas 2009).
It thus appeared rational, even natural, to increase border patrolling and security in response
to the increase in illegal activity along the border. In addition, militarization fit the trend in
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immigration enforcement since the 1970s, as it was just one of many attempts to increase
immigration enforcement’s power. For example, in 1975 the Supreme Court held that, under
certain circumstances, Border Patrol officers could stop motorists in the Border zone and
question them about their immigration status if there was a reasonable suspicion they were
undocumented, and in 1976 the Court created an exception to the 4th Amendment’s
protection against unreasonable search and seizure by permitting Border Patrol to setup fixed
checkpoints on major highways near the Mexican border (Hing 2004:99). While the ‘75 and
‘76 decisions were significant, the Court’s 1984 decision to allow evidence obtained through
illegal search and seizure to be admissible in deportation proceedings gave immigration
officials the go-ahead to do just about whatever they wanted when it came to enforcement,
sending a clear message that the undocumented would be dealt with by any and all means
necessary.
Hence in the early 1990s, under the auspices of Operation Hold the Line in Texas,
Operation Safeguard in Arizona, and Operation Gatekeeper in California, walls and fences
began to spring up, clearly demarcating the boundary between the U.S. and Mexico, and
Border Patrol implemented new securitization and control strategies along the Border.
Operation Gatekeeper presents the epitome of the securitization mentality that slowly
overtook immigration and border politics from the 1980s onward. Established in 1994 by a
collection of government interests and implemented and overseen by the San Diego Sector of
the U.S. Border Patrol, which is itself a part of the Department of Homeland Security,1
Operation Gatekeeper aimed to deter would-be border-crossers through a “show of force,”

Before the creation of U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Department of
Homeland Security in 2003, border patrol operations were housed under the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service (Customs.gov 2010).
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concentrating both agents and technology along the Tijuana-San Diego border (CBP.gov
2010). Originally covering just 14 linear miles of border, it was extended to 66 linear miles,
or 7000 square miles, in just two years and acquired a second layer of fencing within 7 years
(Andreas 2001). Large fences and walls, massive floodlights, ground sensors, infrared spy
videos, night vision cameras, increased ground and sky presence of Border Patrol agents, and
immigration checkpoints along all major freeways were all integral to the program’s
implementation (Urrea 2004; Andreas 2001). In addition, patrols became more regimented,
with agents being placed at half-mile intervals all within eyesight of one another and in
constant contact, along the U.S. side of the fence (Andreas 2001). Overall, the undertaking
was made possible by a substantial increase in funding and staff. 2
A special report on Operation Gatekeeper, issued by the Office of the Inspector
General, alludes to difficulties in adequately assessing the operation, noting that evaluation
“calls for a subjective determination, and depends on the definition of success, one's
expectations versus actual achievements, and other often intangible factors” (1998).
Although there is truth to the report’s conclusion, Operation Gatekeeper—like similar
enforcement projects—was implemented based on the assumption that a show of force along
the Border would dissuade potential aliens from attempting to enter the U.S. illegally;
however, this assumption was incorrect. Despite being credited with decreasing the flow of
unauthorized immigration, disrupting smuggling operations, and increasing the number of
unauthorized immigrants and smugglers prosecuted in U.S. courts in the San Diego Sector

Between 1993 and 1998, as Operation Gatekeeper and similar plans were implemented
along the border, Border Patrol’s annual budget rose from $354 million to $877 million
(Andreas 2001). Furthermore, between October 1994 and June 1998, the number of Border
Patrol agents at the San Diego Sector jumped from 998 to 2,264 (Op Cit.).
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(CBP.gov 2010), many suggest that Operation Gatekeeper merely shifted unauthorized
traffic, not prevented it.
This negative analysis of Border policies like Operation Gatekeeper is relatively
common and has been applied to Border securitization in general. For example, in The
Devil’s Highway, Luis Alberto Urrea argues that Operation Gatekeeper and similar projects
have not actually prevented illegal border crossings but merely shifted them away from urban
areas to the mountainous desert regions of the Southwest, which are subjected to less border
patrolling, as their harsh climates are viewed as natural barriers to crossings (2004). Peter
Andreas expresses similar sentiments in Border Games, suggesting that increased border
security is as much a gesture or a ritualized performance as it is a real deterrent to border
crossings. What is more, in referencing Operation Gatekeeper directly, he cites the
subsequent rise in crossings in remote parts of San Diego County as highlighting the shift of,
not the end to, border crossings in response to the project (2001). CBP data support this
conclusion: between 1994 and 1999, total CBP apprehensions rose 57% and continued to rise
well into the first decade of the 21st century (Hing 2004:188).
Additionally, some scholars point out that “get tough” Border policies like Operation
Gatekeeper actually benefit organized crime. For example, Hing notes that as bordercrossing became more difficult, unauthorized immigrants increasingly relied upon the
services of sophisticated smuggling rings with ties to organized crime and drug traffickers
who had the expertise to outsmart Border Patrol (2004:189). What is more, as demand for
these services rose, smugglers’ fees grew exponentially. For instance, smuggling costs from
Douglas, AZ, to Phoenix rose from just $150 in 1999 to upwards of $800 just two years later
(Op. cit.). Finally, it has been suggested that these policies also increase the use of fraudulent
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documents to gain entry to the United States, as evidenced by the jump in port of entry
apprehensions involving false documents after the institution of Operation Gatekeeper and
similar operations (Op. cit.).
The push for securitization of U.S. borders has only increased since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. As Edward Alden underscores in The Closing of the
American Border, counterterrorism and immigration enforcement have been conflated since
September 11th, a trend he believes is detrimental to successfully accomplishing either goal
(2009:291). Alden notes that increased immigration enforcement has been the government’s
“quick and easy” way of increasing national security efforts in the face of terrorist attacks
(Op. cit.). Yet the vast majority of undocumented immigrants are not terrorists; thus,
funneling billions of Homeland Security dollars into increased border enforcement does little
to prevent terrorism (Alden 2009:295).
Overall, the preeminence of Border securitization over the past several decades is
irrefutable. What is more, the combination of technological advances, real or imagined
terrorist threats, and a global trend towards securitization are likely to crystallize America’s
belief that it is absolutely necessary to physically secure its borders through militarization
and surveillance. That being said, Border securitization is today only part of a much larger
government attempt to control unwanted immigrants through policy.
Criminalizing Undocumented Immigrants at the Federal Level
At the same time that legislators embarked upon “closing” America’s borders, they
also amped up immigration enforcement policies in the nation’s interior. While the trend
over the last thirty years has been towards increased securitization and the criminalization of
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undocumented immigrants, legislators and public opinion have bounced back and forth at
various points in regard to how best to manage immigration.
The first major post-1965 reform came in 1986 with the passage of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA). Although it did drastically increase Border Patrol funding
and create employer sanctions for the hiring of undocumented immigrants, it also granted
amnesty to several million undocumented immigrants (Hagan & Phillips 2008).
Interestingly, IRCA also contained a less publicized provision to assist 35 countries that had
been “adversely affected by the immigration changes of 1965. In short, the provision created
a “diversity” program—also known as the NP-5 program—that allocated additional visas to
countries that had experienced a net loss in visas after the passage of the 1965 Hart-Celler
Act. As Hing notes, this served primarily to benefit western European nations:
The list included such countries as Great Britain, Germany, and France...So the so-called
diversity program [x] was not about diversifying the country, which of course remained
overwhelmingly white. It also was not about helping immigrants from countries that had
little ability to voluntarily immigrate to the United States historically, for example,
African nations. The ‘diversity’ program was actually an affirmative action program for
natives of countries who already made up the vast ethnic background of the country, such
as western European countries. The program was about helping Europeans immigrate to
and already Eurocentric country. In many respects, the philosophy of the so-called
diversity program was the same philosophy of the national origins quota laws of the
1920s...(2004:100)
It is rather easy to understand how such a provision could make its way through Congress.
As America’s minority population continued to grow throughout the 1970s and ‘80s and
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fears over undocumented Mexican immigration intensified, it is no surprise that many
Americans were nostalgic for a pre-1965 America and hoped to restore previous immigration
trends through such a provision. Furthermore, when couched in the language of “diversity,”
who could argue against it?
All in all, the bill was rather contradictory. As Schrag points out, “IRCA was a
complex and intensely negotiated compromise among business and agriculture (which
wanted more workers), immigration rights groups (which sought amnesty to legalize those
already here), and restrictionists (who were demanding tighter controls and opposing
anything that seemed to reward the illegal behavior of those who were here without
documents)” (2010:166). Furthermore, some have argued that by legalizing several hundred
thousand immigrants—many of them Mexican—IRCA actually strengthened immigrant
networks within the United States, thus encouraging the unauthorized immigration of
hundreds of thousands more (Schrag 2010:167). On top of failing to prevent or decrease
illegal immigration, because employer sanctions were rarely enforced—and when they were,
it was typically to intimidate undocumented workers seeking union representation or
complaining about unfair labor practices—they did little to discourage the hiring of
undocumented workers (Hing 2004:182; Schrag 2010:166). Overall, IRCA is commonly
regarded as a failure at best and a complete sham at worst.
Ten years later, there was much more consensus about how to deal with the
“immigration problem.” This was made evident by the passage of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, commonly referred to as IIRIRA
(commonly pronounced “ira-ira”). IIRIRA drastically changed the climate of immigration,
tightening immigration controls, supplying additional funding to Border Patrol, and generally
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broadening enforcement powers (Phillips, Hagan & Rodriguez 2006; Schrag 2010). It also
expanded the number of deportable felonies, reclassifying many minor offenses like drunk
driving and simple assault as aggravated felonies. Moreover, it created legal “bars” to deny
visas of any kind for up to 20 years to immigrants found unlawfully present in the U.S. for an
extended period of time (IIRIRA Sections 212 and 301). Moreover, depending on case
specifics, individuals found in the U.S. without authorization for more than a year were now
eligible to be permanently barred from the U.S. (Op. cit.). IIRIRA even included a rule
prohibiting illegal aliens from receiving in-state tuition breaks at state colleges and
universities (Schrag 2010:174).
The same year, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) also
passed. AEDPA greatly enhanced enforcement power, as well as limited judicial review in
immigration cases (Phillips, Hagan, & Rodriguez 2006). After September 11th, the 2001
USA Patriot Act further expanded immigration enforcement authority and, in the words of
Rachel H. Adler, added a “thick veil of secrecy” to the already hidden realm of immigration
control (2006). Among its many provisions, the act bars some foreign citizens from entering
the U.S. on the basis of their language; expands categories of deportable immigrants; allows
for secret searches without probable cause in criminal investigations; authorizes the attorney
general to detain noncitizens without a hearing; and permits the indeterminate detention of
immigrants (Adler 2006; Hing 2004). Along the same lines, Congress enacted a 2002
“special registration” law requiring all alien males over 16 years old from any of 24
countries, all but one predominantly Muslim, to be registered, photographed, and
fingerprinted (Schrag 2010:175). Three years later the REAL ID Act was passed, which
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prohibited states from issuing driver’s licenses or other identification documents to people
who could not prove legal permission to be in the country (Op. cit.).
Then came the attempted Sensenbrenner Bill in 2005, which passed in the House but
never made it through the Senate. Pushed forward by many Republican legislators, the
proposed law had sections detailing how to prevent the entry of terrorists; immigration and
visa fraud; electronic verification of employees’ legal status; a mandate for developing a
training manual on catching illegal immigrants for local police; deportation procedures; and,
among other things, a rule stating that anyone who “harbors, conceals, or shields” an
undocumented alien within the U.S., whether knowingly or “in reckless disregard,” be guilty
of a crime (Schrag 2010:175). Several parts of the bill, including e-verify, or the electronic
verification of Social Security Numbers for the purpose of lawful employment, were passed
by Congress on separate occasions.
Overall, these policy changes have resulted in greater numbers of deportable
immigrants by vastly expanding the criteria for deportation and have set the stage for
immense increases in detention and deportation (Lawston & Escobar 2010:1). In addition,
post-1986 policies have increasingly granted immigration control agencies even more power
and discretion, along with finances, but have failed to ensure the protection of immigrant and
citizen rights alike. While these policy changes are drastic, what makes them potentially so
damaging is that they have all been primarily based upon a criminal justice/enforcement
operation model (Lucas 2005). Within these policies, immigrants are treated as criminals not
because they have committed what many of us would consider a “traditional” crime—such as
burglary, rape, or homicide—but simply for being present in the United States. As such,
immigration officials have become more akin to special operatives or military police than to
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social workers, who are typically responsible for handling human matters. In other words, in
the past, immigration was a social issue, a political issue, and at times an economic issue, but
it has only recently become crystallized as a criminal issue in the minds of legislators,
enforcers, and the public alike.
DHS and Changes to Immigration Enforcement
Aside from new immigration legislation, another legacy of the 2001 terrorist attacks
was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003. Excluding the
IIRIRA reforms of 1996, this was clearly one of the most dramatic changes to immigration
enforcement in the past twenty years. To streamline operations, the Immigration and
Naturalization Services (INS), responsible for immigration enforcement and management
since the early 20th century, was restructured under the umbrella of the newly formed DHS.
This impacted not only organizational hierarchies, but systems of operation and internal data
management as well. A 2004 report from the DHS provides a simple overview of the
change:
As part of the realignment, two new bureaus were formed within DHS to handle
enforcement actions: the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Bureau
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The Inspections and Border Patrol
responsibilities shifted to CBP whereas the responsibility of enforcing immigration laws
within the United States shifted to ICE.
Together, these two organizations are responsible for apprehending aliens in violation of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)—i.e. foreigners without legal permission to be in the
United States—and moving them through the appropriate immigration channels (United
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2004).
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Since its inception, ICE has developed a wide variety of innovative strategies and
programs to enhance immigration enforcement capabilities. ICE itself is split between two
operating components: Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and Enforcement and
Removal Operations (ERO). HSI investigates immigration crimes; human rights violations
and human smuggling; smuggling of narcotics, weapons, and other types of contraband;
financial crimes; cybercrime; and export enforcement issues (ICE Homeland Security
Investigations 2010). ERO primarily deals with undocumented immigrants and is composed
of several easily distinguishable operations. Fugitive Operations (FUG), Criminal Alien
Program (CAP), and Secure Communities are three of the most prominent ERO operations,
and are all used to apprehend, process, detain, and deport undocumented migrants and
immigrants. FUG is responsible for tracking down fugitive aliens—undocumented migrants
or immigrants who have either failed to show up for a court date or deportation date—and
taking them into ICE custody. The Criminal Alien Program (CAP) targets undocumented
migrants and immigrants currently serving time in jail or prison. CAP agents make regular
visits to detention centers and check inmate records, placing retainers on undocumented
inmates so that they are handed over to ICE once they have served out their sentence.
Secure Communities is the newest operation within ICE and involves computer
systems that link local law enforcement directly to ICE. In the past, if local law enforcement
officers suspected that someone in their custody was undocumented, they had to call ICE and
ask an ICE agent to interview the suspect over the phone to determine whether or not to
transfer him or her to ICE; Secure Communities removes this step. Now, when local officers
put someone’s fingerprints into the computer system, a report is automatically sent to ICE,
and the individual’s immigration status is checked with no direct contact between local law
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enforcement and ICE. Retainers are automatically lodged with the apprehending department
for all undocumented individuals so that they can be transferred to ICE custody at the
appropriate time. If the department releases the individual before ICE can place such a
retainer, Secure Communities agents track down and apprehend the undocumented person on
the street.
It is clear that, for the most part, ERO operations mimic the activities of standard law
enforcement or special operatives enforcement groups. Furthermore, the primary functions
of ERO subgroups—FUG, CAP, and Secure Communities—all appear to be modeled upon a
criminal justice/enforcement paradigm, which indelibly conflates undocumented migrants
and immigrants with criminals, criminalizing immigrants and perpetuating the criminal
immigrant myth. While undocumented persons have committed a federal misdemeanor, or in
some cases a felony, offense in accordance with federal immigration law and legislation such
as IIRIRA, ERO mandates, procedures, and posturing can severely distort undocumented
criminality.
For example, in an anonymous interview I conducted with an ICE agent in the fall of
2010, the criminal alien narrative was repeated again and again; however, the agent openly
acknowledged that a huge portion of undocumented immigrants who end up in ICE custody
do so as a result of committing arrestable traffic violations, not serious criminal offenses.
Hence by simply being present in the United States, the undocumented become susceptible to
increasingly harsh criminal penalties for nontraditionally criminal offenses and are likely to
commit future immigration-related offenses—such as becoming a fugitive to avoid
deportation, reentering the U.S. without authorization after being deported—once they have
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been given a criminal status. Overall, changes to ICE under DHS reorganization have
criminalized immigrants through enforcement procedures and organizational culture.
State-Level Policy Developments and Local Immigration Enforcement
Although anti-immigrant policies at the community-level have existed since the
1800s, with some of the most memorable being various anti-Asian laws passed in the old
West, such legislation experienced a rebirth beginning in the late 1970s. This is of little
surprise as America’s foreign-born population grew from 9.6 million in 1970—still lower
than at any other point in time after 1900—to 14.1 million by 1980 (Schrag 2010:163).
Included among this 14.1 million were a substantial number of undocumented folk, many
whom were Latino and many whom were concentrated in the American west (Op. cit.). As
in the past, as the population of immigrant “others” began to grow, so did the xenophobic and
racist ideology used to push anti-immigrant legislation forward.
One of the first new-wave anti-immigrant bills popped up Texas in 1975 when the
state legislature revised its education code not only to deny funding to local districts for any
student not “legally admitted” to the United States, but to authorized districts to deny
enrollment to such students (Schrag 2010:164). While the legislation was short-lived—
knocked down in Plyler v. Doe by the Supreme Court with a 5-4 margin—it was quickly
followed by similar bills in a number of western states, many of which were subsequently
knocked down. For instance, Proposition 187, passed by 59% of California voters in 1994,
was also struck down as unconstitutional by federal courts. If successful, the bill would have
denied nearly all public services, including schooling, to illegal immigrants and their children
(Schrag 2010:170). It also would have required all public employees to report all illegal
aliens to their agency head, the attorney general, and immigration authorities (Op. cit.).
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This was not the first time immigrants, especially undocumented ones, had been
equated with a heavy financial burden upon hardworking American citizens. Just a year
before the passage of Prop 187, Representative Anthony Beilenson, whom Schrag describes
as a “solidly liberal Democrat from Beverly Hills,” proposed a Constitutional amendment to
deny citizenship to U.S.-born children of illegal immigrants (2010:169). To make his case,
he warned about rising anger over illegal immigrants and the burden they and their families,
both legal and illegal, placed on the American taxpayer, as well as the “growing number of
pregnant women who come here for the precise purpose of having their ‘American’ babies”
(Op. cit.). After a brief hiatus, proposals to deny citizenship to U.S.-born children without
American citizen parents have resurfaced in Arizona, Georgia, Montana, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and South Carolina, as well as the US Congress. Currently, more than
38 states are working on similar proposals (Billings Gazette 2011).
While more extreme bills that explicitly target undocumented immigrants such as
these have either failed to pass or later been knocked down in various court cases, many less
severe bills and ordinances have made it through state or local legislative committees.
Among these were successful bills in California, Arizona, and Massachusetts to ban most
bilingual public education (Schrag 2010:174). A number of laws restricting “normal”
activities of undocumented immigrants have also been successful, including Oklahoma’s
Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007, which makes the harboring, transportation,
concealment, or shelter of undocumented immigrants a felony, and South Carolina’s statute
prohibiting illegal aliens from attending public colleges and universities. In fact, over the last
half-decade the number of state and local immigration-related proposals have exploded. As
Schrag points out, 2007 witnessed the proposal of 1,560 immigration laws and the passage of
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240 new immigration laws in 46 legislatures; 2008 brought another 1,267 proposals and 175
new laws and ordinances in 39 legislatures (2010:180). Despite the prevalence of
immigration proposals at the state and local level, comprehensive federal immigration reform
has yet to materialize, and some states claim this is exactly why they must now take
immigration matters into their own hands.
One such state is Arizona, now infamous for the passage of its SB 1070 bill in the
spring of 2010. Put simply, the bill grants state and local police increased power to enforce
federal immigration law, making immigration checks a mandatory aspect of police
interrogation and requiring that all immigrants carry immigration paperwork proving their
authorization to be present in the United States at all times. Furthermore, the law’s wording
implies the use of racial profiling in determining whom to question about their immigration
status, and reads as follows:
For any lawful contact made by a law enforcement official or agency of this state or a
county, city, town or other political subdivision of this state where reasonable suspicion
exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States, a
reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the immigration status
of the person (Senate Bill 1070).
While the law does not explicitly extol racial profiling as a usable tool for law enforcement
officers, the presence of the term “reasonable suspicion” in regards to one’s immigration
status begs the question: aside from racial or ethnic characteristics—like skin tone or
speaking a foreign language—what about an individual might cast doubt on their
immigration status?
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Law enforcement agencies throughout Arizona have voiced their opposition to the
new law, claiming it not only distracts from traditional law enforcement duties but will also
make law enforcement more difficult as immigrant populations will be less likely to work
with the police when crimes have occurred for fear of immigration consequences
(Change.org 2010). Furthermore, the U.S. Attorney General has filed a lawsuit claiming that
the law is unconstitutional. While the matter has yet to be resolved, in April of 2011 a threejudge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals refused to reverse a lower court’s order
that blocked several aspects of SB 1070 from going into effect and noted that federal officials
would likely prove that the Arizona law is unconstitutional as Congress has given the federal
government sole authority to enforce immigration laws (The Republic 2011). Proponents of
the bill, including Arizona Governor Jan Brewer, refuse to back down and have asked to
bypass the next level of appeals and head directly to the Supreme Court for a final ruling
(Op. cit.).
Then in March of 2011, Utah’s Governor Gary Herbert signed a package of
immigration bills greatly resembling Arizona’s SB 1070. Among these, HB 497 requires
police officers to “verify the immigration status” of persons detained, booked, or arrested for
most felonies and misdemeanors “upon reasonable suspicion the person is an illegal alien,”
(UTAH HB 497). Another creates a state-level guestworker program for undocumented
immigrants. Overall, Utah’s recent immigration reform attempts have been met with mixed
reviews. Some have praised the reforms as successfully bipartisan, attempting to enhance
enforcement while at the same time offering amnesty to undocumented workers (NPR 2011).
Others have pointed out that states do not have the power to create guestworker programs,
nor to grant legal status to undocumented individuals, meaning that even if Utah hands out
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work permits to undocumented folks, they could still be detained, deported, and even
imprisoned by federal immigration authorities. As Steve Camarota, research director for the
pro-enforcement Center for Immigration Studies, points out, “The guestworker stuff is
entirely meaningless” (Huffington Post 2011).
To no one’s surprise, in May of 2011 both the American Civil Liberties Union and
the National Immigration Law Center brought a class-action suit against the state of Utah
claiming that requiring police to “verify” people’s immigration status violates federal civil
rights and immigration law (The New York Times 2011). On May 10, 2011, the day HB 497
was set to take effect, it was suspended by U.S. District Judge Clark Waddoups. In
explaining his decision, Judge Waddoups stated that it was likely that at least some portions
of the law would be found unconstitutional, thus beginning what will likely be yet another
lengthy appeals process regarding immigration reform (ABC News 2011).
The same day that Utah’s legislation was blocked from taking affect as it was likely
unconstitutional, the Texas state legislature passed HB12, popularly referred to as the
“sanctuary cities” bill. In short, the bill prohibits local governments from adopting rules that
stop law enforcement officers from inquiring about immigration status of people they stop,
detain, or arrest, but does not require them to do so (Reuters 2011). Localities that do not
comply risk losing state funds. Similar to SB1070, HB12 has met with much opposition from
law enforcement as the new law will overburden already strained departments and will likely
make Hispanics fearful about calling the police (Star-Telegram 2011).
In Georgia, another “get tough” immigration bill passed in the spring of 2011, HB87,
just awaits Governor Nathan Deal’s signature. This bill creates penalties of up to 15 years in
prison and a fine up to $250,000 for undocumented immigrants who use false identification
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to get a job, includes provisions to specifically exclude undocumented immigrants from
being employed on government projects, and requires all employers with more than 10
employees to use the federal E-Verify system, among other items. Several organizations,
including political, social, and human rights activist groups have called for a boycott of the
state and its major industries, which includes Coca-Cola, Delta Airlines, AFLAC, and Home
Depot (AJC 2011; MyCuentame.org 2011). A similar bill was passed in Alabama on May 5,
2011 (Fox News Latino 2011).
Anti-immigrant policies have also taken off at the county and municipal level, yet like
their state-level counterparts, they have had mixed results. Many such laws have eventually
been blocked by federal courts, such as the attempts of Hazleton, PA, Escondido, CA, and
Farmers Branch, TX, to prevent landlords from renting to undocumented immigrants (Schrag
2010:181). In other cases, cities have attempted to prevent day laborers from congregating
outside to solicit work. For example, in 2007 New York’s Suffolk County passed an
ordinance that made loitering along roadways to solicit work a criminal misdemeanor with
$500 fine; the ordinance was eventually blocked by the New York Civil Liberties Union
(NYCLU 2011). Despite the mixed success of such policies, by 2007 more than 100 similar
ordinances had been proposed, and upwards of 35 passed (Op. cit.).
Cooperation agreements between local police departments and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) appear to have been more successful than local ordinances and
have been quite common. Prince William County, VA, went a step further than most locals
and created its own Criminal Alien Unit (Schrag 2010:181). In 2009, the county released
general guidelines for the “Local Enforcement Response to Illegal Immigration,” noting that
“any [local] law-enforcement officer [x] may, in the course of acting upon reasonable
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suspicion that an individual has committed or is committing a crime, arrest the individual
without a warrant upon receiving confirmation from [ICE] that the individual (i) is an alien
illegally present in the United States, and (ii) has previously been convicted of a felony in the
United States and deported or left the United States after such conviction” (Prince William
County Police Department General Order: 45.01 2009). In what appears to have been a
preemptive attempt to ward off legal action, the guidelines emphasize that police may not
make an arrest “solely because a person is an illegal alien...because the Police Department
has no legal authority to independently enforce Federal Immigration Law” (Op. cit.). Many
such policies, however, are often overkill as ICE’s previously mentioned Secure
Communities program is already widely used across the US, and officers from ICE’s
Criminal Alien Program frequent jails and prison across the country daily.
Add to such legislation a number of formal and “informal” policies, including the
practices of state DMV’s, landlords, banks, hospitals, energy and cable companies, video
rental stores, and even public libraries as just a handful of actors that require valid state
identification, Social Security Numbers, or proof of legal residency to acquire goods and
services. As things stand, illegal aliens are ineligible for U.S. identification documents,
making it extremely difficult—and in some instances impossible—for them to obtain a wide
variety of goods and services or participate in daily activities such as renting an apartment,
opening a bank account, getting health insurance, setting up a satellite dish, registering a
vehicle, or even buying a beer. Adding these everyday restrictions to the long list of
immigrant-specific policies, one quickly realizes the trickle-down effects of immigration
politics into immigrants’ everyday lives. In effect, such restrictive immigrant-specific
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policies are another form of criminalization in regard to criminalizing immigrants in the
public eye and pushing immigrants to use extralegal means for accomplishing goals.
CONCLUSION
The history of US immigration policy and discourse has been characterized by
nativism, xenophobia, racism, and discrimination since the original 13 colonies. When these
fell out of favor—at least openly—Americans turned to securitization and later to
criminalization in order to distinguish and exclude the “other” who by then had become and
remain Latin American immigrants. Thus, while early regulation of immigrants emphasized
characteristics such as the skin color, language, and religion as reasons for exclusion, more
recent waves of regulation have underscored the need to protect America’s borders from both
terrorist and criminal threats—especially undocumented immigrants. Yet despite vehemently
excluding various immigrant groups from full participation in American life, the U.S. has
never attempted to truly prevent immigrants from coming to the United States. Instead,
America has created an immigration system that relegates immigrants to a second-class, and
in the case of undocumented immigrants an underclass, a position from which to be taken
advantage of and exploited.
Current immigration and immigrant-targeted policies at the federal, state, and local
level continue the United States’ legacy of biased immigration policy and enforcement, as
well as support for the proliferation of anti-immigrant sentiment, especially towards
undocumented immigrants. Existing policies further criminalize the undocumented and limit
their ability to lead a “normal” life without violating some additional policy or law. As such,
it can only be assumed that the average undocumented immigrant violates numerous laws
throughout the course of his or her life in the US in addition to violating immigration law, not
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out of malice but simply out of necessity. Furthermore, in violation of immigration law and
potentially a whole host of additional regulations, undocumented immigrants are likely to
fear legal consequences, including deportation, and are thus highly unlikely to report being
victimized, making them increasingly vulnerable. In sum, by crystallizing social and legal
discrimination, past and present immigration and immigrant-specific policies have effectively
created an underclass of immigrants comprised predominantly of the undocumented, but with
the potential to include anyone perceived as foreign, “illegal,” or simply unwanted regardless
of citizenship or birthplace, as all poised to offend or be violated.
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CHAPTER 4: ESTABLISHING IMMIGRANT FEAR AND RESTRICTIONS
“I have lived 8 years in the shadows. Many people have lived fifty...the [United States]
travels to other countries to liberate people...[while] here, inside this country, [the U.S.] has
its own prisoners” (Mexican M 30’s, referring to undocumented immigrants).
As discussed in previous chapters, it is apparent that current U.S. immigration policy
shapes Latino immigrants’ lives. Furthermore, it has been established that these policies and
others targeting immigrants restrict immigrants’ opportunities to legally participate in
American society, increasing the likelihood that they may utilize extralegal means of
participation, and also increases the likelihood of immigrant victimization due to their real or
perceived vulnerability. In short, these policies encourage and facilitate crime. For this to be
true, however, requires two conditions. First, immigrants themselves must be self-aware of
their immigrant status and the ways it impacts their lives; if not, immigrants will not alter
their behavior in accordance with their immigration status. In other words, if immigrants do
not feel that their immigration status impresses upon them a need to turn to extralegal
activities to live in the United States, than their status as immigrants will likely have a null
affect on their participation in crime when other demographic characteristics are controlled
for. As we know, this was the case with Latino immigrants’ participation in violent and
property crimes as explored in the introduction. Second, Latino immigrants must feel
disempowered or vulnerable to a certain extent by their immigration status. If immigrants
believe they have the power to denounce victimizers and display said power, potential
victimizers may not perceive them as any more vulnerable than non-immigrants, which
makes Latino immigrants’ status unlikely to affect their rates of victimization apart from hate
crimes targeting foreigners or minorities.
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It should be noted, however, that the majority of research on the history of American
immigration policy and the story of Latino immigrants in the United States has focused
almost entirely on immigration in the context of the U.S.-Mexico border. In effect, it has
only been over the last thirty years that immigration enforcement has actually traveled to the
nation’s interior. Hence the purpose of basing this study, in part, around the following
discussion of 12 interviews with Latino immigrants living in Southeast Michigan, is to
examine how federal immigration policy, local immigrant-specific policies, and the current
anti-immigrant climate play a part in shaping undocumented Latino immigrant offending and
victimization in the Midwest.
Overall, if immigration and immigrant-specific policies actually do encourage crimes
by, with, and against Latino immigrants, they must be conscious, active participants in this
relationship; this is what interview conversations revealed. All 12 participants agreed that
undocumented Latino immigrants are aware that their presence in the United States is
unauthorized and that as such, they are prohibited from participating in numerous activities.
Furthermore, participants agreed that the majority of undocumented Latinos live in constant
fear of potential arrest, detention, and deportation due to their immigration status, making
them more vulnerable to predatory offenses. Taken together, restrictions undocumented
Latinos face, as well as their fear and vulnerability, make them both more likely to offend
and be victimized. Thus in essence, the following provides a detailed look at the affects of
the overarching status offense every singly undocumented Latino immigrant commits:
unlawful presences in the United States.
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RESTRICTED ACTIVITIES
“Life here is very difficult. Super difficult. Why? Because we don’t have, we don’t have a
paper, yes for the simple, the simple fact that we don’t have a piece of paper” (Mexican 30’s
Male).
Participants offered a detailed assessment of the numerous activities undocumented
immigrants are prohibited from participating in, as well as the many ways immigrants get
around such prohibitions, which will be discussed later. Of all the restrictions impacting
their lives, the inability to acquire a social security number, state ID, or driver’s license
appears to have the single greatest impact of undocumented Latinos ability to participate in
American society and—aside from being present without authorization—appears to be the
driving force behind both immigrants’ participation in crime and victimization. Today,
leasing an apartment, being employed, registering for school, driving, visiting a hospital,
traveling, gaining access to specific locations, signing up for services such as electricity or
cable, checking out a library book, and even making some purchases and returns are
predicated on holding a valid ID. Basically, without an official government ID, it is almost
impossible to do anything today’s world of technology, security, and control.
When discussing prohibited or restricted activities, participants almost always began
with the most basic aspects of everyday life from which immigrants are excluded. This often
included obtaining valid IDs, driving, having and using bank accounts, and signing up for
household services like electricity, gas, cable, and phones. For example, when asked what
activities are specifically prohibited for undocumented immigrants, this Costa Rican
woman’s response was quite standard:

93

...just very basic things like, um, I mean it’s hard to have a bank account. It’s hard to
cash your checks. It is, it is a, a major obstacle that there are no licenses for
driving...yeah there are a lot of things that we’re not allowed to do. Like even
travel...even inside the country it’s hard. Just to take a flight or to take a train or even
the bus is something that if you’re smart enough you won’t do...It’s very hard to, like
to rent a car. Yeah a lot of things like to get like, you know like the electricity or
cable stuff, sometimes to start the process they ask for a social security number and
all the documents and [smiles] they have come up with other solutions for you know
that kind of people [makes quotations with fingers, still smiling] supposedly.
Sometimes they charge you um, like a deposit, like $400, $500 deposit [to] skip that
social security thing.
From her perspective, as an undocumented immigrant, one is pretty much restricted from all
sorts of “everyday” activities. When asked the same question, two other participants offered
a similar perspective, but their responses centered around not having a valid social security
number:
Female Participant: For everything they ask [to check your] credit. Obviously we
know that in every country there are laws...[but] how can one avoid [doing illegally]
what most of the time the same government prohibits one from doing [legally]?...Like
what happened to me last week. I went to setup the satellite dish and they simply said,
‘Do you have a social security [number]?’ I don’t have a social security number. I
have a tax ID number. ‘We’re going to check your record. Oh, you can’t setup an
[account] because your record is empty.’ Obviously [laughs].
Male Participant: And how are we going to build credit if no one will let us start?

94

Female Participant: Exactly! And to be able to start building credit [with the
company], you have to pay $1500 cash first!...In this way or, many times, under the
table, the same government that wants to eliminate violence, scams, or what do they
say when things aren’t done appropriately?
Male Participant: Frauds?
Female Participant: Frauds. Yes the same government, it doesn’t allow us to do things
the proper way as we would like to. Look, you can’t drive without a license, but if
you go to apply for a license and explain, ‘Look I have a car. I am working. I don’t
have another form of transportation.’ No! Denied! You want to get insurance. You
offer to pay [x]. No, because you are an illegal...You want to continue studying. No
because you are an illegal. You want to go to a dance. [You use] your passport as
identification and they look at you as if you were an assassin. As if you were a thief.
Simply because your [ID] doesn’t say ‘United States.’ (Costa Rican 30 Female &
Mexican 30’s Male)
Other participants linked the difficulties of being an undocumented Latino to the
inability to get a driver’s license:
[I go to] the store to buy, I don’t know, one beer. And they see that my license is
expired and say ‘No.’ It doesn’t work. I feel like this is a type of discrimination
because I know the law only requires that one is of age in order to buy alcohol...This
is just one example of what happens with an expired license. It closes many doors.
(Mexican 23 Male)
As was the case with this young man, losing the ability to participate in or perform certain
activities or, as we might say, to have certain privileges, due to an expired license was very
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frustrating for nearly all participants. This is likely exacerbated by the fact that until a few
years ago, undocumented immigrants could obtain driver’s licenses and thus had access to
much of what society has to offer. For example, one 26-year-old participant spoke of the
expiration of his license with a tangible air of sadness:
Personally, I don’t have an ID because, about 5 years ago, they changed the laws in
the state of Michigan referring to driver’s licenses. And I had my license and I had
my ID, which are now both expired. About a year ago in February the police stopped
me and I had to go to court for driving without a license. I also don’t know if I can
return to school because my license is expired. Sometimes I have problems at the
bank when I want to make a big deposit or withdrawal. I still have my bank account,
it’s just that not having a license has complicated things for me a bit.
This participant was not the only one to discuss the expiration of driver’s licenses as
something worth fearing when upcoming and worth mourning when gone. Multiple
participants noted that most undocumented Latinos’ licenses have already expired and those
that are still valid will soon expire. In fact, one young Mexican participant mentioned that he
knows many people who now dread their birthdays because their licenses are set to expire.
Put simply, for the average undocumented Latino, the expiration of a driver’s license brings a
life sentence of exclusion from American society.
FEAR AND VULNERABILITY
“I, um, I’m basically trying to be invisible. I mean everybody knows the risks. I think
everybody would agree with that. How we live? Well, we live with fear” (Costa Rican
Female 32).
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Fear and vulnerability—although not always explicitly expressed—were recurring
themes in every interview conducted. Not a single participant negated the notion that
undocumented Latino immigrants know that their mere presence in the U.S. violates the law.
At the same time, many did not feel that being present illegally was the same as committing a
“traditional” crime and wanted to emphasize this point. Throughout the interviews
participants often noted that Latino immigrants are “treated like criminals” despite only
coming to the U.S to work and give their families the chance at a better life. As one woman
noted when asked about the treatment of immigrants while in detention, “...it is a crime to be
illegal I know but, [immigrants] get mixed with other people that did like, real crimes
[laughs]. I don’t see it like we do a real crime. Well supposedly it is real.” Yet regardless of
the rationalizations or justifications participants used when discussing immigrants‘ illegal
presence, interviews consistently revealed that undocumented Latino immigrants are aware
that they are breaking the law.
Participants also stressed that acknowledging and worrying about the risks associated
with being undocumented are simply a part of undocumented Latino immigrants’ daily lives.
As one couple expressed:
Male Participant: So, immigrant life is, is very tough. It is very tough, very,
intimidating. I am referring to, that we always live withFemale Participant: With fear.
Male Participant: With intimidation, intimidation. What I mean to say by intimidation
is to be frightened. Do you understand? Frightened. Because even though I go to
and from work with the thought that at any moment immigration is going to find me
is always on my mind. (Mexican Male 30’s & Costa Rican Female 30)
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All participants agreed that this potential for discovery and subsequent deportation is a threat
that weighs heavily on undocumented Latino immigrants, and furthermore, it is the principle
fear immigrants have. As one young Mexican man put it, “...for us as immigrants here, you
never know when you are going to be arrested or you don’t know when they are going to
catch you. I think this is the biggest risk.”
Immigrants’ fear is logical because police arrests, ICE detentions, and even
neighborhood raids can happen at any moment without warning. Briefly outlining the
realities of immigration enforcement in Southeast Michigan helps contextualize participants’
comments. As a federal law enforcement agency, Michigan ICE offices follow the same
protocol and regulations as do ICE offices around the country. Being that Michigan shares a
border with Canada, and specifically, that the Ambassador Bridge connecting Detroit to
Windsor, Ontario, is one of the most high-volume crossing points between the U.S. and
Canada, Southeast Michigan tends to have a fair amount of ICE and CBP activity. Both ICE
and CBP have main offices in Detroit, just about 45 minutes away from the location of this
study. While several local police departments have made public statements claiming not to
work directly with ICE, eyewitness accounts have placed them at the local raids and the
Detroit ICE office does participate in Secure Communities, a police-ICE cooperation
program discussed briefly in Chapter 3.
To further contextualize participants’ fear of ICE, local police, and deportation, it
should be mentioned that ICE activity has greatly increased in Washtenaw County over the
last several years. Perhaps not coincidentally, this rise has coincided with a dramatic
increase in the county’s Hispanic population, which the Census placed at 8,839 in 2000 and
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11,597 in 2009 (Census.gov).3 There have been numerous instances of raids of family
homes, as well as several large-scale raids on businesses including a chain restaurant in
nearby Canton, Michigan, and a local roofing company. Most recently several ICE vehicles
stationed themselves outside an elementary school in Southwest Detroit, home to a large
Mexican population, around the time that school lets out, frightening parents to the point that
they did not want to pick up their children and deeply startling children. Furthermore, there
have been numerous traffic pullovers leading to deportation. In fact, the situation has
become so precarious that local immigrant rights groups (also a growing force in response to
ICE activity) and concerned community members felt the need to push the Ann Arbor City
Council to pass a resolution stating the city’s opposition to SB1070-type legislation, as well
as police-ICE cooperation. While the resolution passed in June of 2010, local ICE activity
continues.
In fact, many Latino immigrants have witnessed immigration arrests firsthand or at
least have known others who have been deported, making fear of the police and ICE
extremely tangible. One woman stressed that even when ICE does not come knocking on
your door, you feel the impact. In discussing a specific incident in Ypsilanti, Michigan,
during which ICE detained five people from one home, she pointed out that “the police kept
on driving by in that neighborhood a lot. So it’s always like um, it is a little bit of
intimidating, but they’re not as bad as other states. That’s for sure.” When discussing ICE,
another woman directly associated ICE intimidation tactics with instilling constant fear in
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Census data on the Washtenaw County Hispanic population likely underestimates the actual
number of Hispanic-identified individuals actually living in the county due to Latino
immigrants’ fear of government agents, like Census takers, who are presumed to be
potentially connected to ICE. This is not only a problem locally, but nationally, and is one of
the reasons the 2010 Census made a special effort to count Latinos residing in the U.S.
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undocumented Latinos, “How do I explain it? ICE is always frightening...When ICE is
outside, everyone is in their apartments. Nobody leaves to go to work. Everyone is trapped
until [ICE] leaves...I don’t think it’s right...living with fear.”
Living in fear or at least aware of the threat of deportation, undocumented Latinos are
never quite sure whom they can trust. One can never tell if an unfamiliar car driving slowly
down the street or a lone stranger meandering through an apartment complex is really just a
regular person or is actually a police officer or an ICE agent. In fact, one Costa Rican
participant emphasized that she considers anyone she does not know to be a potential law
enforcement agent: “Before we leave the house, we have to check the windows to see if there
is a suspicious car or person outside...it’s the same if we go to the supermarket...even a
person that does not have the slightest chance of being a police officer, [you] always
associate with, with immigration. Or you think, ‘this person could deport me.’”
Participants with children seemed to be the most affected by their status, and those
without children acknowledged that life as an undocumented immigrant is much more
difficult for those with children. This appears to be especially true for undocumented Latinos
with U.S. citizen children because, as citizens, children can be taken into the custody of
Child Protective Services in the event one or more parent’s deportation. For example, when
discussing daily fears and potential deportation, one mother of three stated that having
children adds to the stress of being undocumented as you are not only concerned with
yourself, but with maintaining the ability to care and provide for your children:
“If you have kids that is the worst...On the news they always show cases of people that, they
get deported and their children, um, they put them in adoption and it, it is really stressful.”
A single male participant put it somewhat differently:
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...and I don’t have children, but if I had children? To leave them here and you are
there [in your native country]? About myself I don’t worry. They can grab me when
they want. I can go.
Despite stating that he would not mind if he were deported, it is clear that this participant
believes that if he had children in the United States, the situation would be much more
troublesome.
Hence, whether expressed explicitly or merely implied, participants seemed to agree
that having children makes the threat of deportation much more serious. Further evidencing
this were conversations with several mothers who participated in interviews and went into
much detail about the lengths to which people go to protect their children in the case of their
deportation. Such protections range from informal agreements with friends and family to
notarized documents granting someone power of attorney over their children. Despite
several options, two participants emphasized the difficulties one faces in securing a caregiver
in the event of their deportation. Both noted that only a legal permanent resident or U.S.
citizen has the power to travel in and out of the U.S. and help reunite children with parents.
As one woman said, whether good or bad, many undocumented Latinos associate with other
undocumented Latinos, and this makes it difficult to find an in-case-of-emergency caregiver
for their children.
Overall, most participants suggested that undocumented Latinos handle the risks of
their immigration status by staying “under the radar.” One participant put it rather bluntly:
“I, um, I’m basically trying to be invisible.” It follows then, that undocumented immigrants
are unlikely to report incidences of victimization to the police because talking with police or
other criminal justice actors has the potential to lead to the discovery of one’s immigration
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status. For instance, when asked about interactions with criminal justice employees
including prison guards, detention officers, and court employees, one participant simply said,
“I think the dream of any Latino would be to never come in contact with any of these
people.” Numerous other participants agreed with this, pointing out undocumented Latinos’
aversion to law enforcement even if they have been victimized. One 28-year-old Mexican
man explained this aversion as a combination of lacking English skills, ignorance, and fear:
Participant: What it is, [immigrants], many of them out of ignorance or fear, we
consider it daring to report anything to the police.
Interviewer: So because of that you believe that there are immigrants who are not
willing to go to the police for assistance out of fear of what could happen?
Participant: Yes. Many because they don’t speak English, because they are afraid that
they could be deported or something like that. You get me? Yes, the Latino
population stays quiet for fear of being deported.
This fear, of course, has a huge impact on undocumented Latinos. By fearing the
police and fearing reporting abuses to the police, immigrants become a target for
victimization. Put simply, many undocumented Latinos can become disempowered by their
immigration status and the fear associated with it. Of course, this is not always the case as
evidenced both by examples of individuals standing up for their rights from interview
conversations and by social justice movements involving vast numbers of undocumented
Latinos, especially on the East and West Coasts over the past several years. Yet for the most
part, participants agreed that undocumented Latinos often feel vulnerable because of their
immigration status. Interestingly, while some participants did not say outright that they saw
undocumented Latinos or themselves as vulnerable, perhaps choosing consciously or
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subconsciously not to take on a “victim” identity, others did. For instance, when asked if she
thought undocumented immigrants were afraid to call the police for help, one Mexican
woman simply said, “It’s certain that more often than not they will take you [instead]...You
can’t do anything...We have no way to defend ourselves.”
As this and other participants’ comments make clear, whether it is actually certain
that undocumented immigrants will wind up in custody if they reach out to the police for
assistance, many undocumented Latino immigrants believe that such contact with the police
could lead to arrest, detention, and subsequent deportation. Hence, as this participant
expressed, many undocumented immigrants believe that they really do have no way to
defend themselves from abuse, exploitation, and other forms of violence. One
undocumented Costa Rican woman summed up this sentiment rather eloquently, stating:
I always say the U.S. is a, is a prison of gold for us. Because we have everything
...but in the end, we are always conscious of the fact that we are hidden...because we
don’t have that little paper to ensure the tranquility and liberty that we have in our
own countries. For that reason I say, the United States: a prison of gold.
Thus without “that little paper” to afford them peace of mind, undocumented Latinos remain
in the shadows, fearful of what may come from speaking out.
CONCLUSION
Overall, several crucial points about undocumented Latinos can be taken away from
project interviews. It is not only clear that immigrants are both aware of and feel somewhat
disempowered by their immigration status; it is also apparent that undocumented immigrants
face numerous restrictions that inhibit their ability to perform “normal” activities without
being dishonest or breaking the law in one way or another. First, most commonly cited
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restricted activities included obtaining valid IDs; driving; registering a car; having and using
bank accounts; signing up for household services like electricity, gas, cable, and phones;
getting insurance; registering for college courses; taking out loans; opening a credit card
account; building credit; renting cars; domestic and international traveling; purchasing
certain items; and entering certain spaces, such as bars and other locations that require ID.
Second, participants agreed that not having valid government identification has an extremely
detrimental impact on undocumented immigrants’ ability to participate in society. Moreover,
not having the ability to obtain a valid driver’s license may be the single most detrimental
restriction undocumented immigrants face. As one participant said, “That’s it, that’s the key:
licenses. The way I see it, for most people, if they could have a license the rest wouldn’t
matter.” In essence, not having an ID is a primary restriction that makes one ineligible for
other activities. Third, there was consensus among all participants that undocumented
Latinos are aware that their mere presence in the United States violates at least some sort of
law or laws. Fourth, there was also general agreement that immigrants’ status was associated
with several risks, the greatest being the threat of deportation. Finally, although discussed in
multiple ways and seen as existing to different extents by different participants, participants
agreed that most, if not all, undocumented Latinos fear the police and refuse to interact with
them even if they have been the victim of a crime, something many participants linked to
increased immigrant vulnerability.
Now that these facts have been established, we can move on to the specifics of the
immigrant-crime relationship in the case of undocumented Latino immigrants in Southeast
Michigan. Grounded by my status-driven offense typology, the next two chapters explore
immigration and crime from two lenses: immigrants as perpetrators and collaborators (status,
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circumstantial, and opportunity offenses), and immigrants as victims (predatory and due
process offenses).

REFERENCE:
United States Census Bureau. 2009. “Fact Sheet: Washtenaw County.” Retreived July 8,
2011 (http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?_event=&geo_
id=05000US26161&_geoContext=01000US|04000US26|05000US26161&_street=&
_county=Washtenaw+County&_cityTown=Washtenaw+County&_state=04000US26
&_zip=&_lang=en&_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=&_useEV=&pctxt=fph&pgsl=050&_s
ubmenuId=factsheet_1&ds_name=DEC_2000_SAFF&_ci_nbr=null&qr_name=null
&reg=null%3Anull&_keyword=&_industry=)
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CHAPTER 5: IMMIGRANTS AS PERPETRATORS AND COLLABORATORS:
STATUS, CIRCUMSTANTIAL, AND OPPORTUNITY OFFENSES
Despite not being allowed to do certain things, undocumented Latinos still live in the
United States and participate in nearly every sphere of society. They merely do so through
extralegal means. While undocumented Latinos may be able to get around restrictions on
their own, as discussed in the previous chapter, there are many activities one cannot do alone
even with fake papers. Offenses occurring under these circumstances are those that I refer to
as, status offenses, circumstantial offenses, and opportunity offenses. To refresh, status
offenses are activities that immigrants—due to their status—are forbidden from or unable to
perform without violating one or more laws. For example, using a fake SSN to get a job is a
status offense because it is directly related to undocumented immigrants’ lack of permission
to work. Circumstantial offenses are those acts that are a crime because of one or more
participants’ immigration status, or an act that is done as a favor for an undocumented
immigrant because his or her status restricts the person from achieving a desired outcome
through legal means. For example, the provision of a ride by a licensed permanent resident
or citizen to an unlicensed undocumented immigrant can be construed as transporting or
trafficking an undocumented immigrant, which is actually a federal offense. Opportunity
offenses are acts in which a person, who could be present in the United States with or without
permission, profits by providing a good or service to an undocumented consumer because his
or her immigration status restricts one from acquiring the good or service. For example, a
citizen registering an undocumented immigrant’s car for a fee is a common example of an
opportunity offense.
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All three offense types provide numerous alternative, often illegal—although at times
merely dishonest—ways to achieve desired outcomes. Hence despite not being allowed to do
certain things, undocumented Latinos still live in the United States and participate in nearly
every sphere of society. They merely do so through extralegal means. As discussed in
previous chapters, however, since undocumented Latinos operate in the shadows and most
academic researchers have neglected to frame their activities within a criminological
perspective, there is no equivalent research with which to compare the following analysis of
status, circumstantial, and opportunity offenses. Instead, we must rely on this studies’
participants to shed light on such activities, something they were more than willing to
discuss.
Overall this chapter embarks upon “virgin” territory. First, the prevalence of
fraudulent documents is explored, with special attention paid to the rules or norms that
govern when, where, and how to use such documents. Then immigrants’ alternatives to
restricted legal participation are discussed. These include a wide range of extralegal
activities that often involve the assistance of friends, family members, or acquaintances with
some sort of legal status in the United States. Finally, the provision of restricted goods and
services to undocumented Latinos for a profit is discussed.
THE PREVALENCE OF FRAUDULENT DOCUMENTS
“Well yes [we don’t have papers]. But the fact is we have our own papers [laughs].
Legalization, we have it in, half an hour” (Mexican 28 Male).
As previously discussed, one of largest obstacles undocumented Latinos face is their
lack of valid government identification. As such, they are unable to participate in some of
the most basic activities without turning to extralegal means that range from mere dishonesty
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to blatant criminal activity. One of the most frequently cited solutions participants
mentioned when discussing how undocumented Latinos get around restrictions was the use
of fraudulent or false documents. Though not a fail-safe by any means, all 12 participants
agreed that the vast majority of undocumented Latinos own fake identification documents for
one reason or another, suggesting that fraud and/or identity theft and the production and sale
of fraudulent documents—status and opportunity offenses, respectively—some of the most
prevalent types of crime associated with immigrants’ undocumented status.
The basic preface to seeking out fake papers is, of course, employment. As
employers are required to verify employee eligibility by law, we can assume that many—if
not most—employers ask new hires to at least provide an SSN, although whether they
actually check its validity is another story. Furthermore, although some participants did
mention that some employers are more than willing to pay wages in cash, which does not
require an SSN, there was a general consensus that undocumented immigrants needed fake
SSNs or green cards to be gainfully employed. As one woman stressed when asked why
undocumented Latinos opt to falsify papers, “To falsify papers, first because we are realists.
Here you want to go to a restaurant and wash plates, you need a social security number, and
if you don’t have one you’re going to fake one.” A young Mexican who had been in the
United States for 8 years offered a similar answer, but also pointed out that many people
would prefer not to employ false documents if they did not feel they had to, “They get a fake
[to work] and that is what moves everything here...and many people don’t want to get one,
but you have to get one because without [fake papers] there is no other way to get work.” In
fact, one participant discussed her past use of false documents, noting that it worried her so
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much she actually quit her formal cleaning job and began working for herself cleaning
homes:
I worked for a cleaning company for 3, 4 years. And every year when I had to change
papers [they’d say], ‘[name] it’s time to change papers.’...The secretary would change
the name and my checks would come with my new name...until I decided to work for
myself. No more fake papers...to fix my case. I know that I’m in the wrong. I know!
It’s always on one’s mind...[fake papers] I know it’s double, triple culpability.
She did acknowledge, however, that her decision was not typical and that most
undocumented Latino immigrants use fakes.
In addition to agreeing that most undocumented folks use fake documents of some
sort, participants also shared similar accounts of what types of documents people buy, how
they are acquired, and how much they cost. First, when one talks about fake documents, one
is usually referring to fake SSN cards, fake green cards, or fake government ID’s of some
kind; most undocumented immigrants do not seek out fake drivers licenses for several
reasons that will be discussed later. Most fakes run between $50 and a couple hundred
dollars, depending on the quality, and have only gotten more affordable in the last ten years
as technology has advanced. Moreover, some producers offer package deals that include a
fake SSN, fake green card, and fake government ID for just a couple hundred dollars.
Sometimes, people actually purchase real SSNs or other identity documents. These
are either stolen or actually sold by the SSN holder; however, real documents can be more
expensive than fakes. For example, one participant went into great detail about the purchase
of Puerto Rican identities, which he claimed to a rather common occurrence:
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Sometimes people also buy Puerto Rican papers...They buy the social and birth
certificate of a Puerto Rican person and they buy them for around $2,000. And you
have your social and your birth certificate from Puerto Rico and you go to the
Secretary of State and say you have just arrived from Puerto Rico and you want your
ID and your license and you are automatically a Puerto Rican citizen...but you run the
risk that, for whatever reason, the police discover that you have committed identity
theft or even the person who sold you their identity turns you in and they put you in
jail. (Mexican 23 M)
In many ways, purchasing a Puerto Rican identity seems like a rather creative fix to not
having one’s own documents. Most Americans are unlikely to doubt that the undocumented
Latino is not necessarily of Puerto Rican descent if he or she is carrying valid Puerto Rican
identification documents. Yet, as this Mexican participant emphasized, even if someone
willingly sells their identity to an undocumented immigrant, if the undocumented immigrant
uses someone else’s identification documents, they are committing identity theft—a very
serious offense. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the seller will not turn the purchaser
in after receiving his or her money.
Not surprisingly, interviews revealed that the purchase of fake documents is much
more common than the purchase of theft of real documents. Two typical ways of obtaining
fakes emerged from interview conversations. In one scenario an undocumented immigrant
asks around until they find someone with a connection; because nearly all undocumented
Latinos have fake documents themselves, it does not take long until one is put in touch with
someone who produces fakes. In the second scenario, one merely drives to Detroit’s
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Mexican Town and hangs out for a few minutes. Undoubtedly he or she will be approached
by someone offering SSNs, green cards, or other IDs.
One Costa Rican participant admitted having used fakes in the past, however, she,
too, had decided to work for herself cleaning homes several years ago and thus had not
attempted to purchase fake documents in nearly a decade:
Participant: Well, long ago, [laughs] ten years ago...you could go, let’s say to Detroit.
You went to Mexican town and for some reason there was always like people in the
street, like hanging in the street all day long, and they could tell, you know [laughs]
who was there for getting papers. Nowadays it’s not like that..I think now here in our
city, there’s one person or two people that do it and it’s just like a phone call and you
know you give like your name and blah blah blah and you meet up and pay and they
give it up to you...you gotta give them like a picture. Gotta go take your passport
photo... I think it’s like $50, $100.... In fact, I think that, some [SSNs] they’re fake
and some I think they’re real.
Interviewer: From?
Participant: God knows who.
One young Mexican participant emphasized that you no longer have to look for
people who can provide you with fakes, noting that instead they now find you, “There are
many people in the street that, when they see you’re Latino, they simply give you their card,
they offer you a social and a green card or ID. And if you need one of those things you call
them. Someone will come to your house and take your photo. They’ll charge you $220 for all
three things, the social, the ID, and a green card.” Another participant pointed out that due to
enhances in modern technology, one need never meet whoever is responsible for producing
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the fakes. “People need ‘immediate legalization’ [laughs], it seems, for work,” he pointed out
and continued, “There is no longer a need to go with the [document producer]. Now
technology has advanced. A photo, an email, and in a few days your papers are at your front
door.” In fact, there was a general consensus among participants that home computers have
made falsifying papers so simple that just about anyone can do it:
Interviewer: So there’s people making them at their house?
Participant: Yeah.
Interviewer: Are these people immigrants too?
Participant: Yeah [laughs]. The one I know, he’s, he cooks in a restaurant and he’s
illegal and so is his wife, and I mean he has the most boring life. I mean just, lousy
car, just like everybody in our community. So it’s not like it’s a stand up person that
is getting all the money there. I think out of necessity someone would have to just,
come up with that and improvise that. I mean it’s just a regular person. (Costa Rican
32 Female)
Although participants agreed that anyone can make fakes, one participant emphasized that
government employees as well as organized crime entities are also involved in producing and
selling fakes. When asked whether immigrants, native-born Americans, or both were
involved in making fakes, he commented that, “within Latinos we have our, our
own...connections that are in charge of making papers. And Americans who work in
government offices in charge of licenses [and with] software can falsify papers...Corruption
runs from the top to the bottom. And it leaves sufficient means of acquiring papers.” Later,
when pressed by his girlfriend who was present for the interview, he also conceded that fakes
can be connected to other, more serious types of crime:
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Participant’s Girlfriend: I’m saying like aren’t fake papers connected to drugs and
drugs connected to weapons trafficking and weapons trafficking connected to fake
papers?
Participant: It’s like a circle, a circle. Everything runs from fake papers to weapons to
drugs. They can get you whatever you need, a weapon, drugs, or papers. Get it?
Everything is a circle, and, and they have different things. The police know. I believe
everyone knows. It’s very well known. (Mexican 28 Male & American 22 Female)
Interestingly, although this participant believed that the connection between the sale of
fraudulent documents, weapons, and drugs is well known, he was the only participant to
make this connection.
Overall, it appears then that in just ten years the production of false documents has
transformed from a specialized skill requiring special tools to a type of fraud that just about
anyone can accomplish with a laptop and printer. It follows that while the production and
sale of fake documents may have previously been linked to more serious criminal activity
and may well still be the fact that anyone can produce fakes suggests that these activities are
likely moving further and further away from organized crime. In addition, this also means
that is much easier and cheaper to acquire false identification documents than ever before.
Despite the ease with which false documents can be acquired and how common they
are, interview participants stressed that they are only appropriate in certain situations. For
example, participants agreed that showing a false document to a police officer was a recipe
for disaster and could even lead to prison time or deportation. As one 26-year-old Mexican
participant explained, “Fake papers are only used for getting a job...because, no, no you can’t
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create an identity with the police or the hospital...you can’t show [fake documents] to the
police because it is a federal crime.” Another participant offered a similar take:
Interviewer: And so if I’m driving and the police stop me, am I going to show or not
show the papers?
Participant: Oh, of course not! [laughs] Not to the police. [laughs]
Interviewer: Why not?
Participant: Why? Because they have their database...They know how to tell the
difference between a real document and a fake. (Mexican 28 Male)
Following this logic, it is not surprising that when asked if undocumented Latinos get
fake driver’s licenses, participants agreed that not only do most undocumented Latinos avoid
fake driver’s licenses, but that it is a horrible idea. For instance, one young man stressed that
fake driver’s licenses are useless for the undocumented:
Shit! I’ve heard of fake licenses, but not for Hispanics, more for European students
who are underage...fake licenses for immigrants doesn’t work...if they’re driving and
get stopped by the police, they are not going to pull out a fake. That doesn’t work at
all. (Mexican 26 Male)
As another participant pointed out, most undocumented immigrants do have real drivers
licenses and although it is a illegal to drive without a license, it is better to carry an expired
license than a fake:
Participant: I heard, my friend that works with me, I heard that they’re making [fake
drivers licenses] now, but I, I don’t know if that’s true.
Interviewer: Do you think that’s because before, immigrants could get a driver’s
license and then they changed it, a couple years ago?
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Participant: Yeah... But you know the funny thing I think is that, a lot of the people
don’t want to get them. Because they would rather have the expired one and keep on
driving like that than have a fake one. Because I think that if you get pulled over by
the police and you’re showing a fake one it will be a hundred times worse than if
you’re showing your own but expired. (Costa Rican 32 Female)
Finally, another participant explained the difference in the level of risk associated with using
a fake green card with a potential employer versus showing a police officer a fake driver’s
license:
One only uses [a fake] when there are not any real risks, like for work...Using a fake
green card is not the same as carrying a fake license. They are very different things
because one simply identifies us in order to say ‘I’m going to work here.’ Driving
[with a fake] is similar, but there is a huge difference in the risk that you run.
(Mexican 30 Male)
Thus although many Americans may view the act of using a fraudulent document to identify
oneself as the same under all circumstances and perhaps without justification in any of them,
undocumented Latinos have created an elaborate system that both distinguishes when it is
appropriate to use such documents from when it is not and also justifies the use of such
documents as necessary.
OTHER STATUS, CIRCUMSTANTIAL, AND OPPORTUNITY OFFENSES
As just discussed, fraudulent documents offer one solution to a number of issues
raised by undocumented immigrants’ statuses. Yet, as also noted, such documents cannot be
used in a number of circumstances, leading undocumented Latinos to seek out other often
extralegal means of getting by day to day. As such, all participants agreed that
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undocumented immigrants deceive, utilize loopholes, and break the law daily in addition to
using fraudulent documents. For example, when asked how undocumented Latinos cope
with the restrictions imposed upon them by their status, one woman commented on the
necessity of lying and breaking the law in everyday life:
[laughs] We have to lie. Um, we have to drive no matter what, I mean you’ve gotta
drive yourself to work and you’ve gotta drive your kids to school. You’ve gotta, you
gotta do your stuff. You gotta go to the doctor and, illegal things. If [you have] a
relative, and it’s really common, if there’s no way for them to come, I mean, I guess
you support something illegal because you’re bringing someone here that is not
supposed to come here. You cooperate by sending money to your relatives...Um, but I
guess a lot of, we do things illegally everyday just because you have to. Things are
not, properly done. I mean you gotta do them. For a while at least, when you live
here... I mean its just hard. It’s kind of embarrassing [laughs] you know, you gotta
come up and say that I don’t have this or I don’t have that. (Costa Rican 32 Female)
When asked for more specific examples, the same woman mentioned that sometimes,
depending on the business, individuals can substitute a foreign passport for a government ID,
but not all undocumented Latinos have valid passports or even have passports at all. She also
noted that one can use the name of a legal relative to acquire services or co-sign on an
apartment when possible, pointing out that “the tough part is like the first apartment that you
rent, and usually it comes up with a relative that already rented somewhere. And you’re like
living there and they put you like sharing the contract. [Laughs] How they did in the first
place, I don’t know. But that’s how it usually starts,” but noting that not everyone has a legal
relative to call upon.
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She was not alone in suggesting that using the names of resident or citizen family
members is quite common among undocumented Latinos. For example, one participant
retold the story of attempting to renew his cell phone contract in which he ended up getting
his sister, legally present in the U.S., to take out a contract in her name for him:
When I signed my cell phone contract I still had my ID, so there was no problem
starting the contract. But now that I had to renew my contract, they saw that my
license was expired and they didn’t want to renew it...I asked if I could use my
[Mexican] passport or something and they said ‘No. You have to use your Michigan
ID.’ So I couldn’t. It was my sister, again, that helped me. (Mexican 23 Male)
In cases where one does not have a relative or friend who will help them acquire a
service, some undocumented Latinos actually pay someone to provide them with the desired
service just as they would pay someone in any normal business transaction. For example,
one participant noted that you can find someone who will let you use their name for just
about any service, including registering cars, for the right price:
When I had my license, a friend of mine said, ‘You know what? Register my car as a
favor and I will give you some money.’ And yes I did register his car, but of course,
logically, I didn’t charge him anything because he was my friend. But there are
people that charge you. You know they say ‘sure I’ll register your car but give me-.’
Really the truth is I don’t know how much they charge, but there are people who pay
to have someone else register their car, or who pay for someone else to take out a cell
phone contract for them, or television service or internet. They pay a person to do
them the favor. Sometimes the person says, ‘well I will do this for you, but you have
to pay for my service too.‘ And you do it because for you there is no other option.
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As alluded to here, these sorts of business relationships have the tendency to cross into the
exploitative. In fact, there is often a fine line between business transaction and victimization
as many “consumers” believe they have no other option but to do what the goods or service
provider asks of them in return. While worth noting now, we shall return to this discussion
in Chapter 6.
Many other participants also noted the normalcy of driving a car registered in
someone else’s name, whether that person registers the car as a favor or for a fee. As one
Mexican woman summed up, driving a car registered in someone else’s name is just another
way to get over:
...[immigrants] are breaking the rules...because look, they drive cars in other people’s
names...Everyone, almost everyone has their cars in someone else’s name. One
person will have 6 or 7 cars in his name, but won’t drive them himself. Because
however you look it at, they are playing dirty [giggles]...they don’t stop driving,
they’re just looking for their own ways to do it. (Mexican 36 Female)
This same participant pointed out that she and her husband chose not to register their cars in
someone else’s name because they did not think it was without risk, as she said, it is just
another way to break the rules. She went on to explain that in California, where she had
lived previously, even undocumented immigrants could register their cars, so at least if one
drove without a license, the car was still in his or her name. That way, if one is pulled over,
at least the police know the car is not stolen.
Like this woman, several other participants noted that not being able to register your
car as an undocumented immigrant is a state-by-state prohibition. One participant mentioned
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that in Illinois, just about a 4-hour drive away, undocumented immigrants can still register
their own cars and receive Illinois plates:
It’s that there are a lot of ways...incredibly, it would seem impossible but, there exist
many forms of having a car in your name and having a license without papers,
without being here legally. I have many friends that go to Chicago—I don’t know
how they do it, truthfully...They give you your Illinois plate, and you register your car
in your name...it’s something legal...you put your name there and you leave with your
title...really you’re driving as if you were visiting from Illinois. (Mexican 26 Male)
Thus for those who do not want to risk driving a car in someone else’s name, a trip to Illinois
may look like the best option.
Regardless of whether one has a friend or relative register his or her car as a favor or
a fee, travels out of state to register his or her car, or simply drives without proper
registration (which was also mentioned by participants), the inability to obtain or renew a
driver’s license driving still poses a risk for undocumented Latinos. For many, however, it is
a necessary risk. When asked what Latino immigrants do when they cannot obtain a valid
driver’s license, participants agreed that the majority simply drive anyways. In fact, many
participants felt that one really has no other viable option but to drive despite the risks
associated with unlicensed driving, the biggest being that one is pulled over by the police and
then handed over to ICE.
For example, one 30-year-old Mexican put it this way, “Well if you have to drive,
you have to drive. It doesn’t matter that one doesn’t have a license. We are aware of the risk
that we run and we have thought about what could happen.” As another young Mexican
participant stated, “I think that it is about surviving, because, I don’t know. Personally, I have
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to drive a car to work because I have to leave very early for work and then return. So I don’t
drive because I like to, I drive because it is a necessity and I imagine that there are many
people like me.” Finally, as one woman said, “What do we do? Well yes, we don’t have a
license but we just get in the car and drive with ‘God’s’ license. That’s what we call it.”
It is important to note, however, that while participants agreed that most
undocumented Latinos drive without a license, they alter their driving behavior in an attempt
to lower the risks associated with driving. For example, several participants mentioned
avoiding certain streets that are known to be frequented by police or even avoiding driving at
certain times of the day for the same reason. In fact, a couple participants noted going out of
their way to avoid running into police. Furthermore, participants agreed that most
undocumented Latinos try to respect traffic laws at all times to avoid being pulled over.
Participants agreed, however, that even when you try your hardest to follow traffic laws, you
always run the risk of being pulled over.
For those who want to avoid the risk of unlicensed driving, however, there are some
alternatives. Of course, walking and biking were mentioned as substitutes for driving, but
participants pointed out that while undocumented Latinos sometimes make this substitution,
it is only viable for short distances in good weather. Many participants also said that some
undocumented Latinos take the bus instead of drive, but this was always followed by a
statement denouncing the poor quality of the local buses, which do not come very frequently
and stop running rather early. In lieu of perceivably decent options, many participants noted
that getting rides as a favor or for a fee is quite common, although it is more common for
long-distance drives.

120

Several participants noted that undocumented immigrants face great risks by traveling
on planes, trains, or buses within the U.S. and thus ask licensed friends or family for rides,
sometimes only paying for gas and other times paying a fee for the ride. For example, one
Costa Rican participant pointed out that driving in unknown territory only increases the risks
for the undocumented:
It would be suicide to do a long trip, out of the state, like out of your comfort area if
you don’t have a license. What happens, what happens if you get pulled over in, I
dunno? Ohio. What happens? You’re so far away. So it’s always good to have
someone with a license that’s up-to-date just in case.
Another participant set the point at which one finds a ride at 3 hours, noting that “when
people go to Chicago, practically whenever the trip is more than 3 hours [x] I believe that
generally one asks someone with a license to drive [such] long distances.”
In the case that they cannot get a ride from a friend or family member, they may be
forced to pay relatively high “taxi” fees. As one man pointed out, “Usually there are friends,
people one knows with papers and they can help you [get around] if you give them some
money, or sometimes out of friendship, but usually you pay some amount of money. It’s a
service. And many people do it. They can take you from here to any part of the United States
or take your things to Mexico. It’s a business,” and of course every service has its price. For
example, one participant said that since she and her husband have chosen not to drive without
proper license and registration, they are forced to pay upwards of $15 for rides around town
even from friends, as said somewhat disappointedly, “Here if you don’t give more than $15
no one will give you a ride.”
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She also mentioned that the ride service she and her husband use is actually run by
another undocumented Latino:
...the man that gives rides, he gives rides, but he doesn’t have a license nor is his car
in his own name...And he doesn’t just take one person. He takes 6 or 7 people in his
car...and he always charges $30 a person to go from [Ypsilanti] to Detroit [one way].
(Mexican 36 Female)
Despite the man’s status, which is uncommon for someone who provides such a service
according to other participants, this woman and her husband believed it less risky than
driving themselves. While it is interesting that this many would risk giving rides as his
profession, knowing that not only is he driving a car registered in someone else’s name
without a license himself, especially considering the risks other participants mentioned in
relation to driving as an undocumented immigrant, it is clear that transporting undocumented
immigrants is a very lucrative business. As this participant pointed out, the man she uses for
rides can make up to $105 to drive passengers one-way from Ypsilanti to Ann Arbor, a
distance of about 20 miles from one downtown to the other, and up to $210 to drive
approximately 30 minutes on the highway from Ypsilanti to Detroit tax-free. At the same
time, a ride from a normal taxi service across town or to Detroit would likely cost more than
what this man charges, although one would not be sharing the ride with other passengers.
When asked about the existence of ride services for undocumented Latinos, one
documented participant said he was not aware of any in the area, but had considered starting
something up himself because he thought there was a good deal of money to be made, but
had second thoughts:
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Shit I’ve thought a lot about this! [laughs]...opening a business like that and I can give
people rides [laughs]. For me I won’t do it though because that can get you in
trouble...because they are going to say that you are helping, with how the laws are
now, they can misinterpret that you are helping [undocumented immigrants] or
trafficking people...(Mexican 26 Male)
Thus even for this documented, licensed man, the risks associated with merely having
undocumented immigrants in his car are simply not worth the money he could make if he
opened an immigrant taxi service of sorts. As fewer and fewer undocumented Latinos have
valid driver’s licenses, however, it is likely that this sort of immigration-related service will
only grow despite the fact that it can be construed as a federal offense.
Overall, when it comes to undocumented Latinos’ solutions to the challenges they
face in daily life, ultimately, most feel forced to violate the law. Moreover, in many cases
immigrants are not alone in their lawbreaking, instead relying on the illegal services or
assistance of residents, citizens, and native-born Americans. As one Mexican participant in
his late twenties summed up when asked how undocumented Latinos overcome restrictions,
it all comes down to crime and money:
It’s completely the opposite. Everything you all can do freely, we can only do
illegally. Finding a job, obtaining a license, a place to live, a car, it’s always driven by
money under the table. Money is money and everyone has their price. (Mexican 28
Male)
While this man’s words are perhaps more blunt and explicit than some other participants’
responses, all other participants acknowledge that undocumented Latinos break the law daily.
Interestingly, each time undocumented Latinos’ participation in illegal activities came
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up, participants framed lawbreaking as a necessity and in some cases, as with the Costa
Rican participant quoted previously, attributed undocumented lawbreaking in part to the
actions and policies of the U.S. government:
Yes one knows that it’s against the law...But they don’t leave you with any other
option [laughs softly]. It would be better if they made other options. One wouldn’t,
one wouldn’t break so many of [America’s] laws. If they would give one the
opportunity, one wouldn’t do these things. It is like they, Americans, force some to do
things that they don’t want to do...but there are times that even though we don’t like
it, we can’t walk the straight and narrow. (Mexican 36 Female)
Like many other participants, this woman neutralized the criminality of undocumented
activities which violate the law, pointing out that breaking the law is not something one
enjoys or prefers to do, arguing that the U.S. government leaves immigrants with no other
viable options and thus forces immigrants to break the law, and emphasizing that
lawbreaking is simply a necessary part of everyday life.
CONCLUSION
Again, several key points can be discerned from participant analyses of the ways in
which undocumented Latinos overcome the prohibitions or restrictions they face in everyday
life. First, it appears that the use of fraudulent documents is both extremely common and
very well known within the Latino immigrant community. The most common fraudulent
documents appear to be fake SSN cards; however, participants frequently noted the existence
of fake birth certificates, fake US IDs, and fake international IDs, as well as the purchase of
real IDs and even entire identities. Interestingly, participants agreed that fake driver’s
licenses are not common because they are perceived to carry more risk than they are worth.
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Moreover, it is apparent that there exists a set of well-known norms and rules to determine
when and how to use such fraudulent documents. Following such guidelines and weighing
the risks against the necessity of using fake papers suggests that undocumented Latinos are
aware that using fakes is against the law and make risk assessments accordingly. Finally,
participants all agreed that using fake papers for employment purposes is the least risky
scenario in which an undocumented immigrant uses fakes.
Furthermore, more often than not, undocumented immigrants behave dishonestly or
violate the law in one way or another in order to carry out “normal” activities and achieve
desired goals. Interestingly, the level of criminality involved in accomplishing specific tasks
depends upon one’s access to relatives, friends, coworkers, or even acquaintances who are
willing to assist an undocumented person as a favor or for a fee. Of course, whoever assists
them must have some sort of authorization to be in the United States—be it a work permit, a
green card, or actual citizenship—or some other form of identification like a valid passport or
even a driver’s license that has yet to expire. Accomplishing restricted tasks with the
assistance of others as a favor or for a fee is especially common in the case of signing up for
some sort of service (electricity, cable/satellite, phone) or registering one’s car. It is also
common for undocumented Latinos to get rides from others if they do not have a license. In
all cases, there is much money to be made in assisting an immigrant gain a desired service or
providing an immigrant with a good or service they cannot get on their own. Finally, while
undocumented Latinos acknowledge that they do break the law, they insist that it is only
because, in many circumstances, there is no way for them to live in the United States without
doing so.
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On the other side of the equation, it appears that there is a substantial amount of
money to be made from the provision of goods and services as well as the production of
fraudulent documents and the sale of real identity documents. As more and more states pass
immigrant-specific legislation further restricting immigrants’ ability to participate in society
and more and more employers adopt the E-verify system to check SSN validity—a
requirement that many states are themselves beginning to adopt in lack of the passage of a
federal requirement—the provision of goods and services and the sale and use of real identity
documents will likely increase. For the time being, however, it seems that advances in
technology have created a relatively lucrative business opportunity for those with computers
and connections to the Latino community.
Overall, based on interview conversations, it is apparent that undocumented Latinos
frequently break the law when their status restricts them from participating in an activity or
achieving a desired end in a legitimate way. Moreover, it seems that in cases of criminal
activity involving at least one undocumented immigrant and one other person—who may or
may not be an immigrant—there are two motivating factors: 1) assisting a friend or family
member (circumstantial offense) or 2) the potential for monetary profit (opportunity offense).
The rewards of such favors and business transactions, however, are not always guaranteed.
In fact, such collaborative crimes have the ability to turn sour rather quickly, leaving
unsuspecting immigrants the victims of theft, extortion, or worse. Yet as shall be presented,
such is the life of an undocumented immigrant, susceptible to vast array of predatory
offenses whether one engages in deception and crime or not.
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CHAPTER 6: IMMIGRANTS AS VICTIMS: PREDATORY AND DUE PROCESS
OFFENSES
INTRODUCTION
As alluded to previously, a large portion of crime related to undocumented
immigration is actually carried out against undocumented Latinos, not by them. I have
referred to such crimes as predatory and due process offenses. As will be seen in this
chapter, such victimization comprises a rather large proportion of all status-driven offenses.
To clarify, predatory offenses encompass all offenses perpetrated against immigrants
because offenders believe they are somewhat immune to apprehension and punishment due
to immigrants’ perceived and actual vulnerability. These offenses are carried out by people
who know or presume to know an immigrant’s immigration status and purposefully exploit,
extort, assault, or violate the immigrant under the pretense that the immigrant will not report
them for fear of immigration consequences like deportation. Wage theft is one example of a
predatory offense, as is domestic abuse predicated on threats of deportation. Furthermore,
while all five offense types (status, circumstantial, opportunity, predatory, and due process)
can occur on their own, in many cases predatory offenses grow out of other, non-predatory
offenses. For instance, someone may provide an undocumented immigrant with a service he
or she cannot obtain on his or her own for an agreed upon fee, but than later threaten to
withdraw said service unless the immigrant pay a monthly fee. In this case, what began as a
collaborative opportunity offense has transformed into a predatory offense with a clear
perpetrator and victim.
Due process offenses include all offenses committed by government actors who
operate within the criminal justice realm that violate the rights immigrants are legally entitled
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to regardless of their status. The case of a police officer pulling over an immigrant not for
committing any form of traffic violation but instead for being presumably undocumented is
one example of a due process offense. The excessive use of force in immigration detention
would be another. The major difference that distinguishes due process offenses from
predatory offenses—other than the perpetrator’s identity as a criminal justice employee—is
that due process perpetrators are acting in accordance with institutional procedures,
objectives, and norms and not for personal gain. Were a police officer to blackmail an
undocumented immigrant for money in exchange for not delivering him or her to ICE, this
would be considered a predatory offense.
Overall, participants agreed that undocumented Latinos fall victim to predatory and
due process offenses daily. Three common themes emerged from interview discussions
about predatory offenses. The first was common discrimination and interpersonal crimes.
This includes various forms of harassment, differential treatment, and psychological and
physical abuse, including domestic violence. The second was the case of business
agreements (opportunity offenses) gone sour. This consists primarily of blackmail and/or
extortion, as well as theft. The third was employment abuse, which includes harassment,
differential treatment, lack of benefits, lack of breaks, wage theft, unsafe working conditions
that violate labor and health and safety laws, and even slavery. Again, it should be pointed
out that some of these offenses are actually illegal, such as domestic violence, while others
may or may not be illegal depending on the context. For example the “theft” of a car by the
person who agreed to register it as a favor or for a fee is not technically a theft; however, in
all practical terms it clearly constitutes a theft as the car rightfully belongs to the person who
purchased it and drives it as his or her own. Furthermore, some of these offenses, such as
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failing to provide employees with a break or pushing them to work harder than others is not
technically illegal as adult employees are not guaranteed breaks under Michigan labor law,
nor does there exist a set of regulations dictating at what pace employees can be forced to
work. Finally, of all predatory offenses discussed, employment offenses were by far the
most common. Hence, they are discussed separately and in the most detail.
For reasons that will be discussed later on in this chapter, this study’s participants
were unable to discuss due process offenses to the same extent to which they were able to
analyze and provide examples of status, circumstantial, opportunity, and predatory offenses.
That being said, participants did mention several due process offenses in common. These
included racial profiling on the part of local police as well as ICE agents, verbal harassment,
and unreasonable searches, seizures, and arrests. Fortunately, due process offenses have
received by far the most attention from researchers and human rights groups of all the
offenses in the typology used here, thus participant contributions in this area are both
contextualized and supported by a thorough literature review and analysis.
DISCRIMINATION, THREATS, AND VIOLENCE
As previously discussed, Latino immigrants face a wide variety of abuses, many
occurring at an interpersonal level. Participants tended to agree with this idea, although the
extent to which Latinos are abused varied from participant to participant. For example, when
asked if people, other than employers or government actors, ever purposefully take advantage
or abuse Latino immigrants simply for being immigrants, all but one participant agreed that a
wide variety of such maltreatments occur with frequency. In these conversations, many
participants expressed a general belief that many Americans do not like Latino immigrants
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simply for being Latino immigrants. For example, one woman pointed out that one feels
discriminated against even when merely running errands around town:
I have seen many people here who are racist towards you...they get angry at you...like
this one [store employee] who doesn’t like us. Every time we go she gets mad...and at
Walmart...they say bad things to you. (Mexican 36 Female)
As another participant noted, sometimes it is a case of feeling unwanted for being an
immigrant. In explaining his position, he shared this story from a trip to Meijers:
It’s not bad people, but people that don’t accept you...they think that we are on a bad
path...I had an experience with a friend that was walking through Meijers, through the
aisles, and a little girl maybe 5 years old fell in front of him and she was like, she got
frightened when she saw him walking behind her and she called her dad like, ‘Daddy!
Daddy! Mexicans here.’ It’s like [frowns angrily], my friend told me that and I know
he has never felt so discriminated against. (Mexican 26 Male)
Yet the same participant stressed that the situation in some places is much better than in
others:
Look, here it’s that, here in Ann Arbor things are very different. There are people
from all over the world. So here they don’t make a face at a Chinese person or an
Arab or a Latino. They don’t judge because they don’t know, it could be that one is
just a student. But if you go outside of...Ann Arbor, perhaps to Detroit...sometimes
people give you dirty looks. (Mexican 26 Male)
While definitely worth noting, discrimination without concrete action is, in many
ways, subjective and difficult to pin down. Put more simply, further examination of how
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undocumented Latinos perceive and experience discrimination as an abstract concept is
beyond the scope of this project.
More than discrimination, some participants mentioned the possibility that someone,
out of jealousy or maliciousness, might threaten an undocumented immigrant with the police
or ICE, but this type of predatory offense did not appear to be as common as others. For
instance, one female participant explained the existence of threats as such:
Well, um, you might always get the case of a jealous coworker, that don’t agree, and I
guess they could report you...Um, you know revenge, like someone might, it might
even come the case where people make like an anonymous phone call or an
anonymous letter, you know like tipping off over some family or some restaurant or,
um. [But] I haven’t heard of cases where people are actually saying if you don’t do
this I’m gonna call immigration. (Costa Rican 32 Female)
Thus while this participant and a couple others thought threats were a real risk of the
undocumented, they were not aware of any actual cases where immigrants were threatened
with law enforcement.
Still, other participants were aware of instances where undocumented Latinos had
explicitly been threatened with calls to the police or immigration. Such threats did not
originate from Americans, however, but were actually made by other Latinos. In fact, a
number of participants agreed that much discrimination and actual threatening or abuse
against undocumented Latinos is perpetrated by documented Latinos, whether native-born,
naturalized, or just residents. One Mexican participant explained the dynamic between
undocumented and documented Latinos as such:
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“Many with papers, they think that they can intimidate other [undocumented] immigrants
with deportation, calls to immigration, or similar things. And they think because they have
papers that they have more power than you or something like that or that they are better than
you.”
Another participant provided a similar analysis:
I don’t know if they have [more power], but they feel like it. They feel that they are
able to say, ‘I have papers. I can do whatever I want,’ including [running stop signs or
speeding], ‘In my case the worst I will get is a ticket.’ Or they say, ‘Oh well they are
illegals. When I want to I will tell immigration to come for them.’ There are tons of
people who are afraid of this. Because [those with papers] always threaten those
without that they can call immigration whenever they want and tell them someone is
undocumented...[So] I don’t know if they have more power, but they assert that they
do. They feel powerful enough to humiliate you. (Mexican 36 Female)
While the last two participants quoted were referring to the power dynamics between
immigrants in a general, one participant directly connected this dynamic to problems
between coworkers:
At work too. People that have papers create a lot of problems for those without.
Because people that work without papers are hard workers, eh? Because at the most
they know their station isn’t the best and they have to work hard...Well then comes a
Mexican with papers and says, ‘Shit! He works hard and I have to get rid of him
because they are going to want me to work that hard.’ Us Mexicans say this person
has become “gringoized.” [laughs] (Mexican 26 Male)
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Thus although participants were somewhat mixed in their analyses of the types and
frequencies of threats immigrants receive that are directly related to their immigration status,
there was overall agreement that such threats do exist.
The case of fake marriages in exchange for money, as well as marriages and
cohabitation with the promise of papers, offer another type predatory offense predicated on
threats of deportation. Most participants agreed that many undocumented immigrants enter
into relationships and marriages with documented folks—some also Latino immigrants and
others native-born Americans—for benefits and vice versa. From interview conversations,
there appear to exist several types of such arrangements ranging from non-abusive to very
abusive. To begin with, several participants mentioned that it is very common for
undocumented Latinos to pay American citizens in exchange for getting married and going
through the motions of gaining the undocumented Latino permanent residency (opportunity
offense); it should be noted that this process takes a minimum of three years in the best case
scenario, and even real marriages can be difficult to prove. While not mentioned in interview
conversations, it is also possible that two people enter into such an agreement as a favor from
one to the other (circumstantial offense).
Throughout interview conversations, however, most participants painted these
relationships or agreements as manipulative at best and abusive at worst, whether the
relationship was solely business or rested upon at least a facade of true love. For example,
one participant shared the story of an undocumented acquaintance who had lived with an
American man for over 20 years, the whole time with him promising to file immigration
paperwork for her as only the resident or citizen spouse can file immigration paperwork for
his or her undocumented partner. She noted the relationship dynamic as somewhat
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exploitative, pointing out that, “[the woman] always says that she runs around doing
everything for him, well as if she was working for him.”
When the subject of relationships between documented and undocumented folks
came up, one participant recounted a joke his coworker had made in reference to the two
marrying so he could get papers and so that in her words, he could take care of her because
she did not want to work anymore. In retelling the story, he shared that the joke had annoyed
him greatly, but that such arrangements were quite common and that, “there are American
women that marry Mexican men so they take care of them and there are Latin men that get
together with American women for the benefits, [license] plates, something like that.” In
other words, there are American woman that hook up with undocumented Latinos so they do
not have to worry about providing for themselves, and there are undocumented Latino men
that hook up with American women so that they can receive all the benefits other
undocumented folks often pay for, such as signing up for services, leasing apartments, and
registering their cars.
Participants also emphasized that such arrangements can become rather manipulative
or abusive. In these cases, the documented partner threatens the undocumented partner with
the police or ICE if he or she does not do what the documented partner wants. One male
participant said he knew of many relationships with such dynamics, but offered an interesting
twist:
Generally it’s a Mexican guy with an American woman...because truly I know many
Mexican guys married to American women. I haven’t seen another situation...the guy
pays for everything, the man is, well he is whipped, or, it’s that, the woman wears the
pants and makes the decisions...And the American women will say, even better in
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Spanish, ‘Listen ese, blablabla. ICE police ahorrita.’4 They call 911 and explain the
situation to the police and the guy ends up in court. They check you out and ask for a
social and they realize what you’re up to here...and if you don’t have a soc you’re
deported. So [you think] better to say, ‘Okay. I will get you a new car and everything
else.‘...I know more than four cases...Many are looking for papers...They marry for
papers and wind up without papers and paying, paying the consequences. (Mexican
26 Male)
It is no shock that abusive individuals might use their partner’s immigration status as another
way to exert power and control by threatening their partners with deportation. It was
surprising that the only cases of abusive relationships involved undocumented Latino men in
relationships with American women; it can be assumed that this was due to my small sample
size, as well as the sensitive nature of domestic violence, for as one participant emphasized,
“Here there is a lot of domestic violence within Latinos, but the women, they don’t denounce
it because they are afraid of being deported as well, or that the police come but don’t give
them a protection order.”
Although participants in this study are unable to definitely say whether or not
intimate partner violence is commonly experienced by undocumented Latino immigrants,
and despite the small amount of existing research on this topic, Roberta Villalon’s recent
ethnographic study Violence Against Latina Immigrants: Citizenship, Inequality, and
Community, offers a detailed analysis of such offenses (2010). As Villalon points out, while
domestic violence occurs across ethnic, racial, class, and gender lines, undocumented
immigrants are particularly susceptible to sustained abuse due to their status. She
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This sentence translates as, “listen man, blablabla. ICE police now.’
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emphasizes that in addition to “the typical abusive tactics,” perpetrators of partner violence
against the undocumented use specific tactics to “attack the survivor’s foreign background
(her legal and economic vulnerability, culture, language, distance from [x] family and
community of origin, and lack of knowledge of [American] laws)” (Villalon 2010:22).
To illustrate this point, Villalon offers the case of Angela and Richie, an
undocumented Mexican woman and her American-born husband. Richie and Angela met at
work. Their relationship started out well, with Richie frequently bringing Angela flowers
and leaving her love notes. After several years, however, Richie began abusing Angela both
psychologically and physically. He frequently used her immigration status as a point of
attack, telling her he was “very pleased that she was never going to be an American,” and
manipulating her employers into firing her because she was “illegal” (Villalon 2010:31).
Even when Angela and Richie were no longer together, he would call her and her
undocumented brother to threaten them both with deportation (Op. cit.).
Furthermore, she points out that undocumented immigrants who have been repeatedly
threatened by their batterer often live in fear of deportation and are hesitant to trust teachers,
doctors, police, and even nonprofit workers, leaving them with few to no resources to turn to
for support (Op. cit.); this severe anxiety, however, is likely experienced by the majority of
undocumented migrants and immigrants. Villalon references the case of Claudia to support
this claim:
...[the lawyer] told Claudia that if her partner ever threatened to take her children
away, she should call 911. ‘The police?’ Claudia asked. Maggie nodded and
explained that it was perfectly fine to call the police: ‘The police are not supposed to
or allowed to ask immigration questions. They are here to help you, so if you are
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having trouble, you should call them.’ Claudia’s face revealed uncertainty; she
claimed that she feared deportation and did not trust the police (2010:43).
As previously stated, Claudia’s feelings are not unique: most undocumented immigrants,
especially those who have had personal encounters with CBP or ICE or been threatened with
deportation, fear the police. What is more, there is nothing to prevent local law enforcement
from taking someone who is suspected to be undocumented into custody and calling CBP or
ICE when responding to a call for assistance. In fact, during my time as a community
organizer for the Washtenaw County Workers’ Center, a nonprofit organization that supports
immigrant and low-wage workers, one immigrant woman recalled calling the police after
being abused by her partner and not only being questioned about her immigration status, but
threatened that in the future “immigration” would be called. In a similar case documented by
the National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, Texas police arrested an
undocumented woman after she called to report her ex-husband’s abuse (NNIRR 2008). The
police then called ICE, who put a detainer on the woman and took her into custody.
Thus overall, it appears that Claudia’s fears, as well as the fears of other
undocumented women like her, are not completely unfounded. What is more, laws like
Arizona’s SB 1070 require police officers to question individuals about their immigration
status, increasing both the perceived and real chances that officers will question individuals
who call the police to report domestic abuse. Finally, while numerous cases of law
enforcement disregard for domestic abuse have been documented—including cases where
victims of abuse have either been arrested or abused even more severely for reaching out to
law enforcement for assistance—in seeking ways out of abusive relationships, undocumented
immigrants risk deportation and even permanent separation from family members and

137

children by reaching out to law enforcement for support. Hence it is clear that although
domestic abuse is based in power relations regardless of the victim’s immigration status,
immigration status adds yet another extremely potent framework from which abusers can
wield their power.
In addition to threats and domestic abusive, participants also mentioned the frequency
of extortion and/or theft within the context of business agreements gone sour. Such offenses
were usually explained as such. An undocumented immigrant enters into some sort
arrangement with a documented person who agrees to provide the undocumented immigrant
with a service of sorts as a favor or for a fee. Then, at some later point after the documented
person has provided the good or service, this provider tells the undocumented Latino that he
or she is going to cancel the service or take back the good because it is in his or her name
unless the undocumented immigrant gives the documented provider something in return.
While this was always discussed as requiring more money in either a lump sum or regular
payments, it is easy to see that this could translate to just about anything from free labor to
sexual favors. In other cases, the provider may simply take back whatever was provided,
even though it was paid for by the undocumented immigrant. As one 23-year-old participant
pointed out, a provider can change his or her mind in an instant:
What can happen is that there is a fight and one person says, ‘Ok well I’m taking your
car. It’s in my name.’ Yes this can happen and it has happened. I’ve known of cases
where it has happened. The same with a phone. Your phone is in my name and if you
don’t pay me I’ll keep it. Or if you don’t give me more I will take it or cancel it.
That’s how it is...For example there are people who report [something stolen] or sell
it. I’ve known of many cases of that.
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Another participant offered a similar opinion:
I know that people here put their cars in other people’s names, but this is no good as
we say because it is as if you have gifted your car to someone else and the day that
they get mad or the day that you all have problems she could call the police [and say],
“you know what this person stole my car”...and even though you have bought it you
cannot say anything. (Mexican 36 Female)
When asked if any other sorts of people ever take advantage of undocumented
immigrants, the most common response was that lawyers are notorious within the Latino
community for manipulating and abusing immigrants’ trust and stealing their money. As one
participant said:
I know cases where lawyers...they get close to you or you call them because you want
to assess your immigration case or something, and they abuse you. They say they can
get you papers or fix your immigration status, and they only stretch things and stretch
things and stretch things for months up to years. They don’t give you anything.
(Mexican 26 Male)
Like this Mexican participant, one Costa Rican participant agreed that lawyers victimize
Latinos all the time, and that furthermore, people tend to trust lawyers as they are perceived
to be upstanding professionals:
Interviewer: And what about lawyers? Do you think that lawyers ever take
advantage?
Participant: [Big sigh] For god sakes! Of course! [laughs] Like my mom, when she
was trying to get her paperwork done. There was this lawyer that my mom kept on
paying and paying and the worst part was that he kept the documents that could prove
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that she entered certain dates and all that and those kind of documents comes like
once...eventually after talking to him and pressuring him, he, he did it. But basically
he stole the money. It was just very bad.
Interviewer: And so how did he do that? He just kept sort of putting things off and not
giving her documents?
Participant: Yeah. He said, ‘Oh I’m gonna send them I’m gonna send them I’m gonna
send them,’ and he never did...So [my mom], um, basically what the guy did was he
kept the documents ready with the stamps and the address and everything and he just
didn’t send it. But he kept on asking for money more and more. And my mom kept on
paying. And at the end she went there, I think she went there like crying up, and, you
know, to say like look, you already did this fine but give me back my papers. If you
are not gonna do this somebody else will but I do need, you know, these papers...
Interviewer: And so do you think that’s common? That lawyers do this like, a lot of
the time?
Participant: Yeah. I have heard of people that the lawyers would ask like for, I don’t
know [they’ll] just take your entire case for $10,000 and people are like paying in
advance. Yeah, I think it’s just ridiculous. But there are always people falling for that.
I think most people know by now that you’re not supposed to do that, but then we are
not too familiar with the prices. And we think our impression is that a lawyer might,
might ask for thousands. That that’s what it goes for. I mean you don’t question it that
much because you think that’s what it is. Those are the prices and you just do it.
(Costa Rican 32 Female)
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Fortunately, this participant’s mother was eventually able to gain legal permanent residency;
however, some are not so lucky. For example, another participant shared the story of her
husband’s deportation, which was, in part, due to hiring a sham lawyer:
Like when the police got my husband...and they sent him to immigration...and I
looked for a lawyer and the lawyer that I had was required to present himself at court.
He only showed up once and after that when I paid him the principal cost, he didn’t
show up again...and later they gave my husband an order of deportation and they
deported him...Because the lawyer didn’t show up he [automatically] lost the
case...We have never found [the lawyer] again. He changed offices from downtown
Ann Arbor...still haven’t found him, and we keep looking. (Mexican 30’s Female)
While the first case of lawyer manipulation in which the lawyer delayed sending the
necessary immigration paperwork while refusing to return the client’s own documents could
potentially be argued to be in line with the law, this second case is clearly fraud. Not only
did the aforementioned lawyer charge his clients for services never rendered, he stopped all
contact with the clients after receiving payment upfront and then moved his office,
suggesting that he was actually guilty of widespread fraud within the community.
THE CRIMINAL WORKPLACE
As noted in the previous chapter, the primary reason for having false identification
documents is to get a job, yet this is just one of many status-driven offenses that occurs in
connection with employment. Despite only comprising about a quarter of interview questions
and prompts, most interviews focused almost entirely on undocumented life in relation to
work. Offenses mentioned by participants included harassment, differential treatment, lack
of benefits, lack of breaks, wage theft, unsafe working conditions that violate labor and
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health and safety laws, and even slavery. In fact, interviews revealed that employmentrelated victimization is one of the most common forms of victimization undocumented
Latinos experience, and one of the most frequent crimes of all those that occur by, with, or
against undocumented Latinos.
This is logical for two reasons. First, the majority of undocumented Latinos come to
the United States specifically because they are seeking U.S. employment—a point that was
reiterated time and time again by each and every participant. Thus there exists a large
population of people without permission to work, who may not be familiar with U.S. labor
laws, and who are willing to work in substandard conditions for substandard pay because
they are still better off than they were in their native homes—which, again, is something that
was stressed by nearly all participants. Combine this with a low-level of labor-law
enforcement and it is no surprise that the employment of undocumented immigrants is rife
with illegal and unsavory activities.
Furthermore, although labor abuse is obviously nothing new, undocumented workers
remove some of the barriers for employers contemplating whether or not to disregard labor
laws from minimum wage requirements to health and safety regulations. This is true for
several reasons. First, because they do not have permission to be in the United States, they
also lack permission to work (Bacon 2008). In fact, both working without permission and
hiring someone who is not authorized to work is illegal (status offense and circumstantial
offense respectively); conveniently, very few employers guilty of this are ever sanctioned
(Op. cit.). In addition, as mentioned, unauthorized immigrants often earn more money
working in the U.S. than they would working in their native countries and are thus willing to
accept bad conditions and pay. Knowing this, it is typically accepted that many employers
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capitalize on undocumented immigrants’ vulnerability, frequently paying undocumented
workers less than minimum wage.
For example, a 1994 Urban Institute study of unauthorized immigrant workers in
California estimated that each undocumented worker made a gross economic contribution of
$45,000, but earned only $8,840 annually (Bacon 2008:81). Furthermore, as Bacon
explicitly notes, “[undocumented immigrants] received a much smaller percentage of the
value they produced than that received by workers who were either citizens or legal
residents” (Op. cit.). Unauthorized workers are also beneficial to employers who want to
violate labor laws, including health and safety requirements, because they are less likely to
file any formal complaints for fear of discovery and deportation; this enables employers to
save even more money and make even greater profits.
Numerous cases of undocumented worker exploitation have been documented by
various researchers, non-profits, and social action organizations. For example, day labor jobs
are famous for the abusive and exploitative conditions they typically entail. A 2005 study of
264 day labor sites across the United States noted that close to half of day laborers surveyed
had been victims of wage theft, and 44 percent were denied food, water, or breaks at work
(Valenzuela 2006). Another study by the Southern Poverty Law Center revealed similar
statistics: 41 percent of Latino immigrants surveyed had experienced wage theft (2010).
While day labor conditions can be near unbearable, some of the most notorious cases
of undocumented worker abuse come from the meatpacking industry. One of these cases
comes from an Iowa meatpacking plant that was raided by ICE in August of 2008. After
detaining 389 workers, the truth about working conditions in the plant were soon
discovered—perhaps because undocumented workers were no longer afraid of what
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consequences of reporting their employer might be as they were already in ICE custody. Of
the workers detained, 20 were underage (Jimenez 2008); one was just 13 years old (New
York Times 2008). What is more, these underage workers claimed that they were regularly
mistreated, beaten, and abused, as well as made to work 17-hour shifts 6 days a week without
overtime (Jimenez 2008).
It is important to note here, however, that neither exploitation nor manipulation are
necessary components of employing undocumented Latinos. It is also worth noting that it is
very possible that some employers never know their employees’ true immigration statuses,
and thus may treat them as they would any other employee. As will be discussed, however,
all but one participant believed that the majority of employers that hire undocumented
immigrants know or assume they are undocumented. It is also possible that employers with
undocumented workers treat them as they would any other workers in spite of being aware of
their immigration status, something numerous participants pointed out. In fact, many
participants emphasized that some employers treat undocumented Latinos very well or, in the
least, treat them just as well as any other employee. For example, one participant mentioned
several of her previously undocumented friends gained residency with the help of their
employers, who in some cases struggled with them for years and covered their legal fees so
they could become “legal.” The point most participants ended on when asked to discuss
whether or not some employers take advantage of or abuse undocumented workers was that
while most employers find some benefit from hiring undocumented workers, there are cases
of fantastic employers who go out of their way to support their undocumented staff. In both
such cases, a circumstantial offense, not a predatory offense, has occurred; it is likely that
many such circumstantial offenses occur. Employment has been placed in this chapter on
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victimization, however, because all but one participant agreed that more often than not,
undocumented immigrants are manipulated, exploited, or abused in one way or another at
work and offered numerous real-life examples to back up their positions.
To take advantage of undocumented labor due to their immigration status, however,
whether out of actual malice or simply a profit incentive at the expense of the employee,
employers must be aware that they have undocumented employees; based on interview data,
this appeared to be the case. Overall, participants believed that most employers know when
they hire undocumented employees, although they may never say anything and might even
pretend to be clueless. For example, one 32-year-old female participant pointed out that the
offering of a fake SSN to a potential employer is really just one big charade in which the
Latino pretends to be documented and the employer pretends to believe him or her:
Interviewer: And what if you don’t have a social security number, or a green card, or
a driver’s license, how do you get a job?
Participant: Well, you know, you always have one because you get it anyways
[laughs]. You will buy it somewhere and you will show it up. I mean that’s what they
wanna see. Just to, like I said, keep up the show. Um, they know it’s not real, of
course. I think anybody can tell the difference between a fake one and a real one.
(Costa Rican 32 Female)
Another participant offered a similar take:
Participant: Many of them, they know. They know.
Interviewer: They know that their employees do not have permission to work?
Participant: Yes...they know but they act as if they don’t know.
Interviewer: Do you think some employers prefer Latino immigrants?
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Participant: Well yes because, because [Americans] get bonuses, they get vacations,
they get so much more. One like, well an immigrant, you can’t, you don’t even think
about what we shall call benefits, medical benefits or any of it...the company makes
more money. They say they don’t know—yes they do. (Mexican 25 Male)
This participant directly linked the hiring of undocumented Latinos to an employer choice,
suggesting that employers are aware of their employees immigration statuses.
Then, of course, there are the employers who do not ask for any form of government
ID and simply pay employees in cash. It can only be assumed that these employers believe
their employees are undocumented, although this study does not control for employers who
pay employees in cash regardless of national origin. Yet in some cases, as with the one
shared by a young Mexican man offered payment in cash if he did not have an SSN, it is
clear that some employers knowingly hire undocumented workers:
Many Arabs employ Latinos—many illegals. Why? Because they pay cash. They
don’t use checks. This happened to me. I went to look for a job and when I was about
to be hired the manager said, ‘Do you have an SSN? Do you have papers? Because if
not I can pay you in cash. Here it’s permitted.’ Perhaps they make a gain this way.
They pay you a little bit less or they don’t get charged something [by the
government]. But they know [it’s illegal] and they are Americans...[In the end] I told
them, ‘Well yes I want my pay in a check. I do my income taxes. I’m in
[immigration] processes.’ And he said, ‘Okay. Sure.’ But I was still very like,
“Wow!” They didn’t ask for anything. They just pay you in cash...the truth is, how
they focus on you, they look at you—it’s very difficult to determine who has papers
and who doesn’t. (Mexican 26 Male)
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As this participant noted, it is often difficult to tell documented Latino immigrants from
undocumented ones. This might lead one to presume employers would “play it safe” and
assume employees to be documented and thus decide not to openly violate labor laws. In this
case, however, the opposite occurred. Based on the participant’s appearance, the employer
assumed that he was undocumented and thus offered payment in cash. Several others also
believed that many employers, and others, assume Latino immigrants are undocumented
based solely on their appearance.
Although participants assured the relative ease with which undocumented immigrants
find work—in other words, their immigrant status does not entirely prevent them from
finding a job—some participants pointed out that certain employers are more likely to hire
undocumented folks than others. In general, participants agreed that it is much easier to
receive a job through word of mouth than by merely applying for jobs. One participant
specifically mentioned seeking out the help of friends and family when looking for a job and
pointed out that knowing an employer hires undocumented immigrants ahead of time makes
a big difference:
You have to know the places before you go...I think that, if you know some people,
everything is okay. The say, ‘oh well I worked here and they didn’t ask me for
anything. You can apply for a job and they won’t ask you for anything.’ So I believe
it is through people you are close to that you can find [work]. (Mexican 30 Male)
Another participant gave a near-identical analysis:
It’s very difficult when, someone doesn’t have…is here illegally. Apart from being
afraid to go out and look for work alone, it’s much easier to ask a friend, ‘Do you
know of some work? Is there work?’ (Mexican 26 Male)
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Furthermore, participants agreed that undocumented immigrants are aware that certain types
of jobs are merely off limits to them, but that undocumented immigrants can usually get
many types low-paying, service sector jobs:
There are places that you can’t go because ultimately you know that they are
government jobs or hospital jobs and you know that they are going to check your
immigration status. And then there are places like restaurants, hotels…landscaping
[where you know they won’t]. Um, I think it’s the jobs that no American or African
American is going to want to do that they are giving us. (Mexican 26 Male)
Yet as one Mexican woman noted, you can never be sure what will happen when you apply
for a job as an undocumented Latino, fake papers or not, and you always run some sort of
risk:
[Usually] you have to work with false documents because if not, they aren’t going to
give you a job. But here many people work without documents...but you know what
they do? [Employers] say, ‘I’ll give you a job without papers, but I’m going to pay
you almost half of what those with papers earn.’ And even working with fakes they
might say, ‘You know what, this isn’t real. This isn’t yours.’ Or others say, ‘Get out
of here now because these documents are fake and I’m going to call immigration.” So
aside from not giving you work, they scare you. (Mexican 36 Female)
As such, undocumented Latinos remain on alert when looking for work as well as when
working, yet the risks are not only well-known, in many ways they have become normalized
to the extent that all participants agreed that the majority of undocumented Latinos accept
poor working conditions or wages because they just see it as the norm.
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When asked if employers prefer to hire undocumented Latinos or if they stand to gain
anything by doing so, most participants agreed that employers like hiring Latinos because
they are hard workers who work for cheap. As one Mexican participant pointed out, in hiring
undocumented Latinos “[employers] receive a class of workers that are going to work much
harder, for much longer, and for less money.” As another 28-year-old Mexican explained
when asked if employers purposefully hire undocumented Latinos for a financial gain, “I
believe that there are people who hire Mexicans or any type of Latino because they are good
people, because they know people have to earn a living, but at the same time they know that
they can pay a little less than they would to someone who is legal here.” In other words,
some employers see the situation as a win-win. The undocumented employee gets a job,
which might be viewed as the employer doing him or her a favor since it is against the law,
and the employer saves a little bit of money by paying the employee less or simply in cash,
saving on the money the he or she is required to pay the government for each employee.
The majority of participants also believed that many employers purposefully take
advantage of or exploit undocumented Latinos. The most common form of exploitation
participants noted by far was wage theft, including below minimum wages, no overtime, and
non-payment for hours worked. As one 26-year-old Mexican noted:
Yes, yes, yes. I see [exploitation] daily at work. Latinos that earn $6.50 working all
night without overtime. That is, for me, unjust...Yes there exists a lot [of
exploitation]...there exist people here that are working practically for free. Get me?
They are people that, are indiginas, people that don’t know much and are afraid. And
they subject these people to fear and say, ‘if you report me I’m going to send you to
Mexico,’ and you will lose your way of providing for your family. Incredibly there
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are people earning $200, $300 every two-week pay period. But working a ton, get
me? This is theft.
He was not alone. A 36-year-old Mexican woman who had recently applied for some local
hotel jobs only to discover they were offering $6.50 an hour gave similar observations:
They take advantage of immigrants...You work perhaps from 10 in the morning until
11 at night. For that sometimes they pay you $300 every two-week pay period or
sometimes...Let’s supposed that you’re scheduled to leave at 10 at night but
something’s still dirty so they force you to clean and they don’t say they will pay you
more. Instead they say you have to leave everything clean...It happens almost
everywhere...I say that they don’t pay [my husband] well because he enters at 9 in the
morning and leaves at 10, 10:30 at night [and works 6, 7 days a week]...And now they
are paying him I believe $550 a week [part in cash and part in check]...but this is not
what they rightly have to pay.
One participant highlighted the differential treatment Latinos experience at work and
how this can impact wages and payment:
Participant: I worked at a restaurant long ago and the guy, the owner, didn’t allow the
Latino employees to punch in or punch out. Everybody had their card to punch in or
out except the Latino employees. Like I am different so I saw the situation and I said
aren’t you gonna give me a card? And I think he was embarrassed because I asked it
in front of everybody and he gave me one. But none of the other people had one. So
he, he paid like the dishwasher for example, that was like the worst part, even worse
than the cookers. The dishwasher he paid only from 4PM to 10PM and he arrived at
4PM but then he left like 11:30 PM so after 10PM all his work was for free. So he got
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like an hour, hour and half every day for free work. And I have heard of cases where
restaurants say like after 2AM whatever they work they don’t get paid. So, yeah. It
could go like 40 minutes, an hour of free work. (Costa Rican 32 Female)
Thus in this case, the employer was able to manipulate Latino employee wages by preventing
the creation of a formal record of employees’ hours, blatantly refusing to pay Latino
employees for all of their hours worked. Yet the same participant attempted to frame some
exploitation in a positive light:
I will mention it like just to not be negative all along, that if you are a Latino
employee you might even get offered to work extra time for cash if it goes beyond the
hours because they know if you make more than the 40 hours they have to pay you
like more, overtime. So they don’t want to pay you overtime.
Like the employer who sees hiring an undocumented worker as a win-win, in this case the
employee gets some cash wages they do not have to pay taxes on and, again, the employer is
able to claim fewer employee hours worked, finding a way around paying the government
money rightly owed.
In other cases, employers may not actually violate any labor laws but may simply
overwork employees and fail to give them breaks or other benefits. For example, one woman
offered a scenario in which an employer purposefully contracts a small number of Latino
employees to replace a larger number of Americans:
If someone has a restaurant, instead of having 5 employees they might have 3 employees and
[they make the 3 employees work harder] to compensate for the two. And they push and push
until- [laughs] They want to see how far you can go. (Costa Rican 32 Female)
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One Mexican participant offered a similar example, but it came from his current work
situation:
Where I work, I am the only Mexican. There’s usually like 4 or 5 Americans on the
line and I’m the only Latino working in the morning. When I started to work there,
the line was all Americans with 3 cooks in the morning. When I entered they let go of
two, and another Mexican came and us two cooks had to do the work of three because
they thought we could work faster and more efficiently. The other Mexican left and
now I am the only one on the line and I do the work of three people. (Mexican 28
Male)
This type of employer-employee relationship, while not illegal, is still abusive as Latinos are
made to provide more work in less time for the same pay-rate, in effect decreasing the
monetary value of their labor in comparison to that assigned to American workers and
placing additional pressure on Latino employees to perform.
While participants acknowledged that exploitation happens in all sorts of workplaces
with all sorts of employers, several participants noted that Chinese restaurants can be
especially exploitative. These participants noted that Chinese restaurants offer some of the
lowest pay, often paying employees a set weekly, biweekly, or monthly salary that equates to
far less than minimum wage if calculated by hours worked. They also pointed out that in
extreme cases, employers may keep workers in the basement of restaurants or in apartments
the employers own and deduct a housing fee from employees’ pay. One participant went into
extreme detail about the Chinese exploitation of undocumented Latinos, even linking
Chinese employers here to networks that bring undocumented immigrants to the United
States from Mexico:
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With Chinese...I know friends...they live 12, 14 in one apartment...as Chinese they
operate like this, perhaps they don’t see it as such, but to me it seems like pure
slavery...When the person arrives from Mexico, living in Mexico without money to
come here, they say, ‘Okay I can take you across [into the United States] and you
don’t have to pay, but over there I have a job [for you].’ It’s like a little mafia. I have
a contact here that’s Chinese that brought three Mexicans to work. They put you in an
apartment—the Chinese rent apartments to the workers. But they put like 10 [in one
apartment]. The Mexicans don’t pay rent, they don’t pay anything. The Chinese pay
everything. And the Chinese charge a monthly fee...So there lives 13, 14, 15—beds in
the living room like, ‘tatatata.’ They work for the Chinese and they don’t pay them
until they have paid off their debt with the people who [helped them cross into the
United States]. If they charge you, I don’t know, $1200 to cross here...it’s going to
cost you $4000 in total because they are lending you money, financing you, finding
you work. It’s, it’s, a circular business. And that is not just talks, but real people that
have lived it...it surprises me a lot of the things I see..you think that it can’t exist...you
close your eyes to it. Like you make yourself blind as you don’t want to see the truth.
But these things are here. (Mexican 26 Male)
These were some of the gravest details shared by any participant. In essence the
aforementioned tale includes international human trafficking, unauthorized employment, a
violation of a number of labor laws, the likely violation of rental agreements, indebted
servitude, and slavery. Furthermore, this example suggests that some of the worst abuses
experienced by undocumented Latinos occur under the shadows of organized crime. While
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not necessarily the case, this may make this sort of victimization more difficult to uncover
and prevent.
Equally as fascinating as the ways undocumented Latinos are victimized in the
workplace was participants’ take on why such abuse occurs. All in all, participants offered
one or more of the same four possible explanations. First, some participants felt that
undocumented Latinos feel pressured to work even if their wages are low and their working
conditions bad. For instance, one Costa Rican woman offered this analysis of victimization:
Participant: You know, how you feel all the pressure to work.
Interviewer: And so when you’re talking about pressure at work, is this something
that people just feel or is it because of they way people [treat, talk, or interact] with
them? Or do you think it’s just because you sort of feel, as an immigrant, like ‘I need
to make sure that I keep this job and don’t have any problems?’
Participant: I think it’s a combination of all. I think it’s because you know that you’re
here illegally and like you said you have the pressure of, ‘Oh if I don’t do this, if I
don’t act like this—I might lose this job.’ Like 90% of times your employer would
know that you are not legal here and they would take advantage of that...It’s a
combination. It’s because people make you feel bad and also because you feel bad on
your own because you are what you are here. (Costa Rican 32 Female)
A second explanation provided by participants is that undocumented Latinos are not
certain of their rights in the United States and do not have a thorough understanding of
American labor laws. In this case, undocumented Latinos were perceived as being easier to
manipulate than Americans:
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One doesn’t know the laws nor their rights and because of that they scare us...yes
sometimes they take advantage of the people that do not know...I believe that most
people don’t know their rights...their bosses don’t pay them in check, they pay them
in cash...[and] sometimes they pay them in cash and people don’t realize they are
paying them less. They say, ‘you know, you worked many hours but I have to
subtract a lot [from your pay] for this or that,’ and the person is losing money.
(Mexican 23 Male)
One participant suggested that even if undocumented workers are aware of their rights, they
might not have the cultural understanding or linguistic capabilities necessary to navigate the
situation:
Sometimes we as immigrants don’t know our rights or like, more than that I believe
that it’s because of language. Yeah, sometimes you cannot express how you
feel...generally more than [for employers] to have a benefit, I believe that it’s not so
much abuse as that we don’t know how to navigate the situation. (Mexican 30 Male)
A fourth and rather common suggestion as to why undocumented immigrants are exploited at
work was that immigrants are afraid to speak up about unfair pay and unjust working
conditions. As one participant stated, ‘Well you know if you speak up there’s always
someone else coming behind you, you know? What, what can they say? The door is open.
You’re free to go anytime you want.” Another participant explicitly discussed a fear of
losing one’s job if one fights for one’s rights, “No, no they won’t speak up. They are afraid to
say anything because of what might happen. They think they can lose their job or something
else.” As these quotes and several other interview conversations made apparent, the majority
of undocumented immigrants feel especially vulnerable to losing their jobs for speaking up
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about unfair work conditions because they are undocumented and cannot work legally in the
United States. Knowing that their employment is against the law, participants emphasized
that most undocumented Latinos believe they must simply accept bad working conditions as
the normal terms of their employment.
Intriguingly, one Mexican participant made a similar argument, but stressed that
undocumented immigrants have the power to change their working conditions if they unite
and stand up for themselves. Instead, she felt that most undocumented Latinos have
acquiesced to such working conditions and thus are to blame, in part, for their victimization:
...nobody defends themselves. Nobody says, ‘You know you are paying me little and
you need to pay me more.’ When my husband entered, they were going to pay him
less. But he said he wouldn’t work for that and so they raised his wage...So even
though they’re immigrants, if they would defend themselves a little bit everything
would be different. But they stay silent. They don’t say anything. I say they’re afraid.
I imagine that if one says, ‘You’re not paying me well,’ they will say, ‘Then get out
of here and look for another job.’ So as you feel you need the work, you take it. But if
everyone decided to defend themselves, this would not be happening here. (Mexican
36 Female)
This woman’s opinion was rather bold in comparison with most responses, although other
participants did agree that it is unusual for undocumented immigrants to stand up to their
employers. It is hard to disagree, in some ways, with the notion that if undocumented
workers could only stand up for themselves that this would stop most labor exploitation. At
the same time, this is obviously easier said than done, and would require a massive
immigrant rights-labor movement at least at the state-level. Furthermore, as another
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participant noted, the government appears to be on the side of employers, not workers nor
immigrants, making any large-scale movement inevitably difficult:
So who protects who? The boss does not protect the workers. But the government
does protect the boss...and the government knows where the lettuce, the tomatoes
come from and who picked them. And this same government is responsible for
deportation raids. (Mexican 30’s Male)
DUE PROCESS OFFENSES
Due process offenses were the final status-driven offense type participants were
questioned about. Again, due process offenses are those perpetrated by criminal justice
actors—in accordance with institutional norms, procedures and goals—against Latino
immigrants they perceive or know to be undocumented that violate immigrants’ rights.
While participants were able to discuss some interactions between undocumented Latinos
and the criminal justice system, most participants felt unable to speak to interactions beyond
those involving local law enforcement or ICE officers as they had no references—either
personal or familiar—to draw upon. In fact, several participants pointed out that what
happens between undocumented Latinos and the criminal justice system is often unknown as
even the slightest interaction is likely to lead to detention and deportation. In retrospect,
asking undocumented Latinos currently living in the United States to discuss due process
offenses is akin to doing a phone survey of the homeless—it is just not the correct sample. In
other words, if undocumented Latinos are not in detention, they have probably been fortunate
enough to never come face to face with most criminal justice actors. Furthermore, although
many undocumented Latinos have known individuals who have been detained and deported,
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it is often extremely difficult to locate such people and thus their experiences may never be
shared with others in the community.
Fortunately, although project participants had little to say about what I have labeled
due process offenses, there exists a relatively large body of research on the treatment of
immigrants by police, Customs and Border Patrol, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
and Detention and Removal Operations employees; however, most of this comes from
human rights and social justice groups as opposed to academics. Overall, this literature
focuses on racial profiling, harassment, use of force, and due process rights both in and out of
immigration custody, as well as detainee well-being. While these issues are commonplace in
our criminal justice on the whole, in the context of immigration enforcement they are
frequently magnified.
For example, a recent report by The Human Rights Immigrant Community Action
Network entitled “Guilty By Immigration Status” argues that recent immigration
enforcement policies threaten undocumented immigrants and increase the likelihood of abuse
(2009). Specifically, the report notes that the Secure Communities initiative permits law
enforcement to dodge due process rights and interrogate individuals about their immigration
status at traffic stops or while in police custody (2009:13). Moreover, Secure Communities,
like Arizona’s SB 1070, encourages law enforcement to use racial, ethnic/nationality, and
religious profiling to target anyone who appears “foreign,” which undermines community
safety and fuels mistrust toward law enforcement (Op. cit.).
Although local county and municipal police have made public statements that they do
not go out of their way to cooperate with ICE or involve themselves in immigration matters,
several participants believed that some police do discriminate against Latinos in the line of

158

duty. For example, one participant retold the story of his documented sister’s recent
encounter with local police, during which she was pulled over and directly questioned about
her immigration status:
I’ve seen many police that are pretty cool, really great, [but] there are a few that are
really bad...they look at you and for whatever tiny thing or whatever detail and then
they are checking you. And the first, the very first thing is they ask you your
immigration status. The very, very first thing. The police harassed my sister. She was
really angry that time because she was about to cross a street in her car and she told
me the light didn’t change or something so she could turn...and the police saw her.
They stopped her and said pretty angrily, ‘if you don’t know how to drive, if you
aren’t following the rules here in the United States I assume you are here illegally. I
imagine you’re an illegal right?‘ And my sister said she was really mad and that she
gave her license to the police, along with her registration and insurance and
everything. The police saw her Mexican license and said, ‘So you are illegal here
right?’...My sister, very angry with the police, said, ‘Here’s everything. And I am
legal here and I don’t know why you are speaking to me like you are. And you do not
have to ask me for my papers. And if I’m not breaking a law then let me go.’
(Mexican 23 Male)
The police did let this participant’s sister go without a ticket, but not without humiliating and
harassing her first simply because she appeared to be a Latino immigrant. Similarly, another
participant offered the experience of his American coworker, who was pulled over not for a
traffic violation, but simply because his license plate was registered with a Spanish-sounding
last name:
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The police said, ‘you’re Latino?’ and he said, ‘why do you think I’m Latino?’ And he
said, ‘Because your last name is Guzman. You’re an immigrant. Show me your
license.’ And [the man] responded, ‘I’m going to give you my license, but I’m going
to correct you. This is my country and I am American,’ and he showed the license.
The police just said, ‘I’m sorry.’ (Mexican 30’s Male)
In both these cases, the police officer’s decision not to ticket or arrest either driver suggests
that no laws had been violated in either case. Instead, the police officers in question chose to
racially profile drivers and inquire about their immigration statuses.
Overall, participants did agree that some police do treat Latinos quite differently from
non-Latinos. As one 36-year-old participant who moved to Michigan from California just
over a year ago exclaimed:
I say that it is pure discrimination because there are, like those [Americans] here that
run stop signs, they run lights, they speed, and they don’t stop them, and they’ll stop
[an immigrant] just for biting his or her nails at a stop sign...and they are checking
every little thing that an immigrant does, every little error, to stop someone, [at least
in California].
Similarly, one participant recounted her experiences living as an undocumented Latino in
Alabama, where she felt police were especially prone to meddle in immigration matters and
often trolled neighborhoods and stores frequented by Latinos:
Well [chuckles] I don’t know, um, if they’re doing that now here in Michigan. I used
to live in Alabama and I know for a fact that they do that. They just, chose a specific
cross where you know a few streets meet and you know they’re there, and you know,
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it’s pretty obvious that they’re stopping every single Latina driver that goes by. Um,
over here I haven’t noticed that too much. (Costa Rican 32 Female)
In other instances, cases of excessive use of force by police against undocumented
Latinos have been documented. Only one participant was aware of any such abuses locally,
noting:
I haven’t had any problems with police abuse myself, but I have heard of other people
they arrested violently...or that don’t have the patience to understand, because maybe
the police ask for your ID or license and registration and if the Latino doesn’t
understand they treat him a bit violently, but me personally, no.
At the same time, several participants, including the participant who shared his
sister’s story, noted that some police are great and simply want to help those in need and do
their job. In fact, many participants made it a point to stress that police can be both good and
bad. For example, one Mexican participant brought up his experience with local police after
he was in a car accident, noting that they let his expired license slide:
Well about a year ago I had a car accident...I got out and the police came. Really cool
guy...he offered me his cell and said to call anyone I wanted...and he said, ‘show me
your license.’ And I said, ‘my license is expired.’...he told me, ‘[look] I should really
arrest you right now since you don’t have a license and you’ve been stopped by the
police twice before, but I’m not going to do it.’...Then he let me go. (Mexican 23
Male)
Participants had a much more negative take on the experience of undocumented
Latinos with immigration officers, yet this is not surprising when one examines the literature
on Immigration and Custom’s Enforcement and Customs and Border Patrol. Sadly,
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numerous highly documented cases of ICE or CBP abuse of immigrants exist in news media
and scholarly research. Matters are complicated, however, by the amount of discretion
afforded to such enforcement agencies and agents. Couple this with increased migrant deaths
along the border and it is no surprise, then, that accusations of Border Patrol misconduct are
relatively common. While many of these cases involve sexual harassment or assault (Urrea
2004), others center on excessive use of force as agent discretion blurs the line between
necessary use of force and abuse of power.
The case of Tomas Sanchez-Orzuna, which has been documented by the National
Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights in a report entitled Guilty By Immigration Status:
A Report on U.S. Violations of the Rights of Immigrant Families, Workers, and Communities,
provides one such example. In August of 2008, Sanchez-Orzuna died in federal custody at a
California Border Patrol station after being picked up for “suspicious behavior” in a public
park. While the official cause of death is still under investigation, it may be linked to the
pepper-spray Border Patrol agents used on Sanchez-Orzuna in response to his alleged
“combativeness” during the arrest (National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights
2008). In this case, it is difficult to determine whether Border Patrol agents’ use of pepperspray was justified or whether Border Patrol treatment of Sanchez-Orzuna directly caused his
death; the mere fact that Border Patrol agents’ actions can be questioned, however, is cause
enough to view such activities as morally ambiguous and thus “dirty.”
Excessive use of force is not limited to Border Patrol agents. In 2008, the National
Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights found that ICE officers exhibited excessive use
of force in more than half the cases they documented (NNIRR 2008). Furthermore, the
group noted that ICE enforcement operations frequently included detention of undocumented
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immigrants and citizens alike without proper warrants (Op. cit.). In one specific incident,
ICE agents entered a home without a warrant and held a 9-year-old boy at gunpoint (Op.
cit.). ICE abuses ranging from lack of required care to death within detention centers have
also been documented. In fact, several lawsuits have been filed against ICE backed by
evidence that ICE prison guards commonly use psychologically and physically abusive
tactics against detainees. In one specific lawsuit, eight teenage detainees claimed that they
were beaten by prison guards so severely while in a Texan detention center that they required
medical attention; one boy was even beaten unconscious (Op. cit.).
In a more extreme case, ICE agents in a Georgia detention center beat an Egyptian
man who had entered the country legally and was seeking asylum because he would not sign
away his rights to a trial before an immigration judge (Op. cit.). They next drove him to an
ICE flight to be deported, but the pilot refused to leave because he saw that the man was in
dire need of medical attention. Instead of taking the detainee to a hospital, ICE agents then
drove him to a detention center in Alabama. Despite experiencing a severe beating, this
detainee was treated better than some: between 2003 and 2008 more than 104 immigrants
died while in federal custody (Op. cit.). While these stories are rather shocking, it is likely
that the most shocking abuse is never reported.
In addition to excessive force and maltreatment while in law enforcement’s custody,
numerous cases of sexual assault against undocumented immigrants have also been reported.
Again, while it is unlikely that the majority of sexual abuse cases are reported, some law
enforcement officers have been convicted of their offenses. For example, in 2008 former
ICE agent Wilfredo Vazquez was sentenced to 87 months in prison for sexually assaulting a
Jamaican detainee in his custody (NNIRR 2008).
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As a handful of scholars point out, abuse during arrest and detention is extremely
common. For example, in the first study to specifically examine immigrant treatment during
arrest and detention, Scott Phillips, Jacqueline Maria Hagan, and Nestor Rodriguez found
that not only were deportees subject to verbal harassment, procedural failings, and excessive
use of force, but that force is more commonly used against deportees than citizens (2006).
Overall, 25% of those interviewed reported experiencing racial slurs during arrest and 26%
reported racial slurs during detention (Op cit.). In addition, 20% of deportees reported
experiencing force during arrest—13% of those arrested by immigration officers and 26% of
those arrested by police—and 11% of deportees experienced force while in detention; in both
cases, the majority of force incidents—between 80 and 95%—were excessive (Op. cit.).
For the most part, participants offered accounts and opinions in line with such
literature; however, many did not have firsthand experience with such abuse. Despite this,
many participants shared stories of immigration raids in the local community and some
witnessed these raids from within their own apartments. For example, one woman pointed
out the frequency of raids in her apartment complex and how aggressive immigration officers
tend to be:
Since arriving here I have heard of like in these apartments [immigration] has taken
like 6 people...and when they came for some that lived here by [name]...I have known
that they treated them very badly...well they were saying bad things in English. Well
the truth is one doesn’t understand much but they were speaking harshly, knocking on
the door. When they came out they were still saying bad words...like racists [things].
(Mexican 36 Female).
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Out of all 12 participants, one participant retold the story of when immigration
officers came to her home and took a number of her family members, without a warrant or
deportation order. She emphasized how frightening the experience was and how rude and
unsympathetic the agents were:
Yes because, here, um, about a year ago, immigration came. But they didn’t knock on
the door. They were waiting at the stop [sign] to see who was leaving and one man
that lived here in my house left; he was the first to leave for work....they stopped him
at the stop [sign] and then they returned so that he would open the door and they
entered. And they came in here, they took my husband, my brother, and a cousin and
others that were living here...they didn’t say that they were immigration nor did they
say they were police...They entered very wild, they were running every which way
searching...they went through the rooms, they searched everything...they carried
themselves very badly. They are very rude. They don’t want one to speak. That’s how
they are. Like that violating laws. They are bad because they don’t have to be that
way. Well I think that if they are going to come they should come with more
respect...They treat you as if you were a criminal... They just entered and took people,
not saying anything, nothing about looking for someone nor that they had an order of
deportation or arrest warrant...That man they grabbed first said that what really
happened was that they took his keys...[ICE] said that he opened the door but he said
he couldn’t because they had handcuffed him. (Mexican 30’s Female)
This account is quite startling, because not only did immigration officers lack a search
warrant and an order of deportation, they used racial profiling to make their initial detention,
and then took the keys of a handcuffed individual to unlawfully enter his home without
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permission, simply to look for other undocumented immigrants. Furthermore, they did not
identify themselves as police or as immigration officers, resulting in an extremely startling
experience for this woman and her family, including her several children.
Nearly all participants denounced such behavior by immigration officers as unjust
and uncalled for. As one participant suggested, “Sometimes [immigration officers] probably
aren’t the most just, but if they said they were going to follow the law, for example...that they
are acting within the power of the law, everything by the rules, if they got me I wouldn’t say
anything because they were respecting my rights [throughout the process], but you know they
don’t act like this.”
Interestingly, one Mexican participant noted that immigration officers of Latino or
Hispanic descent tend to be the roughest with undocumented immigrants:
“...you know who are the worst? Latino [immigration officers]...They’re people who
speak Spanish. People who were nationalized here or they grandparents were...but
now they have the power to be American...I don’t know if they feel a hatred, or they
feel superior because they are from the same race. But they’re the ones that say, ‘Stop
it!’...the ones with Mexican last names are the worst. (Mexican 26 Male)
While he was the only participant to make this connection explicitly, it does coincide with
numerous participants’ statements regarding general discrimination and maltreatment of
undocumented Latinos by documented Latinos. Unfortunately, an analysis of the identity
dynamics involved in undocumented-documented Latino relations within the context of
immigration enforcement is far beyond the scope of this project, although definitely worth
further investigation.
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One final unique comment worth mentioning came from the one documented
participant in the study, who, when asked about immigration abuses, agreed that abuses do
take place, but noted several cases where immigration officers surprisingly let undocumented
immigrants go:
...because immigration has grabbed some of my friends and asked for their
[information], checked them and if nothing came up they let them go...and I’m like
wow! Wow I’m surprised! Get me? And I say that from this perspective they are
targeting people that really should, that have to return, that are delinquents, that sell
drugs. But there are many times that they get them and boom [they’re gone]!
(Mexican 26 Male)
Detention and Removal Operations
While participants did not offer any information regarding immigrant abuse within
detention, this hole can easily be filled in by existing research, which, for the most part, finds
detainee mistreatment to be widespread. For example, in “Huddled Masses: Immigrants in
Detention,” she emphasizes the prevalence of detainee physical and sexual assault, as well as
racial bias in case processing, and credits this to the application of a criminal justice
paradigm to immigration enforcement and control (Lucas 2005:325). In a study of the
Krome Processing Center—a federal immigration detention center located in Miami, Florida,
that operates within a CJ paradigm—Cheryl Little explored such detainee abuse using
firsthand research and media analysis (1999). Her report highlights a 1999 Miami Herald
expose that identified severe psychological abuse of detainees—including racially offensive
language and threats—as one of Krome’s greatest problems (Op. cit.).
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The abuse experienced by Krome detainees is not uncommon and could even be
considered “mild” when compared with other detainee abuse incidents. For example, in the
retelling of a 1995 incident, Dow highlights how detainee abuse often mimics torture:
“plucking detainees” body hairs with pliers, forcing detainees to place their heads in
toilet bowls. . . ordering detainees to perform sexual acts upon one another, forcing
detainees to assume. . . degrading positions while naked, and. . . forc[ing] prisoners to
chant “America is number one!”’ (Dow 143–4)
Little notes a specific case quite like this at Florida’s Jackson County Jail, where a group of
detainees filed official complaints over racial and ethnic slurs, as well as being “shackled
naked to concrete slabs in spread-eagle positions where they were left for hours, beaten with
batons, and shocked with electric riot shields” (1999:572). Later that same year, detainees in
another Florida jail filed a civil rights complaint with a Tampa federal court after being
beaten, stripped naked, dragged through dog and human waste and left for twenty hours in
flooded cells; unsurprisingly, the abuse came after detainees had filed written complaints
against their jailers (Op. cit.). Employee actions presented here are in clear violation of the
Detention Standard, as well as civil rights guaranteed by American law and international
human rights agreements, yet a relatively small effort has been made by the government to
curb such abuse.
Blatant disregard for detainee rights is even more common than physical and
psychological abuse. Numerous scholars have highlighted general detainee mistreatment,
which ranges from vermin in cells, contaminated food, and inadequate ventilation to lack of
access to counsel, arbitrary and retaliatory transfers, and loss of mail, documents, and
personal property, among many other problems (Little 1999; Lucas 2005; Phillips, Hagan, &
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Rodriguez 2006). For example, Phillips et al, found that of the 300 deportees interviewed,
more than one third did not have adequate access to food and water and nearly half did not
have access to a telephone while in detention (Phillips, Hagan, & Rodriguez 2006).
Conditions are so bad in some detention centers that even employees have even filed
formal complaints. For example, Detention Officers at the Krome facility sent a formal
memo to their supervisor highlighting some of the extreme conditions at Krome, including
general restroom facilities for criminal, noncriminal, and children detainees; a lack of tables
and chairs so substantial that detainees are forced to eat their meals on the floor; a total of 6
beds for 39 female detainees; overcrowding and poor ventilation; no recreation for women
and children; and an extremely high noise level that interferes with detention center
operations (Little 1999:562). Unfortunately, while Krome officials claimed to be in the
process of bringing the center up to regulation standards, at the time of Little’s research, they
had thus far failed to do so.
Potentially more damaging than inadequate food or medical care, or even physical or
psychological abuse, is blocked access to legal aid as it can be the determining factor in a
detainee’s deportation as well as his or her only means of reporting mistreatment. In her
study of the Krome detention center, Little points out that detention employees failed to
provide detainees with an accurate list of free and low-cost legal aid, directly in violation of
requirements outlined by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) (1999:556).
Furthermore, she found that detainee telephone access failed to meet the ICE/DRO Detention
Standard (Op. cit.). In addition, Krome detainees often had no access to pens/pencils, paper,
or immigration forms, were refused the opportunity to send certified mail including pleadings
to the Board of Immigration Appeals or the federal courts, and had inadequate facilities for
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legal consultations (Op. cit.). Moreover, Krome employees’ frequently failed to 1) ensure
that detainees were brought to legal appointments; 2) notify lawyers that detainees had been
brought to the attorney-client visitation area, often leaving lawyers in the waiting room for
hours on end; and 3) file crucial immigration documents with the Immigration Court in a
timely fashion or, in the worst cases, at all (Op cit.).
Finally, Little exposed the danger of detainee transfers. First, detainees are often
transferred after their lawyers have already filed an appearance with the Immigration Court,
making it exceedingly difficult for attorneys to continue representing their client, as 1)
detainees are often transferred extremely far distances; 2) detainees are not permitted to
notify their attorney of their transfer and DOs rarely do so; and 3) ICE/DRO frequently loses
track of detainees once they have been transferred (Little 1999:567). Further complicating
matters, detainees can fall victim to multiple transfers between federal detention centers and
state facilities, making it even more difficult to locate them. Finally, detainee transfers mask
the length of time individuals spend in detention as detention length is tracked on a per-stay
basis. This is evidenced in several rather disturbing depositions presented in Kattolo v.
Reno, where INS officials openly admitted being unable to state the average length of
detention or the number of detainees held long-term (Op. cit.). This is extremely
problematic—and somewhat shameful—as it impedes an accurate accounting of America’s
immigration detention system.
Despite being primarily responsible for detainee abuse, even the federal government
has acknowledged several flaws of the immigration detention system. For example, in a
2006 audit of ICE/DRO by the DHS’ Office of the Inspector General, investigators
acknowledged several instances of detainee mistreatment and neglect—including inadequate
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healthcare, lack of timely access to medical facilities, environmental health and safety
concerns, and noncompliance with detention confinement guidelines—and noted that the
ICE/DRO Detention Standard does not provide a process for detainees to report abuse or
civil rights violations (Hagan & Phillips 2008:90). Yet despite being documented by
academics, lawyers, journalists, and the federal government, detainee mistreatment continues
unabated.
Furthermore, some scholars have argued that the recent rise in private immigration
detention centers has exacerbated detainee mistreatment. For instance, Lucas notes that the
use of private detention allows the government to deny responsibility for detainee abuse,
instead scapegoating individual employees or private corporations (Lucas 2005). She
specifically comments on what she dubs “Motel Kafkas,” or motels with private security
guards—many supplied by G4S Secure Solutions, formerly known as Wakenhut—that hold
detainees without fresh air or telephones (Lucas 2005:325). Welch, borrowing from
Goffman (1961), characterizes these private immigration detention facilities as “total
institutions,” depriving detainees of contact with the outside world and often exceeding the
restrictions placed on “traditional” criminals in US jails or prisons (Op. cit.).
While such extremes do exist, one of the most commonly cited issues associated with
housing immigration detainees outside federal immigration centers is that private and state
correctional employees are unfamiliar with immigration law and procedure. In addition to a
sheer absence of knowledge about the US immigration enforcement system, many nonfederal facilities, especially jails, are considered short-term facilities and do not provide
detainees with sufficient medical care, recreational facilities, or appropriate legal resources
(Little 1999). Moreover, state facilities are rarely prepared for non-English-speaking
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detainees (Op. cit.). Furthermore, ICE/DRO has failed to hold non-federal centers to the
Detention Standard. Overall, housing detainees outside the federal immigration system
significantly inhibits detainees’ ability to contact ICE/DRO for general information, as well
as contact their specific deportation officers for case information (Lucas 2005).
Today contract facilities house more than 60% of detained immigrants (Lucas
2005:327). Why house detainees outside the federal system when it is clearly a recipe for
disaster? Aside from the need for increased detention space, several scholars have linked the
rise in private and state contract detention to cost savings and profits (Little 1999; Lucas
2005). Building upon this argument, Lucas insists that the transition to contract detention has
led to the commodification of immigrants, noting that some officials have even referred to
detainees as a “product” that will never run out (2005:327). The argument is quite catching,
considering that detention facilities operate within a system where filling beds and cutting
costs often outweigh detainee wellbeing. In this scenario, the federal government supposedly
saves money and county jails get to fill beds that would otherwise be empty with detainees
that bring in an average of twice the actual cost to house and feed them (Little 1999; Lucas
2005:328).
Rising detention costs have led US immigration officials to embark upon various
additional cost-cutting measures including “preventative detention,” or “detention
outsourcing.” In essence, new efforts aim to block unauthorized entry to the United States
before migrants reach the US. This is achieved via partnerships with Latin American
countries such as Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras that have adjusted national immigration
policies to suit US interests and enhanced local enforcement operations with US funding
(Flynn 2002). For example, the US has paid to bus unauthorized Central Americans
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apprehended at the Mexico-Guatemala border back to their native countries (Op. cit.).
Moreover, the US has covered the building costs of immigration detention centers in Central
America and often pays for the costs associated with detaining undocumented immigrants.
As Joe Banda, an INS/ICE representative in Honduras, stated when questioned about these
partnerships, “the cost savings [from detaining and deporting migrants in Honduras as
opposed to in the United States] are enormous” (Op cit.). It is hard to argue with Banda’s
logic: the average daily cost of detention in Honduras is $8.50 per day per migrant, as
opposed to upwards of $60 a day to detain an immigrant in the US (Op. cit.). Unfortunately,
detention conditions in Central America are often even worse than those in the US. Thus
decreasing US detention numbers and costs by paying other countries to house detainees in
substandard conditions does not improve America’s immigration track record.
The aforementioned cases provide a mere sampling of documented abuses perpetrated
by against immigrants while in detention. Furthermore, it is also apparent that many law
enforcement officers in particular and institutions overall have little or no regard for adhering
to the law when interacting with, processing, and overseeing undocumented immigrants
within agency custody. Clearly, research incorporating the voices of undocumented Latinos
who have been processed through the various points of our immigration system from arrest to
detention could add a wealth of knowledge to this already substantial body of literature.
CONCLUSION
All in all, several key points are highlighted in participant conversations on predatory
and due process offenses. First, predatory offenses appear to be a normal aspect of
undocumented Latinos’ everyday lives. Furthermore, there does not appear to be a specific
offender type prone to victimizing undocumented Latinos. Participants noted that both
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foreigners and native-born Americans can victimize undocumented Latinos. Participants
also noted that documented Latinos are also guilty of victimizing the undocumented.
Although not explicitly expressed as such, it also appears that in the case of status-driven
victimization, perpetrators and victims are usually familiar with one another whether through
intimate relationships, friendships, work, or business transactions. This reinforces the idea
that in these instances, immigrants are being targeted because of their undocumented status
as only those who are somewhat familiar with them are likely to know or assume their
unauthorized presence in the U.S.
In general, participants agreed that undocumented immigrants are frequently
discriminated against, threatened, manipulated, and abused by a number of actors.
Participants noted that intimate partnerships—especially those involving one documented
partner and one undocumented partner—create a power dynamic that facilitates
manipulation, if not abuse. This was in line with Villalon’s research on intimate partner
violence between documented and undocumented partners. Moreover, participants noted that
undocumented Latinos often fall victim to various frauds at the hands of manipulative and/or
deceptive lawyers who overcharge them and/or fail to provide legal services after payment.
Participants also agreed that undocumented immigrants frequently fall victim to
extortion and even theft after entering into arrangements for service provision, such as when
an item or service such as a car or cell phone contract is taken out in a documented person’s
name on behalf an undocumented Latino. In these cases, undocumented immigrants are at
the whim of the provider, who may threaten to cancel the provision of service or take the
item involved, such as a car, for him or herself at any moment unless something more is
offered in exchange. This can become extremely serious in the case of car registrations, as
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the person in whose name the car is registered may threaten to call the police and claim that
the undocumented person he or she initially had an arrangement with (and the rightful owner
of the car) has stolen the car, which could lead to deportation.
Finally, participants agreed that predatory offenses are extremely common in the
workplace. The worksite is likely the location where the majority of predatory offenses
occur and employment relationships are likely the most rife with criminal abuse as defined
by the law. Overall, participants cited wage theft as the most common offense. This
includes underpayment (wages that do not meet the federal minimum), non-payment of
overtime, and non-payment of wages, all of which violate the federal Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA). Other abuses in the workplace range from manipulation and discriminatory
treatment to indebted slavery. Furthermore, participants agreed that the majority of
undocumented Latinos do not speak up about labor violations because they either do not
know their rights, they know their rights but they lack language skills sufficient enough to
say anything, or they know their rights and have the language skills but are simply afraid of
being fired or worse.
In the case of due process offenses, participants had less to say. Most participants felt
unable to discuss such offending as they had little to no personal experiences to draw upon.
In addition, they noted that undocumented Latinos’ interactions with law enforcement often
lead to deportation, making it difficult to communicate with or even locate those who have
been picked up. In essence, the sample in this study came from a population of Latino
immigrants currently living in the United States, and if one truly wants to focus on due
process offenses, one must have a sample of people who have gone through the criminal
justice/immigration system.
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That aside, participants did still make valuable contributions to the analyses of due
process offenses at the local level. First, most participants agreed that police can be very
helpful or very discriminatory, and this simply depends on the actual officer. At the same
time, a number of participants stated that police often scrutinize Latino drivers and harass
them about their immigration status even when they have not committed any traffic
violations or crimes. Furthermore, most participants agreed that ICE officers harass Latinos
unnecessarily, questioning them without cause and performing searches and detaining
individuals without warrants or orders of deportation. In addition, several participants noted
that ICE officers are often very rude and even violent when interrogating individuals or
raiding homes.
While participant discussions of due process offenses were limited, they are in line
with existing research on criminal justice abuses against undocumented immigrants. As can
be seen here, law enforcement and other criminal justice actors are not only in a position of
power over the undocumented due to their occupation status and because many
undocumented immigrants are not sure of their rights in the United States. Furthermore, the
sheer number of documented abuses against the undocumented in the context of immigration
enforcement alone is a testament to the normalization of rights abuses and disregard for the
law on behalf of individual criminal justice and immigration actors and the criminal
justice/immigration enforcement apparatus as a whole. This is extremely unfortunate as this
only perpetuates the undocumented Latinos’ victimization by transforming those who are
intended to protect against violence and abuse into some of the most dangerous abusers of
all.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
This project was aimed at disentangling the complicated relationship between
immigration status and crime in the case of Latino immigrants, casting aside unwarranted
stereotypes and highlighting actual status-driven offending and victimization. To accomplish
this, a thorough review of the literature on immigrant and Latino offending, which negates
the criminal Latino stereotype, was necessary. This review revealed that, despite a few
exceptions like MS-13, a century of research on immigration and crime has found that while
immigrant offending has varied slightly across time and place, immigrants almost always
exhibit lower crime rates than native groups and, in some cases, are more able to withstand
crime-facilitating conditions. A detailed analysis of the history of immigration and
immigrant-specific policies in the United States was also necessary. As seen in Chapter 3,
such an examination reveals the racialized nature of immigration policy, the increasing
criminalization of immigrants, especially undocumented Latinos, and the adoption of a
criminal justice/enforcement model at the core of current immigration policy. Taken
together, this literature review and policy analysis suggest the likelihood that immigration
and immigrant-specific policies actually facilitate and encourage crime by, with, and against
Latino immigrants for two inter-related reasons. First, within the current framework of
immigration policy, immigrants are clearly constrained by their second-class status. Second,
these status-driven interactions with other immigrants as well as nonimmigrants are both
influenced by the criminalization policies towards illegal immigrants.
In order for this hypothesis to be correct, just one of four possible tenets needs to hold
true: 1) immigration and immigrant-specific policies actually deny Latino immigrants the
ability to perform or participate in certain “daily” activities through legal means, leading
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them to adapt vis a vis illegal means; 2) Latino immigrants perceive that immigration and
immigrant-specific policies deny them the ability to perform or participate in certain “daily”
activities through legal means, leading them to adapt vis a vis illegal means; 3) Latino
immigrants are vulnerable to victimization because immigration and immigrant-specific
policies actually deny them equal protection from victimization; or 4) Latino immigrants are
vulnerable to victimization because immigration and immigrant-specific policies are
perceived to deny them equal protection from victimization by victimizers and/or victims.
As policy analysis and interviews revealed, not only does one tenet hold true, but all
four tenets hold true. Numerous policies actually restrict Latino immigrants’ ability to
perform or participate in “daily” activities through legal means, and the solution for this
expressed by all participants was an adoption of illegal or extralegal means of performance
and participation. Furthermore, not only do immigration and immigrant-specific policies and
the way they are carried out actually deny Latino immigrants equal protection from
victimization, all participants agreed that this was the case. Hence not only does policy
shape immigrants’ lives, immigrants also perceive it to do so. More to the point, this policy
shapes status-driven crime and victimization. In other words, immigration and immigrantspecific policies do drive offending by, with, and against Latino immigrants.
To examine such offending, a status-driven offense typology was created. This
typology divides offenses into five types: status offenses, circumstantial offenses,
opportunity offenses, predatory offenses, and due process offenses. Recall that status
offenses are activities that immigrants—due to their status—are forbidden from or unable to
perform without violating one or more laws. Circumstantial offenses are similar to status
offenses in that they include “normal acts,” like hiring an employee or giving someone a ride
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to the grocery store, that become illegal due to one or more of the participants’ immigration
statuses. Opportunity offenses include all service-related offenses and comprise the “blackmarket of immigration.” Predatory offenses encompass all offenses perpetrated against
immigrants because offenders believe they are somewhat immune to apprehension and
punishment due to immigrants’ perceived and actual vulnerability. Finally, due process
offenses include offenses committed by government actors—such as Customs and Border
Patrol (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), police, judges, and so on—that
violate immigrants’ rights. Again, this offense typology uses a working definition of “crime”
that includes acts prohibited under criminal regulatory law and analogous forms of social
injury because not all crimes, whether harmful or merely deceptive, which are connected to
immigration status are labeled or defined as offenses by the state.
In Chapter 4, several key points on restrictions undocumented Latinos face as well as
their vulnerability were established. From this it was not only clear that immigrants are both
aware of and feel somewhat disempowered by their immigration status; it is also apparent
that undocumented immigrants face numerous restrictions that inhibit their ability to perform
“normal” activities without being dishonest or breaking the law in one way or another. Of
these restrictions, the inability to obtain a valid driver’s license appears to have the most
detrimental impact on undocumented Latinos. Furthermore, there was consensus among all
participants that undocumented Latinos are aware that their presence in the United States
violates at least some sort of law or laws and that this is associated with several risks, the
greatest being the threat of deportation. Finally, although discussed in multiple ways and
seen as existing to different extents by different participants, participants agreed that most, if
not all, undocumented Latinos fear the police and refuse to interact with them even if they
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have been the victim of a crime, something many participants linked to increased immigrant
vulnerability.
In Chapter 5, immigrants’ alternatives to restricted legal participation were discussed.
It was established that most undocumented Latinos behave dishonestly or violate the law in
one way or another (status offenses) in order to carry out “normal” activities and achieve
desired goals. Furthermore, this often involves collaborating with another person who is
typically documented and can provide as a favor or for a fee a desired service or good
(circumstantial and opportunity offense). Moreover, it seems that in cases of criminal
activity involving at least one undocumented immigrant and one other person—who may or
may not be an immigrant—there are two motivating factors: 1) assisting a friend or family
member (circumstantial offense) or 2) the potential for monetary profit (opportunity offense).
At the same time, it was also pointed out that there is much profit to be made by providing
undocumented Latinos with goods and services they cannot themselves acquire.
Additionally, the prevalence of fraudulent identity documents was also evidenced, as was a
system of rules or norms dictating when, where, and how to use such documents. Finally,
while undocumented Latinos acknowledge that they do break the law, they insist that it is
only because, in many circumstances, there is no way for them to live in the United States
without doing so.
Chapter 6 explored predatory and due process offenses, laying out the various ways
undocumented Latinos are victimized and highlighting the prevalence of such victimization.
It was established that undocumented immigrants are frequently discriminated against,
threatened, manipulated, and abused by a number of actors. Furthermore, both foreigners
and native-born Americans victimize undocumented Latinos, as do documented Latinos.
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Although not explicitly expressed, it also appeared that in the case of status-driven
victimization, perpetrators and victims are usually familiar with one another whether through
intimate relationships, friendships, work, or business transactions. Intimate partner violence,
extortion or theft linked to service provision and legal council, and labor abuses were
discussed as the most common predatory offenses. Labor law violations were above all the
most common predatory offenses. Moreover, this finding was consistent with existing
literature, however limited it may be. Finally, although participants were unable to discuss
due process offenses with much depth, they did discuss the prevalence of racial profiling by
law enforcement and a general disregard for the law and immigrants’ rights on the part of
police and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, all of which is supported by existing
literature.
In sum, interviews confirmed that undocumented Latinos are involved in a wide
variety of status-driven offenses as perpetrators, collaborators, and victims, supporting the
notion that immigration and immigrant-specific policies actually facilitate and encourage
crime. Despite establishing this, however, there are still two questions left unanswered.
First, what does it matter if immigration and immigrant-specific policies facilitate and
encourage crime? Second, what should be done about this, if anything?
The first question can be explored from a variety of perspectives. For instance, some
may argue that a substantial chunk of status-driven crimes explored here victimize
undocumented Latinos, and that as they are here without legal permission and engaged in
law-breaking on a daily basis, they bring such victimization onto themselves. Others may
even argue that they deserve to be victimized in some circumstances for the same reason.
Still others may see the prevalence of status-driven crime as another reason to support
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tougher immigration enforcement policies to keep unwanted immigrants out of the country
and get rid of those already here illegally. The problem with all these perspectives is that
they fail to recognize that both undocumented Latino immigrants and status-driven crime are
well-integrated into American society. In other words, such offending and victimization is
much more than the sum of its parts and goes far beyond illegal immigration as a social
problem. Status-driven crimes are the product of a long history of biased immigration policy,
capitalist labor relations, and the failure of the United States to uphold the just application of
existing laws.
For those who argue that undocumented Latinos, as offenders themselves, deserve to
be victimized, it must be emphasized that this victimization is also harmful to Americans. In
the case of interpersonal victimization, such offending encourages the proliferation of a
culture of offending among those with a legal right to be here, including residents,
naturalized citizens, and native-born alike. Furthermore, it spurs violence by suggesting that
there is a benefit to be gained when those with power exert themselves over those they view
as disempowered. Finally, a substantial amount of immigrant offending and victimization
happens in connection with organized crime and even human trafficking, thus likely
supporting or facilitating a number of more violent crimes.
In the case of employment-related offenses, the cost to the average American is even
easier to identify. Employers hired undocumented immigrants in order to avoid labor, health,
and safety regulations. This not only lowers wages but reduces benefits and worsens
working conditions. Overall, the hiring of undocumented workers normalizes substandard
wages and working conditions in many industries, which leaves American workers with
fewer desirable job opportunities. In effect, employers undercut the power of American
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labor by hiring undocumented Latinos just as large industrial factories in the early 20th
century tried to undercut the power of labor unions by hiring scabs and strikebreakers who
were willing to work in subpar conditions. This is not only detrimental to workers’ rights on
the whole, but also scapegoats undocumented Latinos as the cause of decreasing labor
conditions. Were employers stopped from exploiting undocumented labor, they would be
forced to improve working conditions in order to find employees willing to work for them.
For those who believe the evidence of such status-driven offending only makes the
case for tougher immigration polices stronger, it should be emphasized that the tougher the
policy, the more likely it is to increase overall offending. This is something one can see
simply by examining the trajectory of immigration policy over the last thirty years. For
example, it is well-established that as the United States has increased securitization of the
U.S.-Mexico border, more and more undocumented migrants have chosen to remain in the
U.S. permanently as the risks associated with crossing the border have increased. This
caused the population of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. to expand greatly, which in
turn means there are now more people here to offend and be victimized. The Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 offers another
example of a law aimed at decreasing illegal immigration that has actually created conditions
favorable to increased crime. In this case, by increasing criminal punishments for illegal
entry into the United States, undocumented Latinos have had more to fear if caught, but
instead of returning to their native countries, they have just tried harder to hide themselves
and rely on extralegal means of survival. Furthermore, recent policies like ICE’s Secure
Communities and laws like Arizona’s SB1070 that strengthen law enforcement-ICE
collaboration only make undocumented Latinos more afraid of the police, which in turn
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makes them less likely to collaborate with police or turn to police for assistance and more
susceptible to victimization. Overall, each intensification of immigration enforcement has
forced undocumented immigrants evermore “underground” and made them more vulnerable
to victimization.
Excluding undocumented immigrants from legal participation in society, as explored
here, is also problematic as the more restrictions the undocumented face the more they must
rely upon extralegal means to compensate for what they cannot do. Regulations that prohibit
undocumented immigrants from obtaining driver’s licenses and registering their cars
provides a simple yet poignant illustration of this. As explored in this study, these two
prohibitions have led to a variety of illegal and extralegal practices including unlicensed
driving, driving without registration, the practice of registering cars in other peoples’ names,
and the emergence of underground undocumented transportation services. Creating
additional immigrant-specific policies to restrict undocumented immigrants’ participation in
society even further, such as proposals to deny undocumented children access to public
education or to deny citizenship to children born of undocumented parents, is only likely to
cause even more offending, not less.
All in all, at the crux of this project lies the belief that current immigration and
immigrant-specific policies are criminogenic. These policies do more harm than good. They
have clearly done little to prevent unauthorized immigration, as evidenced by the nearly 13
million undocumented immigrants currently living in the United States, despite setting out to
do so. What is more, they have led to the creation of a wide variety of status-driven crimes
that would not exist were it not for such policies. In essence, current policy creates millions
of offenders and victims that would not otherwise exist. Thus beyond being about the
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promise of law, human rights, or the immigration debate as a whole, this argument speaks to
the reduction of crime, violence, and harm in the United States for the good of everyone
regardless of one’s position on immigration or undocumented immigrants.
In order to reduce status-driven offending and victimization, America must undertake
serious immigration reform that moves past political divides. We must accept that
undocumented immigrants are here, for good or bad, and move forward with an
understanding that they are deeply integrated into society. Furthermore, we must understand
that until this second-class population can live in the open with the same opportunities to
participate in society and the same protections from victimization, status-driven crime will
only continue. Hence any reform that attempts to decrease status-driven offenses must be
threefold. First, we must decriminalize immigrants. Immigration is a human phenomenon,
not a criminal one, and most undocumented immigrants have never committed what we
would consider dangerous criminal offenses. Ultimately, we must reduce undocumented
immigrants’ fear of criminal punishment for being present without authorization as well as
their fear of deportation because these two factors allow offenders to victimize immigrants.
Second, some level of amnesty must be provided to the nearly 13 million
undocumented immigrants currently residing in the United States. Amnesty may come as an
offer of permanent residency status without any penalties for being previous unauthorized
residence, or it may be some new form of work-residency for those who intend to work in the
United States for several years without ever applying for citizenship. The point here is that
until current undocumented immigrants can come out from the shadows, status-driven crimes
will continue.
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Third, the United States must create more immigration opportunities for those who
desire to come here. This means increasing the number of people allowed to immigrate here
each year. Cutting out some of the red-tape involved in applying for visas and processing
immigration applications more quickly to reduce entrance wait-times -as mentioned
previously, even direct family members of American citizens often wait years for a visa.
Furthermore, immigration policy must take into account the United States special
relationship with the rest of the North American continent. The United States has shared
geographic, historical, political and economic relationships—including the North American
Free Trade Agreement and the Central American Free Trade—with the majority of North
American countries, thus North American immigration is somewhat distinct. As such,
immigration reform may include something similar to the European Union’s allowance of
intern-Union work permission for EU citizens. In this scenario, citizens of North America
would able to travel and work freely throughout North America, eliminating a need for
illegal immigration within these nations and greatly reducing illegal immigration to the
United States.
In sum, by exploring the immigration-crime relationship from criminological and
socio-historical frameworks that incorporate the voices of Latino immigrants, it is clear that
the only way to reduce status-driven crime is to target immigration and immigrant-specific
policies, i.e. the criminogenic forces from which it springs. By decriminalizing immigrants,
providing amnesty, and allowing more open access to the United States, status-driven
offending and victimization would all but disappear. Furthermore, organized criminal
networks connected to illegal immigration would weaken. Together this would make
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America a safer and less violent place. Overall, putting an end to status-drive crime benefits
us all, not just Latino immigrants.
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APPENDIXES
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APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
1) Where are you from? How long have you lived in the United States? Do you have a lot of
family here [spouse, children, parents, siblings, etc.], or is most of you family in
______________? What kind of work do you do? Is this what you did in
_____________?
Age: ________

Gender: ________

Race/Ethnicity: ____________________

2) Are Latino immigrants prohibited from some “normal” activities that American citizens do
as part of their everyday life? Could you provide some examples of these? What kinds of
risks do you think many Latino immigrants take as part of their daily life? How do people
adjust to or avoid these risks? Do any of these risks involve American citizens, and if so, are
the American citizens involved aware of the risks? Can you provide some examples?
b. For example, let’s say a Latino immigrant wants to drive, but does not have a driver’s
license. What would most Latino immigrants do in this situation? What if this person
decides to drive without a license and is stopped by the police. What would most Latino
immigrants do in this situation? Might an immigrant without a driver’s license ask
someone with a driver’s license for a ride, and if so, who would they likely ask? Do you
think these scenarios are common?
c. For example, let’s say a Latino immigrant wants to get a job, but does not have legal
permission to work. What would most Latino immigrants do in this situation? Would
someone who wants to work but does not have permission look for employers that do not
care whether or not their employees have permission to work? And what if this person
was offered a job, but the paperwork for the job asked for a Social Security Number? Do
you think this happens frequently? Do you think that most Latino immigrants without
legal permission to work find work easily?
d. For example, what would most Latino immigrants do if they needed some form of
identification, but did not have a legally issued identification card or certificate? Let’s say
a Latino immigrant wanted to get false identification documents. How would he or she
acquire these? Do you think this happens often?
3. I’m curious to see if you think there are people who make money off of immigration or
immigrants, or if there are people who make money providing certain goods or services to
immigrants. If you do think people make money off of immigration, do you think the goods
or services they provide are worth the cost? Are there some cases where people make money
off of immigration without providing anything to those they charge money? Let’s start with
the Border region. Do you think there are people along the Border who make money
providing goods or services to immigrants? What are your thoughts on this? Could you give
me some examples? How about once Latino immigrants are living in the United States?

191

a. For example, if someone wants to enter the U.S. from Mexico, what kinds of people might
they deal with? How might one find a way enter the U.S. and who would they need to talk
to or pay? What goods or services would a Latino immigrant who wants to cross enter the
U.S. need before entering? Do you think this is common?
b. For example, let’s say a Latino immigrant wants to enter the U.S. without permission.
Could this person bribe police, Border Patrol agents, or American citizens to help them
enter the U.S.? Do you think this is common?
4. I’m interested to know if you think the police or government employees, employers,
service-providers (like lawyers), or average Americans treat Latino immigrants differently
than American citizens? In what way? Why do you think this is?
5. Do you feel that some people take advantage of Latino immigrants because they are
immigrants? Can you think of some examples? Do you think that some people
purposefully harm or abuse Latino immigrants because they are immigrants? Can you
explain your thoughts?
6. In general, do you think Latino immigrants are taken advantage of by people they do not
know, people they live near or work with, or people they know (family, friends, significant
others, etc.)?
a. For example, do you think it is common for employers to treat Latino immigrant workers
differently than non-immigrant workers? How so? Might Latino immigrants be paid less
than American citizens? Might Latino immigrants work in jobs with unsafe or unfair
working conditions? What might Latino immigrants do if faced with this situation?
b. For example, do you think it is common for lawyers, notaries, or translators/interpreters to
give Latino immigrants incorrect information, have them fill out unnecessary applications,
or charge them unfair fees? Is it common for these service providers to charge for services
and then not provide any services? What might Latino immigrants do if faced with this
situation?
c. For example, do you think it is common for police or other law enforcement agents (like
Border Patrol or ICE), to: (1) fail to provide services to Latino immigrants, (2) to
discriminate against Latino immigrants (e.g. racial profiling), or (3) to deny them their
rights? Do you think it is common for law enforcement agents to threaten, physically or
sexually abuse, or extort money from Latino immigrants?
d. What about people who work in corrections - including prisons, jails, and detention centers
-or who work for the court -like judges and lawyers? Do you think that any of these
people treat Latino immigrants differently than American citizens? How so? Why do you
think this is?
e. For example, do you think that being a Latino immigrant can negatively affect someone’s
personal relationships? How so? I’d like to use a scenario here. Let’s say a Latina
immigrant is in a relationship with an American citizen who threatens her about her
immigration status. How might she react? Where might she go for support? Do you think
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it is common for partners to harm their significant other and make threats about their
immigration status?
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APPENDIX B – GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Agringar -to become “gringoized” or like a gringo (see gringo)
The Border –the region expanding several hundred miles into the United States and Mexico
along both sides of the politically-defined U.S.-Mexico country border
Bracero Program -a guest-worker agreement between the U.S. and Mexico from 1943 to
1964 -facilitated legal access for hundreds of thousands of Mexican migrant laborers
Circumstantial Offense -offense linked to the undocumented immigrant’s immigration status,
such as hiring an undocumented worker or giving a ride to an undocumented immigrant
Community Organizer -someone who works with the community to support the community,
typically as part of a social organization, community group, or workers’ center
Criminalization -the process of making or treating 1) a person or group of persons, 2) an item
or object, or 3) an act criminal, either in legal or social discourse
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) -branch of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security that
is responsible for monitoring and controlling the flow of goods and people into and out of the
United States
Decriminalization -the process of ceasing to treat 1) a person or group of persons, 2) an item
or object, or 3) an act as criminal, either in legal or social discourse
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Due Process Offense -illegal activity that violates the rights of undocumented individuals,
such as racial profiling, illegal search and seizure, failure to inform individuals of their rights,
denying one the right to legal council, etc.
Gringo -slang Spanish word for an American or white person; may be mildly offensive or
derogatory depending on the context
Guestworker -a non-native migrant worker with legal authorization to work in United States
as recognized by the granting of a temporary work visa; among these are H-2A visas
(agricultural), H-2B visas (nonagricultural), and H-1B visas (skilled), which require
guestworkers to return to their country of origin if they: quit their job, are laid off, or are fired
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) -the 1986 act created a distinction between
agricultural (H-2A visa) and nonagricultural (H-2B visa) guestworkers, as well as granted
legal status to approximately 2 million undocumented immigrants present in the United
States at that time
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) -1996 Act that
drastically changed the climate of immigration, reclassifying many minor offenses like drunk
driving and simple assault as aggravated felonies and created legal bars that deny visas of
any kind to immigrants who have been caught in the U.S. without authorization
Secure Communities Initiative -Immigration and Custom Enforcement’s (ICE) initiative that
facilitates immigration-police collaboration, permits law enforcement to dodge due process
rights and interrogate individuals about their immigration status at traffic stops or while in
police custody
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) -prior to the creation of the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security, the government organization responsible for all immigration-related
matters
Indigena -Spanish for indigenous, referring to people of indigenous or native descent who
may or may not speak an indigenous language or uphold indigenous cultural traditions
Key Community Informant -someone who serves as the gatekeeper to a community,
granting access to people of said community to outsiders; someone who is very
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knowledgeable about a specific community and is usually considered a member of said
community by the community
Minutemen -vigilante group along the U.S.-Mexico border that claims to enforce
immigration and border policies and support Customs and Border Patrol agents
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) -1994 agreement between Canada, the
United States, and Mexico that liberalized trade policy between the three nations and
included both environmental and labor rights side agreements
Non-Citizen -in the United States, a person without citizenship who may have one of many
immigration statuses and be present lawfully -with a Visa or Permanent Resident status -or
unlawfully -including having once been granted lawful entry to the U.S. or having never been
granted lawful entry to the U.S.
Opportunity Offenses -service-related illegal activities that are economically motivated
and stem from market opportunities linked to unauthorized immigration
Participatory Research -studies in which those being studied play a major role in
developing and carrying out said study
Permanent Resident -a person who has been granted lawful permission to reside for an
indefinite amount of time in the United States, and who could qualify for U.S. citizenship by
meeting various criteria
Predatory Offense - illegal action, like fraud or assault, that specifically targets
undocumented immigrants due to their perceived and actual vulnerability, as well as the idea
that they are less likely to report crimes to the police
Proposition 187 -1994 California proposition that included denying public education and
other social services to undocumented immigrants
Snowball Sampling -technique for acquiring participants in which the researcher asks
each participant to recommend potential participants they are aware of, creating a
participant pool that resembles a web
Status Offense -behaviors that are not viewed as inherently wrong or illegal, but are merely
unacceptable or restricted for specified groups; examples include prohibitions on underage
smoking or drinking
Unauthorized Immigration -commonly referred to as illegal immigration
Undocumented Immigrant -commonly referred to as an illegal immigrant, although the
technical term is “illegal alien”
Visa Waiver Program (VWP) -grants residents of 36 countries (all but Singapore and
South Korea being European) exemption from obtaining a visa before travel to the U.S.
as long as their stay is less than 90 days
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